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Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First
Amendment Challenge
CAROL RICE ANDREWS*
This Article examines whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment
overrides a variety of court rules and other laws that potentially limit a
plaintiffs access to court based on his or her motive alone. It is a continuation
ofProfessorAndrews' earlier article in this Law Journal in which she examined
the Petition Clause generally and concluded that the clause protects a limited
right of court access. In this Article, Professor Andrews takes the analysis one
step further and conducts herfirst case study of the Petition Clause right of court
access. She tests the vast array of laws, ranging from court rules to civil rights
statutes, that preclude or punish a plaintifffor filing an otherwise meritorious
civil suit for an improper motive. Professor Andrews concludes that most such
rules run afoul of the Petition Clause
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil litigants have a 'new" constitutional right of court access. It is part of
the First Amendment right to petition the government. 1 Though this right may
come as a surprise to many legal analysts, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized an individual's right of court access under the Petition Clause for
thirty years, albeit in the unusual settings of antitrust and labor litigation.2 Other
courts3 and legal scholars4 have begun to apply the principle more broadly, but
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. I would like to
thank Dean Ken Randall, the University of Alabama School of Law Foundation, and
particularly the William H. Sadler Fund for their generous financial support. I also gratefully
acknowledge the continuing support and input from the faculty and students at the University
of Alabama School of Law.
I The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the f-eedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and topetition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
2 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
49, 60-61 (1993) (concluding that objectively reasonable lawsuits are immune from antitrust
liability); Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1983) (holding that the
"filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor
practice" under the National Labor Relations Act); California Motor Transp. v. Trcking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (stating that the "right of access to courts is indeed but
one aspect of the right to petition" and limits application of the antitrust laws).
3 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Petition Clause protects
access to court and thus limits common law torts, such as abuse of process and interference
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this new right of court access remains ill-defined and needs thoughtful
consideration. This Article is the second in a series in which I offer my analysis
of the right to petition courts. I conclude that the Petition Clause invalidates, or at
least limits, the diverse set of laws, ranging from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 to the civil rights statutes, that potentially penalize plaintiffs for having
improper motives in bringing a civil suit.
In my previous Article that was published in this Law Journal, I generally
assessed the right of court access under the Petition Clause.5 I first examined
whether the right to petition properly extends to courts at all. I explored the
language, history, policies, and recent interpretations of the Petition Clause and
concluded that the Petition Clause includes a right of court access. I then
attempted to define the parameters of the right This was the most difficult and
controversial aspect of my work. I proposed that the right to petition courts is a
narrow right: the right of an individual or group only to file winning civil claims
that are within the particular court's jurisdiction. Finally, I proposed how courts
with contractual relations, that might otherwise impose liability based solely on a plaintiff's
filing suit. See Cove Road Development v. Western Cranston Indus. Parks Assoc., 674 A.2d
1234, 1237-38 (R.I. 1996). For more cases applying the right to petition courts see infra notes
59-64.
4 See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899
(1997) (arguing that the Petition Clause overrides the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
protects the right to pursue claims against the government); see also Kara Shea, San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni: The Public Concern Criteria and the Scope of the Modern Petition Right, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1697 (1995) (arguing that retaliatory discharge claims based on the Petition
Clause right of court access requires independent analysis from retaliation claims based on
speech); Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Amendment Implications of Professional Real Estate
Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199 (1994) (questioning whether the Supreme Court's
recent interpretation of the right to petition also applies to and limits procedural laws such as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the tort of abuse of process, and section 1927 of the
Federal Judiciary Code); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGs CONST.
L.Q. 15, 58-64 (1993) (arguing that the Petition Clause as applied to courts invalidates the
reasonable inquiry prong of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b)); David Franildin, Comment,
Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties? The Legality of State Court Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing
Act, 63 U. Cme. L. REV. 1607 (1996) (addressing the extent to which the Petition Clause limits
application of the Fair Housing Act to the filing of civil suits for a discriminatory aim); Note, A
Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions,
106 HARV. L. REV. 111 (1993) [hereinafter Suits Against the Government] (arguing that suits
against the government are "double' petitions deserving of heightened protection under the
Petition Clause and requiring relaxation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11).
5 See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the
First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 557 (1999).
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might protect this right, principally by borrowing First Amendment speech
standards, such as the strict scrutiny and breathing room doctrines. I predicted
that such protection likely would have the effect of broadening the right: For
example, a court rule likely could not bar the filing of meritorious claims because
such a rule would unduly chill access to file winning claims.
This and future articles apply my proposed Petition Clause analysis to test
specific laws that touch on court access. This, my first case study, examines laws
that restrict the motives with which a plaintiff may file a civil suit.6 Many of
these laws aim to deter frivolous suits, but they are indifferent to the merits of the
claim and may even bar winning claims. Some, such as court rules, are obvious
in their limitation on court access, but others, such as the federal
antidiscrimination laws, are indirect motive restrictions on court access. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's two principal decisions in which it recognized a right to
petition courts involved laws that on their face did not purport to regulate court
access, but nevertheless would have penalized plaintiffs who had the wrong
motive in filing suit In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., the Court narrowly construed the antitrust laws so that
they could not attach to the filing of an otherwise meritorious civil suit even
though the plaintiffs actions otherwise qualified as an antitrust violation (i.e., the
plaintiff had an anticompetitive intent in filing the claim and the litigation
actually caused injury to competition).7 In Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB,
the Court similarly narrowed the National Labor Relations Act and held that an
employer who retaliates against striking employees by suing them for
defamation could not be held liable for that act of retaliation if the employer
prevails on the defamation claim.8 In both cases, the Court recognized that the
filing of a civil suit was a form of petitioning activity and was protected from
liability so long as the plaintiff's original complaint met the requisite standard for
6 "Motive" can have different meanings in varying contexts. Unless I otherwise state, I
use the term in this Article in a broad sense, to include the plaintiff's purpose, aim, feelings,
and intent However, I do not use the term to mean the plaintiff's awareness of other factors. In
other words, I distinguish between a standard that regulates how much a plaintiff knows about
the merits of his claim (an awareness standard) from one that turns on his purpose in filing the
suit (a motive standard). A plaintiff could file the suit for a malicious motive (e.g., to ruin the
defendant financially) and violate a motive restriction, yet believe that the suit has merit and
thus complies with an awareness standard. Likewise, he could violate an awareness standard by
recklessly disregarding that his claim has no merit but comply with a motive restriction because
he had no "bad" purpose in filing suit For further discussion of the different types and uses of
"motive," see infra Part IV.
7 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
8 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
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factual and legal merit.9 This protection applied regardless of the plaintiff's
anticompetitive or retaliatory motive. 10
In this Article, I further explore whether the Petition Clause should limit
these and other restrictions against filing suit for a "bad" purpose.1 I1 start in Part
II by describing the general parameters of the right to petition courts, as I
examined in detail in my previous article. I recount the evolution, modem
recognition, and scope of the right I also outline briefly the standards that I
propose should test and protect the right of court access.
In Part 1.1, I survey the history and current array of laws that potentially
restrict a plaintiff's access based solely on his or her motive in filing suit. In
addition to the antitrust and labor laws already identified by the Court, laws such
as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the tort of abuse of process, professional
rules of conduct for lawyers, civil rights laws, and obstruction of government
statutes all potentially serve to punish a plaintiff based on ill motive alone. The
best example is Rule 11(b), which sanctions a plaintiff, a plaintiff's lawyer, or
both, if they filed a civil suit in federal court for "any improper purpose."'12
In Part IV, I generally assess whether the Petition Clause properly should
invalidate or limit laws such as Rule 11. I take a closer look at the Court's
precedent with regard to the motive and the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms, including the right to petition courts, and conclude that the Court
likely would invalidate laws that restrict court access based solely on motive. I
also independently apply strict scrutiny and breathing room analysis and
conclude that most motive restrictions impermissibly infringe the First
Amendment right of court access. I conclude, in Part V, by outlining the changes
necessary to bring the current laws into compliance with the First Amendment.
HI. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO PETITION COURTS
Analysis of motive restrictions on filing suit requires a working definition of
9 See ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60-61; Bill Johnson Restaurants,
461 U.S. at 745.10 See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60-61; Bill Johnson Restaurants,
461 U.S. at 741, 743.
11 In another article, I focus exclusively on the motive restrictions in the professional rules
of conduct for lawyers. There, I repeat much of the analysis of this Article, but I also address
issues unique to professional rules and look at all professional motive restrictions applicable to
civil litigation, not just those limiting the filing of the initial claim. Carol Rice Andrews, The
First Amendment Problem with the Motive Restrictions in the Rules of Professional Conduct, J.
LEGAL PROFESSION (forthcoming Spring 2000). (on file with author).
12 For the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(1) see infra text accompanying note 152.
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the Petition Clause right of court access. That was the point of my previous
article: assess the general validity and scope of the right to petition courts. I recap
that analysis briefly in the four sections of this Part. First, I highlight the
historical, textual, and policy bases for extending the right to petition to the
courts. Second, I survey the judicial and academic development of the right.
Third, I explain the key elements of my definition of the right-that it protects
only the ability to file winning claims. In the final part, I briefly explain the basic
standards by which courts should protect that right.
A. The Historical, Textual, and Policy Bases for Applying the Right to
Petition to the Courts
The Anglo-American right to petition dates back to at least 1215, when King
John in the Magna Carta agreed to a procedure by which barons could petition
for redress if the King or the King's ministers breached other commitments in
the Magna Carta.13 By the time that England was colonizing America, the right
had become part of the "fabric" of English constitutional law and had evolved
into a right possessed by every English subject, not just the barons.14 The right to
petition was one of the few individual freedoms stated in the 1685 English Bill of
Rights which guaranteed the "right of the subjects to petition the king" and
provided "that for redress of all grievances... parliaments ought to held
frequently."' 5
In the American colonies, English colonists retained the rights of English
subjects and thus could petition the government in England.16 Colonists also
regularly petitioned their local colonial governments. 17 When the colonies
13 See 1215 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61, translated and reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA
CARTA 333-35 (1965) (stating that 'if we or... any of our servants offend against anyone in
any way... four barons shall come to us or our justices, if we are out of the kingdom, and shall
bring it to our notice and ask that we have it redressed without delay").
14 See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestegal Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2169 (1998). Professor Mark notes that the right
to petition traditionally belonged to all persons, not just enfranchised citizens. See id. at 2155-
87.
15 BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in I BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOcuMENTARY HisroR 43 (1971).
16 Colonial charters typically granted colonists the "iberties of an Englishman." For a
description of such charters and their relationship to the right to petition, see Don L. Smith, The
Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations
10-45 (1971) (unpublished dissertation in Government, Texas Tech University) (on file with
author).
17 Some colonial charters expressly preserved the right to petition the local government.
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declared independence and formed their own state constitutions, many new states
specifically preserved the right to petition. 18 Maryland, for example, declared
that "every man hath a right to petition the Legislature, for the redress of
grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner." 19
How, if at all, did this right of petition apply to the courts? At the time of
American independence, the written statements of the right to petition referred to
the King or the legislature but did not mention the courts. In fact, Sir William
Blackstone, the English legal historian, in 1765 described the right to judicial
relief as a right separate from the right to petition.20 Likewise, many early state
constitutions separately preserved the right to judicial relief, in clauses that are
today termed "remedy clauses." 21 But this did not mean that the right to petition
was distinct from the ability to seek private redress. Indeed, petitions to the
legislature often included claims for resolution of private disputes.
In 1776, the concept of separation of powers was not as it is today. The
legislature was the branch closest to the people, and the people turned to that
branch when they needed help. That assistance often took the form of private
relief. Both the English Parliament and the colonial legislatures took on the role
of courts and regularly decided private disputes.2 2 This was true even in the
See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSEttS BODY OF LIBERTIEs (1641), reprinted in I SCHVARTZ, supra
note 15, at 73 (stating that "[e]very man ... shall have libertie to come to any publique Court,
Councel or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing,... to present any necessary
motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information") (spelling as in original).
18 For a complete listing and reproduction of the early state constitutional statements of
the right to petition, see Andrews, supra note 5, at n.159.
19 MARYIAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. X (1776), reprinted in I SCHNVARTZ, supra
note 15, at 281.
20 See 3 WILjAM BLACKSTONE, CO mETARiES *136-39.
21 For example, Maryland had both a petition clause, see supra note 17, and a "remedy"
clause, which stated:
That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to have
remedy, by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of
the land.
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVII (1776), reprinted in I SCHWARTZ, supra note
15, at 281. For a complete listing and reproduction of the early state constitutional remedy
clauses, see Andrews, supra note 5, at n.166.
22 Gordon Wood, in his seminal work, The Creation of the American Republic, explained
the practice of the American colonial legislatures acting as courts:
]he assemblies in the eighteenth century... saw themselves, perhaps even more so than
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postrevolution American state governments that had expressly declared a
separation of powers in their constitutions.2 3 Indeed, both James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson complained that the Virginia legislature habitually decided
disputes and encroached upon the judicial function despite Virginia's
constitutional mandate of separated powers.2 4 Thus, at the time of American
independence, the right to petition included the right to ask for relief of a judicial
nature even if that relief was granted by the legislative branch.
Political thinking about the proper distribution of governmental powers,
however, was changing. The drafting of the Petition Clause reflects that
evolution. The state model of government, and hence a person's right to petition
that form of government, was one in which the legislature was supreme. When
James Madison proposed the first version of the amendments to the federal
Constitution that would later become the Bill of Rights, he followed the state
example and stated the right to petition only in terms of the legislature.25
the House of Commons, as a kind of medieval court making private judgments as well as
public law. Because the courts themselves were so involved in governmental and
administrative duties, it was inevitable that the line between what was political and what
was judicatory would be blurred.... Although there is some evidence that by the mid-
eighteenth century the distinction between legislative and judicial function was beginning
to harden, the assemblies continued to exercise what we would call essentially judicial
responsibilities, largely, it appears, because of the political nature of the court system, the
fear of royally controlled judges, the dislike of gubernatorial chanceryjurisdiction, and the
scarcity of trained judges. The assemblies constantly heard private petitions, which often
were only the complaints of one individual or group against another, and made final
judgments on these complaints. They continually tried cases in equity.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 154-55
(1969). See also JAMES S. HART, JUSTICE UPON PETITON: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND TmE
REFORMATION OF JUSTICE 3 (1991) (describing the judicial practices of the House of Lords in
the seventeenth century).
23 Six of the original thirteen states--Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia--expressly declared a separation of powers in their
constitutions. For a listing and reproduction of these provisions, see Andrews, supra note 5, at
n.170.
24 In the Federalist Papers, James Madison cited Thomas Jefferson's observations and
stated that the Virginia legislature "in many instances, decided rights which should have been
left tojudiciay controversy' and that the intrusion was "becoming habitual andfamiliar." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 62 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in original)
(quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (Lester DeKoster ed.,
1976)).
25 James Madison proposed the following statement of the right to petition: "The people
shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor
from applying to the Legislature by petition, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances."
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 1026.
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However, just as the structure of government changed with the new federal
Constitution, the formulation of the right to petition also evolved.
The Constitution authorizes a federal government of only limited powers
with the courts alone having the judicial power.26 Thus, Madison's proposed first
draft of the Petition Clause, which envisioned only petitions to the federal
legislature, would not have included the right to ask for judicial relief. To include
the right to ask for judicial relief, the right to petition had to extend to all three
branches of the government. This is exactly what the first Congress did. The
House Select Committee, charged with reviewing Madison's proposed
amendments, broke away from the state model of petition right and broadened
Madison's language to include the right to petition the entire "government." 27
That broadened right to petition remained in the version approved by the first
Congress and ratified by the states as part of the First Amendment.28
The actual reason for this change may never be known,2 9 but it reasonably
26 Article III states that "[t]hejudicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). Congress, on the other hand, received
under Article I only "legislativepowers." Id at art. I, § I (emphasis added).
27 On July 21, 1789, the House of Representatives appointed a Select Committee, that
included James Madison, to review Madison's proposed amendments. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 15, 1050-55. One week later, the Select Committee reported back to the House with a
modified version of Madison's proposal. See id. The Select Committee proposed the following
Petition Clause: 'The freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and consult for their common good, and to apply to the government for
redress of grievances shall not be infringed.' House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789),
reprinted in id. at 1122.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The House approved the proposed amendment on August 24,
1789. House Journal, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 1138. The Senate modified
slightly the House version, and, among other things, replaced "apply" with "petition." Senate
Journal (Aug.-Sept. 1789), reprinted in id. at 1148. This chbnge is consistent with a judicial
application of the right to petition; some initial civil pleadings are today still termed "petitions.'
See BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1145-46 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 'petition" as a "formal
written application to a court requesting judicial action of a certain matter" and a "recital of
facts which give rise to a cause of action").
29 Existing records do not reflect any debate or discussion of the broadened language. No
records exist at all regarding the deliberation of the House Select Committee or of the Senate. 2
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 1145. The House Journal records some debate touching upon the
Petition Clause, but this debate centered on whether to delete the statement of the right to
assemble and to add a right to instruct legislators. House Debates (July-Aug. 1789), reprinted
in id. at 1089-1105. These debates give us some insight as to other aspects of the right to
petition but not as to whether the right extends to the courts. See Andrews, supra note 5, at
630-33, 636-39 (discussing the House debates and their significance as to the meaning of the
petition right).
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may be read as reflecting the new distribution of power among all three branches
of the federal government. The framers were mindful of the distinction between
the "legislature" and the "government." The original federal constitution uses the
term "the government" only three times and does so in reference to the entire
government of the United States, not just selected branches.30 Furthermore, in
drafting the proposed amendments, the Select Committee was careful in its use
of the term "government" and distinguished between the "government" and its
individual branches.31 Thus, the text of the federal Constitution, especially the
Petition Clause itself, suggests that the new right to petition "the government"
extends to the entire government, including the judiciary.
The policies of the Petition Clause also support application of the petition
right to the courts. The Petition Clause shares many of the same policies as the
Speech Clause. The right to petition is similar to the right of free speech in that it
is a means by which the people may "communicate their will" to their
30 Article I grants Congress power over the District for the"Seat ofthe Government ofthe
United States," and Article IV guarantees to "every State" a "Republican Form of
Government" U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 17 & art. IV, § 4. Most significant is the "Necessary
and Proper Clause," in Article I, which gives Congress the power to 'make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [given in
Article I to Congress], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States . . . ." Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For a further discussion of the meaning and use
of the term "government," see Pfander, supra note 4, at 956-57.
31 For example, the Select Committee proposed the following separation of powers
amendment:
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the government of the United States, shall be
exercised as therein appropriated, so that the legislature shall never exercise the powers
vested in the executive or the judicial; nor the executive the powers vested in the
legislative or judicial; nor the judicial the powers vested in the legislative or executive.
House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at
1123. The Senate ultimately rejected this proposed amendment, but this rejection does not
necessitate a narrow reading of the Petition Clause. See id at 1145-46. Some members of the
first Congress viewed the amendment as unnecessary because the Constitution already
separated the three branches of government through its scheme of limited and enumerated
powers. See House Debates (Aug. 18, 1789), reprinted in id at 1117 ("Mr. Sherman conceived
this [separation of powers] amendment to be altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as the
constitution assigned the business of each branch of the government to a separate
department"). More importantly, even if the first Congress believed that Congress could
exercise judicial powers, that belief does not undercut application of the right to petition all
three branches. Only the converse result-adoption of a separation of powers amendment and
revision of the right to petition to extend only to Congress-would mandate a narrow reading
of the Petition Clause.
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government, 32 but the petition right protects a particular type of
communication-requests to the government for a redress of grievances. By
separately preserving this right, the Petition Clause helps to give persons a sense
of participation in their government, to better inform the government and to
provide the opportunity for a peaceful settlement of disputes, advancement of the
law, and correction of social problems.
These aims of the Petition Clause are served not just by petitions to Congress
or to the executive, but also by application to the courts. Indeed, the courts are
the official mechanism for dispute resolution. Courts achieve the other aims by
allowing people in civil complaints to inform the government of their needs and
to request change in the law. In some circumstances, civil suits are the only
practical means to achieve change and correct social ills. 33 In sum, application of
the right to petition to the judiciary may well be a novel concept to some legal
observers, but it has support in the history, text, and policies of the Petition
Clause.
B. Modern Recognition and Application of the Right to Petition Courts
The Supreme Court seemingly agrees that the Petition Clause protects access
to court. The Court's first recognition that litigation is a form of petitioning
activity came more than thirty years ago, in a line of cases in which it held that
organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and labor unions, have a First Amendment right to organize
and advocate litigation by their members.34 The Court relied principally on the
right of association, but it also cited the right to petition. The most direct
32 James Madison explained how the Speech, Press, and Petition Clauses together
protected the people's right to inform their government of their sentiment:
The right of freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared to
be beyond the reach of this government the people may therefore publicly address their
representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiment by petition to the
whole body, in all these ways they may communicate their will.
House Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in id at 1096.
33 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,430 (1963) (arguing that "litigation may well be
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress ofgrievances").
34 In these cases, states applied a number of laws, primarily those banning solicitation of
litigation and the unauthorized practice of law, to try to stop the group sponsorship of litigation.
The seminal case was NAACP v. Button, in which the Court held that the First Amendment
protected the NAACP's efforts to organize litigation to challenge school segregation. See id. at
428-29, 443-44. See infra notes 425-27; see also Andrews, supra note 5, at 571-76
(discussing the right of court access under the group litigation cases).
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statement came in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar,35 in which Virginia tried to enjoin the union from advising its
members about claims under the Federal Employer's Liability Act: "Ihe State
can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one
another than it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting to the
courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so
handicapped."36
This pronouncement of a right to petition courts did not prompt widespread
recognition or application of the right Legal analysts, and even the Court itself,
supposed that this new doctrine applied only where other First Amendment
rights were implicated, particularly the freedom to assemble.3 7 This narrow
reading is not surprising given that the Court at the same time was rejecting
claims that due process conferred a broad right of court access to individuals.38
In a series of cases in the early 1970s, indigent plaintiffs charged that filing fees
barred their access to court and violated due process. The Court held that
plaintiffs had no due process right of initial court access except in extraordinary
circumstances, where courts are the only means to resolve the dispute and the
matter is one of fundamental importance.39 Thus, an indigent divorce petitioner
has a due process right of court access because marriage is a fundamental right
and because judicial decree is the only means by which to obtain a legal
35 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
3 6 Id at 7 (emphasis added).
3 7 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985)
(noting a "conceptual difficulty" in applying the union litigation cases to an individual claim
because "the First Amendment interest at stake [in the union cases] was primarily the right to
associate collectively"); Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 43-49 (interpreting the group litigation
cases as requiring the presence of a First Amendment freedom other than petitioning).
38 Also contributing to a narrow reading of the group litigation cases and of the general
right of court access was the Court's development of a separate and unique right of court access
for prisoners. See Andrews, supra note 5, at 571-76. The Court has struggled with the
constitutional basis for this new right, at times suggesting that the right comes from the Habeas
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause, and some members of the Court
question whether the prisoner doctrine has any constitutional footing at all. See Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's
declaration of a 'Tundamental right of access to the courts [for prisoners] ... is found nowhere
in the Constitution").
39 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76, 382-83 (1971) (stating that due
process typically does not protect "persons seeking access to the judicial process in the first
instance.., because ... resort to courts is not usually the only available, legitimate means of
resolving private disputes" and that judicial access may be "placed beyond the reach of any
individual" unless resort to courts 'Is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a
fundamental human relationship").
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divorce,40 but a bankruptcy petitioner41 and a person challenging an adverse
welfare determination 42 have no such right to gain access to the courts.
Recognition of an individual right of court access required further
development of the Petition Clause. This came in the unlikely setting of antitrust,
as part of the Noerr immunity doctrine. This doctrine has its roots in a 1961 case,
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.43 There, a
group of truckers brought antitrust claims against railroads that had lobbied the
governor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill beneficial to truckers. 44 The alleged
intent behind the railroads' lobbying efforts was to "destroy" the truckers.45
Nevertheless, the Court narrowly construed the Sherman Act so that it did not
apply to such lobbying activity, and in doing so, relied in part on the Petition
Clause: The "right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade
these freedoms."'46 Ten years later, in 1972, the Court in California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited47 extended Noerr antitrust immunity to
adjudication:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to
administrative agencies... and to courts, the third branch of the government.
40 See id. at 376, 383 (holding that "marriage involves interests of basic importance in our
society" and that "a State may not, consistent with the ... Due Process Clause, ... pre-empt the
right to resolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has
prescribed for doing so").
41 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973) (noting that an alleged
bankrupt's interest "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the "associational" interest
in dissolving a marriage and that "a debtor ... in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his
debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors").
42 See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam) (noting that the interest
in welfare payments "has far less constitutional significance" than divorce and that the welfare
administration hearing process was an alternate form of dispute resolution, thus rendering
access to courts nonessential).
43 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
44 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 129. The literal terms of the
Sherman Act could reach lobbying if the petitioner intended to monopolize trade or acted
collectively with others to restrain competition. See infra Part m.c.1.
45 See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 139.
46 Id. at 138. The Court also relied on the additional policy ground that political activity is
essentially different from the commercial activity that the Sherman Act was meant to regulate.
See id. at 137-38; see also generally David McGowan & Mark Lemeley, Antitrust Immunity:
State Action and Federalism, Petition and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
293 (1994).
47 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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Certainly, the right to petition extends to all departments of the government The
right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right ofpetition.48
In 1983, the Court gave further meaning to the doctrine in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants v. NLRB4 9 There, a single employer sued picketing waitresses for
allegedly defamatory statements in their pamphlets. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found that the employer had brought the claim in
retaliation for the workers' picketing and enjoined the employer's suit as a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).50 A unanimous Court
reversed, by narrowly interpreting the NLRA, and as in Noerr, by relying in part
upon the Petition Clause:
In California Motor Transport... we recognized that the right of access to the
courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition .... "The right of
access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on
the ground that what is sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a
protected right [under the NLRA]." 5 1
As long as the employer's suit met the requisite standard of merit,52 the
NLRB could not interfere with the employer's right of access to court. Thus, the
Court opened the door to a universal right of court access by applying petitioning
immunity to a single plaintiff in a "non-political"53 case outside of antitrust.
48 Id. at 510 (emphasis added). The California Motor Transport pronouncement was
dictum in that the Court ultimately held that the defendants' adjudication efforts were a "sham"
(i.e., baseless claims) and therefore not protected petitioning. See id- at 510, 513; see also infra
notes 56, 81-86, 383-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's "sham" exception to
antitrust petitioning immunity).
49 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
50 The NLRA, like the Sherman Act, is broad enough to attach to civil court filings if
done with the requisite intent and resultant harm. See infra Part I.C.2.
51 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 741 (citations omitted); see also id. at 742-43
("[c]onsidering the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the state interests... we
conclude that.... [t]he filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined
as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's
desire to retaliate"). Justice Brennan joined in the judgment and wrote a concurring opinion,
but he agreed that the Petition Clause extended to the courts and that the narrow interpretation
of the NLRA had "constitutional resonances." Id at 751-52 (Brennan, J., concurring). See
infra notes 83-87, 398-403 for a more detailed discussion of Bill Johnson's Restaurants v.
NLRB.
52 See infra notes 81-86,389-403 (discussing the merit standard)
53 Some courts and commentators previously had narrowly interpreted the right to
petition courts to apply only to political cases. See Grip-Pak v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694
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In the fifteen years since Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court has
reaffirmed three times the First Amendment right to petition courts. Two
statements were dicta.54 The third and most influential statement of the right
came in 1993, in another antitrust case. In Professional Real Estate Investors,
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,55 the Court clarified its holding in
California Motor Transport that certain "sham" litigation is not protected by
Noerr petitioning immunity.56 The Court in Professional Real Estate Investors
held that, in order to constitute a "sham," and thus fall outside of Noerr
petitioning immunity, litigation must be both objectively unreasonable and made
in subjective bad faith.57 If the claim is objectively reasonable, motive is
irrelevant, the claim is not a sham, and its filing is immune from antitrust
liability.58
It was this clear definition of the Noerr immunity as applied to litigation that
apparently spurred recognition of the right to petition courts outside of antitrust
and labor suits. Though wider application of the immunity already had begun in
related fields, such as state antitrust, unfair trade, and other business tort
litigation,59 many courts read Professional Real Estate Investors as a
F.2d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting "that the extent of protection is invariant to the nature
of the lawsuit' and suggesting that political litigation is entitled to added protection over that
extended to litigation between competitors).
54 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,484 (1985) ("[F]iling of a complaint is a form
of petitioning activity."); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984) ("The First
Amendment right protected in Bill Johnson's Restaurants is plainly a 'right of access to the
courts ... for redress of alleged wrongs.'").
55 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
56 See id. In Noerr, the Court limited petitioning immunity by allowing certain "sham"
lobbying activity to be subject to antitrust liability. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). California Motor Transport carried the
sham exception over to judicial petitions, but its definition of sham litigation prompted
considerable confusion. See infra notes 81-86, 383-97 and accompanying text (discussing this
confusion and the sham exception).
57 See Professional Real Estate In vestors, 508 U.S. at 57.
58 See id. at 60 ("Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court
examine the litigant's subjective motivation."). See infra notes 82-89, 391-403 (discussing
Professional Real Estate Investors in more detail).
59 See McGuire Oil Co. v. MAPCO, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (applying
California Motor Transport and Bill Johnson's Restaurants and holding that the Alabama
Unfair Trade Practices Act cannot be premised on civil litigation); Suburban Restoration Co. v.
ACMAT Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting in dicta that the Petition Clause
prevented plaintiffs from basing the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and tort of
interference claims on previous civil filings); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 625 F. Supp.
800, 804-05 (D. Minn. 1986) (relying on California Motor Transport to dismiss a tortious
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constitutional protection applicable in all contexts.60 Thus, state and lower
federal courts have recognized that the Petition Clause limits some applications
of the tort of abuse of process, 61 selected fee-shifting statutes, 62 and state billing
interference claim premised on the filing of a civil suit); Pernwalt Corp. v. Zenith Lab., Inc.,
472 F. Supp. 413, 424 (ED. Mich. 1979) (applying California Motor Transport to dismiss
counterclaims that alleged that a primary trademark suit constituted tortious interference and
abuse of process); see also C. DOUGLAS FLOYD & E. THOMAS SULLiVAN, PRivATE ANTrrUST
ACTIONS: THE STRUCUWRE AND PROCESS OF CIVIL ANfRUsT LMGATION, § 4.4.17, at 582-84
& n.232 (1996) (collecting cases applying Noerr immunity for lobbying efforts to state
business tort claims and concluding that "[t]his result appears to reflect the courts' implicit
conclusion either that Noerr ... is ultimately grounded in the First Amendment or, by analogy
to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Noerr, that state tort law was not intended to govern
essentially political activities").
60 See, e.g., Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 182 F3d 1132, 1135
(10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "because it emanates from the First Amendment right of petition,
Noerr-Pennington immunity stands independent of its aborigine roots in antitrust") (citations
omitted); Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1997) ("It is well established that
all persons enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts, although the source of this right
has been variously located in the First Amendment right to petition for redress, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.... and the Due Process Clause... :); San Filippo, Jr. v.
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434-35 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the filing of
'lawsuits ... implicate[s] the petition clause.., of the first amendment"); Lyon v. Vande Krol,
940 F. Supp. 1433, 1437-38 (SD. Iowa 1996) (recognizing a fundamental right of court access
under the right to petition); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 955-56 (SD.
Cal. 1996) (applying Noerr-Pennington to state law claims attacking the filing of a patent suit
"[tlhe majority of courts who have considered the issue have concluded that the immunity is
constitutional and rooted in the First Amendment right to petition."); Armuchee Alliance v.
King, 922 F. Supp. 1541, 1549 (ND. Ga. 1996) ("It is well-established that 'the right of access
to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress
of grievances."'); Scioto County Reg'l Water Dist. No. 1 v. Scioto Water, Inc., 916 F. Supp.
692, 702 (S.D. Ohio 1995) ("This Court agrees that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not
limited in application to antitrust claims. The doctrine is grounded on the First Amendment
principle that an individual or entity has the right to pursue legitimate efforts to influence
government decision-making and to approach the courts in order to obtain redress of
grievances."); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. American Fundware, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516,
1522 (D. Colo. 1993) ("Despite the lack of reasoned authority on this question, there are
numerous federal, district and state court cases in which the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has
been applied to non-antitrust claims.... These courts recognize that, while the doctrine arose in
connection with antitrust cases, it is fundamentally based on First Amendment principles.").
61 See, eg., Proportion Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., No. 94-1426, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
25871, at *5-8 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1995) (relying on Professional Real Estate Investors and
remanding for specific finding as to whether the main claim was objectively baseless before
ruling on propriety of tortious interference and abuse of process claims based on the main
claim); Whelan v. Abell, 48 F3d 1247, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("As Noerr-Pennington rests
on the conclusion that the filing of claims in court or before administrative agencies is part of
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procedures. 63 The right has even wider use in civil rights litigation in which
plaintiffs affirmatively use the Petition Clause to challenge a wide array of
impediments to their access to court.64 These developments in turn have
prompted a few scholars to take notice and question other possible applications
of the right 65 In sum, a right of court access is now a recognized part of the
Petition Clause.
C. The Narrow Scope of the Right of Court Access Under the Petition
Clause
The right to petition courts is not well defined. In my previous article, I
the protected right to petition, it is hard to see any reason why, as an abstract matter, the
common law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process might not in some of their
applications be found to violate the First Amendment."); DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp.,
953 Pl.d 277, 284-85 (N.M. 1997) (recognizing a right of court access under the federal
Petition Clause and narrowly construing the tort of misuse of process).
62 The Eighth Circuit held that the Petition Clause overrode a statute that imposed all
defense costs on any plaintiff challenging a workers' compensation refund statute, regardless of
whether the plaintiff was successful. See In re Workers' Compensation Refirund, 46 F.3d 813,
822 (8th Cir. 1995).
63 See generally Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
policy of state hospitals to bill indigent patients for medical services only if and when they sued
the state violated the patients' right to petition courts).
64 See generally Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1997) (claiming that the
plaintiff was harassed and barred from court access by judge's dog); San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (claiming that the state interfered with court access
by firing university professor in retaliation for his filing suit against state university); Ryland v.
Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983) (alleging that county officers infringed on parents'
access to court to file wrongful death claim through destruction of evidence regarding murder
of plaintiffs' daughter); In re Addleman, 991 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (holding that
denial of parole, based in part on the applicant's "active history" of litigation against prison
officials, violated the applicant's Petition Clause right of court access).
65 See supra note 4 (collecting academic commentary). Not all scholarship concludes that
Noerr is a constitutional concept. See Thies K611n, Comment, Rule 11 and the Policing of
Access to the Courts After Professional Real Estate Investors, 61 U. C. L. REV. 1037, 1066-
67 (1994) (arguing that Professional Real Estate Investors should not be construed as a
constitutional mandate to override such laws as Rule 11 and the tort of abuse of process). In
addition, some courts continue to adhere to the view that the petition right of court access is
dependent on other First Amendment rights, such as association or speech. See WMX Techs.,
Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[t]he protections afforded by
the Petition Clause have been limited by the Supreme Court to situations where an individual's
associational or speech interests are also implicated"); see also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
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proposed a narrow definition of the right: The right of an individual or group to
file a winning claim within the court's jurisdiction. This is admittedly a
controversial definition, but it is one that is consistent with, if not mandated by,
existing Supreme Court precedent. Whether this definition comports with
historical notions of the petition right is a bit of a guessing game; the record is
thin even as to the existence of a right to petition courts. However, there is at
least some basis in history and policy for each of the elements of my proposed
definition of the right. Here, I recap only the two elements of my definition that
are relevant to the evaluation of motive restrictions: the right to file civil
complaints that allege winning claims.66
First, I contend that the right of court access is one of initial access only.
This means that the petition right is merely the right to file a civil complaint. It
does not affect the substantive rights of litigants or the ability of the legislature to
define, limit, or even eliminate causes of action. Nor does it govern the
procedure used by courts after the plaintiff files the complaint. This definition
arguably is mandated by Supreme Court precedent. In Minnesota State Board of
Community Colleges v. Knight,67 the Court stated that "[n]othing in the First
Amendment or in this Court's case law interpreting it suggest that the rights to
speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or
respond to individuals' communications on public issues." 68
Some scholars, however, argue that the Court is wrong and that the
government has a duty to respond.69 They rely principally upon historical
66 1 discuss the other two elements-that the ight extends both to an individual and to
groups of persons and that the right extends only to claims within the court's jurisdiction-at
length in my earlier article. See Andrews, supra note 5, Parts lI.A & III.D.
67 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
6 8 Id at 285.
69 The advocacy of a duty to respond began principally with a Note in the Yale Law
Journal by Stephen Higginson, in which he surveyed the history of colonial petitioning
practice in Connecticut and concluded, among other things, that the colonial right to petition
"was an affirmative, remedial right which required governmental hearing and response' and
that "[tlhe original design of the First Amendment petition clause ... included a governmental
duty to consider petitioners' grievances." Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the
Right to Petition Governmentfor the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE LJ. 142, 142-43 (1986).
A number of other scholars also argue that the government has some form of duty to respond
to petitions. See Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8
UCLA L. REv. 729,732-33 (1960-61); David C. Frederick, John Quincy.Adams, Slavery, and
the Disappearance of the Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 113, 114-15 (1991); Mark,
supra note 14, at 2169; Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 33-34, 49-51; Anita Hodgiss, Note,
Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 575 (1987);
Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice
Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1524-28 (1984); Note, Suits Against the Government, supra
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petitioning practice in which the government, including the first Congress,
regularly responded to citizen petitions. This argument is persuasive; a large part
of the legislative agenda in the first Congress was set by citizen petitions.7 Yet,
the matter is by no means settled. In addition to the Court's holding in Knight,71
some scholars point to contrary historical evidence and argue that the
government has no First Amendment duty to respond to petitions.72
This historical debate need not be resolved in order to define the
government's duty in response to petitions to courts. Indeed, the debate itself
suggests some meaningful conclusions about the right First, no one suggests that
the Petition Clause requires the government to grant the relief requested by
petitions. The government is free to grant or deny the request, subject only to
possible problems at the next election. The First Amendment right to petition
courts likewise should not impact the substance of the underlying request. The
government may deny the claim or limit the substantive cause of action or
remedy, free from any concerns under the First Amendment
Even as to the procedure of the response, the First Amendment should have
only a negligible, if any, impact on courts. If the view in Knight prevails, the
courts have no First Amendment duty to respond to petitioners. If the academic
critics prevail, the government may have some minimal duty to respond, but the
duty of courts already exists under other provisions of the constitution,
principally the Due Process Clauses.73 Due process requires the government to
give civil complaints fair and reasonable consideration once they are filed.74 This
note 4, at 1116-17.
7 0 See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791
(Kenneth R Bowling et. al. eds. 1998) (surveying actions on petitions presented to the first
Congress).
7 1 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
72 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidnan, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 739, 740, 743-56, 766 (1999); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging. . .":
An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Peftion, 54 U. C1N. L. REV. 1153,
1190-91 (1986). In my previous article, I too questioned the duty to respond. See Andrews,
supra note 5, at 637-41. For example, there is evidence that members of even the first
Congress viewed responses to petitions as a measure, though prudent, within their political
discretion. See House Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at
1095 (statement of Representative Gerry: "the representative will, if he thinks proper,
communicate his instructions to the House").
73 Professor Lawson and Mr. Seidman, however, argue that the duty to respond to judicial
petitions is part of the "judicial power" and thus derives from Article Ill. See Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 72 at 757-58.
74 A cause of action is a "property" interest subject to due process protection once suit is
filed. See Phillips Petroleum, Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807-08 (1985).
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duty of reasonable response probably exceeds the duty owed under the Petition
Clause.75 Petitions to courts are unique in this respect Due process does not
require the other branches of government to respond.76 Thus, there is a "fit"
between the petition and due process rights and the Court's narrow construction
of those rights, at least as applied to the courts. The Petition Clause,77 with its
attendant heightened scrutiny, protects the right to file the initial complaint, and
the Due Process Clause, with its more relaxed reasonableness standard, steps in
to govern procedure after the initial filing.7 8
Second, I propose that the absolute right to petition courts extends only to
winning claims and does not include losing claims, even those that had some
merit when filed. That I propose some form of a merits standard is not by itself
controversial. A merits standard not only makes practical sense-it frees the
courts and other parties of the burden of frivolous claims-but it also comports
with the Court's definition of both protected speech and petitions. The Court has
long held that not all speech is within the First Amendment right of speech. False
speech, for example, is not within the core right protected by the First
Amendment "freedom of speech." 79 In McDonald v. Smith,80 the Court imposed
75 Even the proponents of a duty to respond disagree as to the extent of that duty.
Compare Spanbauer, supra note 4, at 51 (stating that a "petitioner never possessed the right to
a full legislative discussion or debate of a particular petition, nor to a public forum to present
testimony relevant to a petition, nor to an investigation of a petition, nor to a detailed
explanation for the denial or rejection of a petition" and that the response due "might be
summary denial"), with Higginson, supra note 69, at 146 (arguing that the right to petition in
colonial Connecticut included a tight of hearing and consideration).
76 See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)
(holding that citizens have no due process right to be heard on matters of general concern).
77 The Speech Clause of the First Amendment also extends to the speech in the litigation
process, but, due to the unique nature of courts, the Court has given states wide latitude in
regulation of speech in the courtroom or speech related to judicial proceedings. See Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984) (noting that a litigant's First Amendment
"rights may be subordinated to other interests that arise in [the litigation] setting").
78 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (comparing the two tests: "strict
scrutiny" for First Amendment freedoms with the reasonableness test for due process). The
First Amendment "breathing room" doctrine might apply to test rules that impact procedure.
Under this theory, the rule, though not directly regulating the "core" right-initial access-
nevertheless might chill exercise of that right. In other words, a lack of fair procedure might
deter people from filing the initial claim. See Andrews, supra note 11, at Part IlB.3.b (on file
with author) (discussing this issue in more depth).
7 9 The Court balanced competing interests to determine that there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact:
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
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on petitions the same false and defamatory standards applicable to speech; in
other words, there is no absolute right to utter false speech in petitions. In Noerr
and California Motor Transport, the Court similarly imposed a "sham"
limitation on petitions.81 Sham petitions, whether executive, legislative, or
judicial, are not within the protection of the First Amendment
The problem is defining the proper merits standard for judicial petitions. The
Court in Professional Real Estate Investors defined the standard as one of
objective reasonableness, even if the claim does not prevail. 82 But the Court in
Bill Johnson's Restaurants gave civil suits less protection: Winning claims are
absolutely immune from liability under the NLRA, but losing claims, even
losing claims that had sufficient merit to withstand summary judgment, are not
protected. 83 Which test did the Court intend to be the First Amendment
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. They belong to that
category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citations omitted).
80 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
81 The definition of "sham" has prompted considerable debate and confusion, particularly
as applied to judicial filings, but at a minimum it now seems to require some form of merit
standard. See supra note 48; infra notes 383-97.
82 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; infra notes 391-403 and
accompanying text.
83 The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants gave two tests for determining whether,
depending on the status of the litigation, a suit is protected under the First Amendment. For on-
going state court litigation, the Court adopted the test for summary judgment-whether
employer's law suit presents "any genuine issues of fact." 461 U.S. 731,745 (1983). If it does,
the Board may not enjoin the suit:
When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff's First Amendment interest
in petitioning the state court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having the factual
dispute resolved by a jury, and the State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of
its citizens, leads us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp the traditional
fact-finding function of the state-court jury or judge.
Id. However, once the state claim is concluded, the test is whether the employer won or lost his
suit:
In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to proceed, if the employer's case in
the state court ultimately proves meritorious and he has judgment against the employees,
the employer should also prevail before the Board, for the filing of a meritorious law suit,
even for a retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice. If judgment goes against the
employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown to
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standard? I contend that Bill Johnson's Restaurants sets the constitutional
floor-only winning claims are within the core right of the Petition Clause.
Both cases were exercises in statutory construction, influenced only in part
by the Petition Clause. The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants was reluctant to
protect employers from liability under the NLRA because of the high risk of
abuse by a powerful employer against individual employees and because
Congress intended the NLRA to be a broad remedial statute.84 Yet, the Court
held that the Petition Clause, as well as the state interest in providing its citizens
a civil remedy for defamation, mandated at least some protection of the
employer's access to court-immunity when the employer wins its suit against
the employee.
In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court did not overrule Bill
Johnson's Restaurants but instead cited it with approval. The Court had a
different assignment in Professional Real Estate Investors: clarify the antitrust
"sham" exception. 85 The Court thus was not limited by the narrow protection in
Bill Johnson's Restaurants. It could give more protection as a matter of antitrust
be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, the interest of the State in
providing a forunm for its citizens has been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed to
adjudicate the... unfair labor practice case. The employer's suit having proved
unmeritorious, the Board would be warranted in taking that fact into account in
determining whether the suit had been filed in retaliation of the exercise of the
employees' . . . rights. If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to
reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys' fees and other
expenses.
Id at 747 (emphasis added).
841Te Court stated that "[s]ection 8(aXl) and (4) of the Act are broad remedial provisions
that guarantee that employees will be able to enjoy their rights .... "Id. at 740. The Court went on to
say that:
[B]y suing an employee who files charges with the Board or engages in other protected
activities, an employer can place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in such
conduct is subjecting himself to the possibility of a burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of
how unmeritorious the employers' suit is, the employee will most likely have to retain
counsel and incur substantial legal expenses to defend against it ... Furthermore,... the
chilling effect of a state lawsuit upon an employee's willingness to engage in protected
activity is multiplied where the complaint seeks damages in addition to injunctive
relief.... Where, as here, such a suit is filed against hourly-wage waitresses or other
individuals who lack the backing of a union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and
provide a remedy is at its greatest.
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 740-41. Section 8(aXl) and (4) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1994), are reproduced infra at note 294 and accompanying text
85 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; infira note 391 and accompanying text.
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policy, and there is a policy basis for making a distinction between the antitrust
and labor contexts. The danger of abuse is greater in the labor context, where the
typical suit is by an employer against an individual employee, than in the
antitrust context, where the dispute often is between commercial competitors.
Though there may be disparity between the competitors, it usually is not as great
as that between an employer and an individual employee. Thus, the different
standard (and greater protection) in Professional Real Estate Investors-for
losing but nonfrivolous claims-likely is a policy judgment as to the proper
reach of the federal antitrust laws.86
Although the Bill Johnson's Restaurants winning claim standard may seem
harsh, it has some basis in both history and policy. Losing suits have long borne
penalties. Courts and even legislatures historically "punished" losing claims by
assessing (sometimes substantial) cost and attorney's fees against plaintiffs who
lost their claims.87 The so-called American rule, against assessment of attorney's
fees on a losing party, is a departure from the English and colonial custom, and
even it is frequently overridden by statute as a matter of policy, to promote or
deter certain litigation conduct.88 If the constitutional standard were a different
86 Most observers do not make this distinction and assume that Professional Real Estate
Investors sets the constitutional standard. See generally supra notes 59-64 (collecting cases
and commentary). They also tend to take an all or nothing approach--he case is either a
constitutional mandate or entirely a question of antitrust law. As discussed above, however, the
question is more subtle-part of the protection in Professional Real Estate Investors is required
under the Petition Clause and the remainder is a policy choice. A few courts have recognized
this distinction. See United States v. Robinson, Fair Housing-Fair Lending T 15,979 (P-H) (D.
Conn. Jan. 26, 1995) (recognizing that Professional Real Estate Investors has both First
Amendment and policy elements and taking a policy and interest balancing approach to
determine the degree of petitioning immunity available under the Fair Housing Act).
87 See supra Part HA (discussing the history of courts imposing costs, fees, and other
punishments against losing plaintiffs). In addition, at least some losing judicial petitioners to
legislative bodies also bore the risk of fees and costs. For example, in 1746, Rhode Island
passed a law requiring petitioners who asked the General Assembly for relief from a trial court
judgment "to pay all lawful costs and damages, that he, she, or they have put his, her or their
antagonists unto, in defending against such a petition' unless the petitioner won the requested
relief. 6 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1757-
1769, at 95-96 (Knowles, Anthony & Co. 1861) (discussing Jan. 27, 1746 Act); see also
HART, supra note 22, at 37-38 (describing the costs and security procedure in the House of
Lords in the seventeenth century).
88 Today, a number of doctrines and statutes allow the assessment of attorney's fees
against the losing party. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:
The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-90 (1993)
(summarizing the common law exceptions and the more than two thousand state and two
hundred federal statutes shifting attorney's fees). Moreover, the American rule applies only to
attorneys' fees: American courts regularly make a losing plaintiff pay at least some of the
[Vol. 61:665
MOTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON COURTA CCESS
threshold of merit-for instance, to bring losing but meritorious claims within
the First Amendment right-the government may not be able to make this policy
choice and impose attorney's fees against losing plaintiffs who acted maliciously
in filing their suit.89 Finally, even though the right to file losing claims may not
be within the literal right under the Petition Clause, the First Amendment does
not give the government free rein to punish losing claims. As I discuss next,
some of the same policies that require breathing room for speech likewise apply
to court access and place some limits on the government's ability to punish
losing claims.
D. Standards for Protection of the Right to Petition Courts
Mere definition of the right of court access is not the end of the analysis. We
must understand how to protect that right. Constitutional protections take many
forms, including general standards of review, such as strict scrutiny and rational
basis analyses, and specific rules, such as the presumption against prior restraint
of speech. Indeed, other clauses of the First Amendment, particularly the Speech
Clause, have spawned a vast array of protective doctrines. The question is which,
if any, of these are appropriate for the Petition Clause. The Court has tended to
borrow from its Speech Clause jurisprudence when protecting rights under the
Petition Clause.90 I generally agree with that approach but urge some caution. I
explore the proper methodology of First Amendment analysis and protection in
more detail in Part IV. Here, I highlight the traditional speech doctrines that are
best suited to protect the right of court access.
The 1945 case of Thomas v. Collins91 set the basic standards for protection
of the right to petition. There, the Court declared that the petition, speech, and
press rights 'tough not identical, are inseparable"92 and demand greater
defendant's other expenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994) (providing that "[a] judge or clerk or
any court of the United States may tax as costs" certain listed items, such as marshal and clerk
fees, court reporter fees, printing costs, and witness fees).
89 1fa meritorious but losing suit were given identical protection as that given to winning
claims, then a motive restriction on such suits seemingly would fail strict scrutiny. See infra
Part IV.C.2. In other words, the NLRA could not apply to and punish an employer who files a
suit against his employees to retaliate against and intimidate his striking employees so long as
his suit had some merit.
90 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
91323 U.S. 516 (1945).
92 Id at 530. The Court explained the relationship of petition and speech:
2000]
OHIO STATELA WJOURNAL
protection than other rights:
MIhe preferred place given in our scheme to the great the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment ... gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character
of the right not of the limitation, which determines what standards govern the
choice.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by
clear public interest threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation.... Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the
widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly. 93
This greater protection takes the form of "strict scrutiny" under which the
government may intrude on a First Amendment right only if it has a compelling
state interest and the government narrowly tailors its regulation to achieve that
interest.94 By contrast, protection of due process requires only that the state
reasonably aim-not narrowly tailor-its regulation to achieve a legitimate state
objective-not necessarily a compelling state interest 95 This difference may
explain why the Court rarely invalidates court access restrictions under due
process: The government usually has some reasonable interest, such as
maintenance of order in its courts, for controlling access to court 9 6 But the
difference also suggests that at least some court rules and restrictions might not
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were
coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They are
cognate ights, and therefore united in the First Article's assurance.
Id.(citations omitted).
93 Id. (citations omitted).
9 4 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-44 (1963) (describing and applying the
strict scrutiny test applicable to First Amendment freedoms). However, as I discuss below, the
proper standards and application of strict scrutiny are the source of confusion. See infra Part
IV.C.2, IV.C.3.b.
9 5 See Jones v. Union Guano, Co., 264 U.S. 171, 181 (1924) (holding that a court will not
invalidate a precondition to filing suit under due process if "the condition imposed has a
reasonable relation to a legitimate object") (emphasis added).
96 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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pass the more demanding strict scrutiny applicable to a right of court access
under the First Amendment
In addition to strict scrutiny, the Court has developed a number of other
doctrines to protect First Amendment freedoms. Perhaps foremost among these
is the "breathing room" doctrine, which extends protection to activity outside of
the core First Amendment right so as to give breathing space to the core right In
McDonald v. Smith, the Court gave the right to petition breathing room when it
applied the New York Times "actual malice" standard to defamatory speech in
petitions.97 This actual malice standard 98 is a form of "breathing room" for
speech.99 It immunizes from liability false and defamatory speech about public
issues or public figures, unless the speaker spoke with actual knowledge or
reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement Though false speech is not
within the absolute speech right of the First Amendment, this narrow class of
false speech nevertheless gets some protection in order to avoid chilling the
expression of true speech about important issues.
Breathing room for speech takes many forms, depending upon the relative
interests at stake. For example, false and defamatory speech about private
persons does not get the same "actual malice" protection as does speech about
public officials, but such speech in some circumstances gets other forms of
97 472 U.S. 479 (1985). There, McDonald wrote President Reagan to urge the President
not to appoint Smith as a United States Attorney, and in the process, allegedly made false and
defamatory statements about Smith. When Smith later sued for defamation, McDonald claimed
that his statements were absolutely protected under the Petition Clause. The Court rejected this
view:
To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to
special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same
ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble.
These First Amendment rights are inseparable, and there is no sound basis for granting
greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the President than
other First Amendment expressions.
Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
98 The seminal case applying the actual malice standard was New York Times v. Sullivan.
See generally 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra notes 346-54 and accompanying text, 462-66
and accompanying text (exploring New York imes and the breathing room doctrine in more
detail).
99 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("[W]e have been especially anxious to
assure to the freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful
exercise. To that end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory
falsehood.:).
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breathing room, such as protection from punitive damages. 100 Likewise, courts
look critically at prior restraints on improper speech--an injunction as opposed
to subsequent punishment-because prior restraints have a particularly chilling
impact on expression. 101 The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines share the
concern about not chilling the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.1 02 The
vagueness doctrine demands specificity in laws so that persons have fair notice
as to prohibited conduct.103 The overbreadth rule invalidates laws that reach too
widely and regulate both conduct within the state's police powers and the
100 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). See also infra notes 464-66 and accompanying text.
101 Professors Nowak and Rotunda explain this preference:
Historically, prior restraint has always been viewed as more dangerous to free speech, but
why? The marketplace theory of free speech supports this historical distinction between
prior restraint and subsequent punishment While subsequent punishment may deter some
speakers, at least the ideas or speech at issue can be placed before the public. But prior
restraint limits public debate and knowledge more severely. Punishment of speech, after it
has occurred, chillsfree expression. Prior restraintfreezesfree speech.
JOHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTirrTIONAL LAw § 16.16, at 1020 (5th ed.
1995) (emphasis added); see also generally Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971); RODNEYA. SMOLLA, SMOLLA&NIMMERON FREEDOM OF SPEECH ch. 15 (1998).
10 2 For a recent discussion of these two doctrines by the Court, see City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (1999) (rejecting an overbreadth attack on an antiloitering
ordinance, but ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
103The vagueness concern applies to all statutes and is a question of due process: Does
the statute put a person on notice of what behavior is permissible and what is outlawed? See
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."). The Court also has warned that statutes touching on First Amendment rights,
including the right to petition, must be stated with "narrow specificity" in order to avoid
chilling the exercise of those rights:
[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression.... [T]he danger [is] tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. These
freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The
threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963) (citations omitted).
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exercise of First Amendment freedoms.104
Because the right to petition is so closely related to speech, these special
protections likewise should protect against any undue deterrent on the filing of
winning civil suits. However, this protection will not precisely replicate that
given to false speech. Indeed, the allowance and type of breathing room
necessarily depends on the relative interests at stake. The personal and
governmental costs and burdens in responding to a lawsuit are different than
those incurred as a result of a defamatory statement.10 5 Nevertheless, we should
continue the general concerns about chilling effect, prior restraints, and
vagueness, even though those concerns might be implemented in a different
fashion.
In sum, we must view as a whole the analysis of the right to petition
courts-whether in the initial confirmation of the right, definition of the right, or
protection of the right. The argument that the Petition Clause protects access to
court must take into account the scope of the right It is quite a different matter to
broadly pronounce that the First Amendment guarantees access to court than to
say that it protects only the right to file winning claims. Even the latter statement
is meaningless without a definition of the term "protects." The protection
afforded First Amendment rights is greater than that given other rights, and the
protection extends beyond the right itself. Yet, the protection is not absolute. We
can best evaluate this analysis in its application. That is the point of this Article:
to apply the general analysis in order to test laws that restrict court access based
on the plaintiff's motive in filing suit.
II. A SURVEY OF MOTIVE RE.STRCTIONS ON COURT ACCESS
Today a diverse set of laws potentially restricts the motives with which a
104 Not just any potentially improper application will invalidate a statute that otherwise
properly reaches activity within the police power of government The test is whether the statute
substantially burdens protected activity. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030,
1077 (1991) ("The 'overbreadth doctrine' applies if an enactment 'prohibits constitutionally
protected conduct.' To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be 'substantial.") (citations
omitted). One of the more important functions of the overbreadth doctrine is its special rule of
standing, under which a person may challenge a statute for applying impenissibly to protected
speech even though the plaintiff's own conduct is not protected by the First Amendment See
Button, 371 U.S. at 432 ("[I]n appraising a statute's inhibiting effect upon [First Amendment]
rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute in
other factual contexts besides that at bar.').
105 See Andrews, supra note 5 at 374-76, 682-88 (discussing different concerns of
speech and court access and noting possible distinctions in the application of breathing room
doctrines).
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plaintiff may file a civil suit. Some do so directly while others do so only
indirectly. The "direct laws" are those that lawmakers specifically intend to
control the circumstances under which a plaintiff may file suit. Their aim is to
curb litigation abuse. The prime example is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b)(1), which directs that a party in federal court must precertify that its civil
pleadings are "not being presented for any improper purpose."'106 The laws that
indirectly regulate a plaintiffs motive, by contrast, are not directly aimed at
controlling court access, but instead are designed to deter general evils, such as,
restraints of trade, retaliatory employment measures, and racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, their terms are broad enough to punish a plaintiff who files suit
with the requisite ill motive. The common element of these laws-whether
indirect or direct-is that their application depends on the motive of the plaintiff,
not the merit of the underlying suit. In Sections B and C below, I outline the
primary examples of both types of laws, but first, I put these laws in context by
examining the general history of motive restrictions and other penalties in
litigation.
A. The History ofMotive Restrictions on Court Access
Punishment of a plaintiff or his lawyer for having a bad purpose in filing a
meritorious claim is a modem phenomenon. However, litigation penalties in
general have a long history.'0 7 Before the Norman conquest, early English courts
assumed that an unsuccessful suit was a false suit, and they made a losing
plaintiff pay with the loss of his tongue.10 8 These courts later allowed the losing
106 FED. K. CiV. P. 11 (bX1), reprinted infull infra text accompanying note 152.
10 7 See generally Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.L 1218 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Groundless Litigation]
(describing history ofjudicial methods to curb litigation abuse).
108 Pollack and Maitland describe the old English view of wrongful litigation:
Wrongful prosecution may be regarded as an aggravated form of defamation. It is a
wrong which ancient law speaks fiercely. In England before the Conquest a man might
lose his tongue or have to redeem it with his full wer if he brought a false and scandalous
accusation. Probably the law only wanted to punish the accuser who made a charge which
he knew to be false; but it had little power of distinguishing the pardonable mistake from
the wicked lie, and there was a strong feeling that men should not make charges that they
could not prove.
2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WLIAM MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 539 (1968) (citations omitted); see also PERCY HENRY
WINFELD, THE HISTORY OF CONsPiRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 4 (1921) ("The
Laws of Edgar, [Edgar ruled England from 959-975 AD], provide that he who shall accuse
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plaintiff to substitute a payment to his opponent, termed "wer," which was a
fixed amount based on the plaintiff's status) 9
The Normans replaced this wer system with "amercement," under which a
losing plaintiff paid a penalty to the court, or King, rather than his opponent.110
The amount of the penalty was a flexible determination based on the extent of
the wrong and seemingly included factors such as the degree of harm done, the
merits of the suit, and perhaps the motive of the plaintiff. 11 These factors,
however, did not determine whether the plaintiff would pay amercement because
all losing plaintiffs paid amercement. The factors influenced only the amount of
the amercement.112
In the thirteenth century, Parliament began to enact cost statutes to allow the
law courts to again award compensation to the victorious litigant.113 The cost
statutes originally provided only for a losing defendant to pay the litigation costs
of the winning plaintiff; including attorney's fees, but in the fifteenth century, the
statutes began to allow some winning defendants to collect the same fees from
another wrongfully, so that he either in money or property be the worse, shall, on disproof of
the charge by the accused, be liable in his tongue, unless he make compensation with his
109 See Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 107, at 1221.
110 See id at 1222-23.
111 See id at 1223 n.44 ("Though virtually every losing plaintiff was amerced,
amercements were proportional to the plaintiffs wrong in bringing the action rather than to the
status of the wrongdoer, and hence could be nominal in a legitimate, though losing, suit"). See
also 2 POLLACK & MAITAND, supra note 108, at 513-19 (describing amercement in the
thirteenth century as "flexible" and noting that "every defeated plaintiff could be amerced for a
false claim").
2 See id.
113 Sir Holdsworth explains that the chancery courts retained the equitable power to order
the losing party to pay the other's costs but that law courts previously had only amercement:
[T]hough from an early date the Chancellor, in the exercise of his equitable jurisdiction,
had assumed the fullest power to order the defeated party to pay costs, it was only by
degrees that the principle made its way into the common law. The amercement of the
vanquished party was perhaps considered a sufficient punishment But a payment to the
king or lord was not much satisfaction to the successful party, and so, side by side with
the amercement, we get the gradual growth of the rule that the vanquished party must pay
costs. The amercement gradually became merely formal, and finally disappeared; but the
law about costs has increased in bulk and complexity from the thirteenth century onwards.
4 SIR WILLIAM HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 536-37 (1924) (citations
omitted).
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the losing plaintiff.114 Loss of the suit, not the motive of the party, was the basis
for awarding costs and fees.' 15 In some cases, the courts apparently limited
assessment of costs to egregious cases and motive played a part in that
assessment However, motive was a limit on the punishment, in other words,
courts did not punish all losing litigants-only those who both lost and had bad
purposes.116 In addition, as early as the fifteenth century, English cost statutes
began to address concerns such as malicious or unnecessary delay, but these
statutes addressed conduct after the filing of the initial complaint and usually
required an additional finding as to lack of merit.117
114 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 399 (noting that before the time of Hery VIII,
"no costs were allowed to the defendant in any shape" but that new statues "very equitably
gave the defendant, if he prevailed, the same costs as the plaintiff would have, in case he had
recovered').
115 In 1929, Arthur Goodhart reported that English courts at the time had the discretion to
assess costs against winning plaintiffs, based in part on the plaintiff's motive. See Arthur L.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.. 849, 854, 861-62 (1929). Goodhart explained that the power
for such imposition of costs had not arisen until an 1875 English law authorized such and that
"in previous statutes costs had followed the event." See id (noting that in 1929 "a party who
brings a vexatious or unnecessary action, even ifhe succeeds to some extent, may be ordered to
pay the whole costs of the other side" and that "the judge may take into consideration the fact
that the claim is grossly exorbitant, ... that the action is brought out of spite or purely for
political motives").
116 The exact standard for imposition of costs is unclear, due to the use of the term
"vexatious." For example, some records state that early judicial petitioners, whether in courts or
Parliament, could be sanctioned for "vexatious" complaints. See WJ. JONES, THE
ELIZABETHAN COURTS OF CHANCERY 190-99, 192 n.3 (describing the requirements for a bill
of complaint in the sixteenth century courts of chancery and noting that "[p]laintiffs had once
been required to enter into sureties to satisfy the defendant's damages and expenses should the
allegations in the bill prove groundless or vexatious, but this was no longer done in the latter
half of the sixteenth century"). Vexatious complaints apparently were both groundless and
particularly offensive. See id at 196 (noting that most bills rejected by the chancery courts
were described by the courts as 'tifling, frivolous, or of small account!' and that some
"contained more vicious characteristics and were designated in the restrained language of the
times, as vexatious or slanderous"); see also JAMES HART, supra note 22, at 196, 241-42
(describing efforts of the House of Lords in the seventeenth century to deter "vexatious
litigants" by requiring them to assign error within eight days of the filing of a petition
challenging a court judgnent and noting that the House assessed fines and costs in the amount
often to twenty pounds against "vexatious litigants" who filed frivolous suits).
117 For example, Parliament in 1565 passed an act authorizing assessment of costs against
some plaintiffs who acted with "malicious minds and without any just... [or] reasonable
cause." 8 Eliz., ch. 2. The statute allowed the court in its discretion to award costs to a
defendant who suffered a writ of"latitaf' and was put to bail by a plaintiffwho delayed his suit
after filing the writ and did not properly file or pursue his declaration. See id Plaintiffs used
writs of latitat to get the defendant to the King's Bench rather than the court of common pleas.
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In the American colonies, courts regularly awarded attorney's fees in
litigation, and, as in England, they assessed fees based on whether a party won or
lost the suit1 18 By the mid-nineteenth century, the presumption against
assessment of attorney's fees came into vogue (the so-called "American rle"),
but American legislatures and courts have always made exceptions. In the 1870s,
American legislatures began to pass statutes that typically provided for a one-
way shift of fees-only a losing defendant had to pay attorney fees, not a losing
plaintiff-but some assessed costs against losing plaintiffs as well.119 The
American statutes traditionally controlled cost awards by specifying the types of
cases in which fees might be awarded based on loss of the suit but apparently did
not address the motive of the losing party.120
Anglo-American courts also punished litigation conduct through the striking
of pleadings. This arguably began under the pleading system called "common
law pleading." English courts started this system, and most American courts
They alleged that the defendant engaged in an imaginary trespass in order to have the
defendant arrested, and once in custody, the plaintiff followed with his actual complaint See
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUC11ON TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 51 (3d ed. 1990). Similarly,
Parliament in 1486 acted to deter delay through failed appeals. It provided that whenever a
winning party had a judgment to recover, the opposing party filed a writ of error, and the
judgment was affirmed: "Said person or persons, against whom the said writ of error is sued,
shall recover his costs and damage for his delay and wrongful vexation in the same, by
discretion ofthe justice afore whomthe said writ of error is sued." 3 Hen. 7, ch. 10.
118 Colonial and early state legislatures set the amount that could be recovered as a means
to control legal fees generally, but they freely awarded costs against losing parties, including
plaintiffs:
During much of the eighteenth century, virtually all the colonies tried to regulate
attorney fees by statute. To be effective, such legislation had to prescribe both the fees a
lawyer could charge his client and those that could be recovered from a defeated
adversary. The laws governing attorney fee awards, in other words, served less as a way to
shift or not shift fees from one party to another than as a way to limit the amount of those
fees. Once the fee was set, it was taken for granted that it could be recovered from a
losing party.
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rules on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW
&CONrT. PROBS. 9, 10-11 (1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
119 See id. at 25-30.
120 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50
(1975) (reviewing history of American rule and surveying statutory exceptions); Vargo, supra
note 88 at 1578-90 (surveying the thousands of exceptions to the American rule against fee
shifting). Some exceptions to the presumption against fee shifting are today broad enough to
consider the motive of the plaintiff, such as the "bad faith" exception, but application to the
filing of a meritorious complaint remains to this day largely theoretical. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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followed it until at least the mid-nineteenth century.121 Because the common law
pleading system provided for a number of defensive pleas that could delay
(seemingly endlessly) the progress of the case, courts sometimes struck
pleadings to speed the case.122 Common law courts may have considered motive
(often phrased "honesty") in determining whether to strike a pleading, but they
struck only defensive pleadings and apparently did not strike even a dilatory
defensive plea unless it also was "false" or lacked merit.123
121 English common law was characterized by its lengthy and formal sets of pleadings.
Early colonial courts were far more liberal as to form and procedure than the English courts, in
large part because they did not have the trained lawyers to implement the procedure. As
American courts developed, they tended to adopt more of the English practice so that by the
early nineteenth century, the state courts followed much of the English procedure. See
generally LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH WHrrrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE, ch. 1 § E (1994).
122 The extent to which American courts under common law procedure struck any
pleadings is a matter of some confusion. An 1826 New York case (when New York still used
common law pleading) reflects this confusion:
Thus it will be seen that the English cases do not entirely agree as to the kind of
pleas which the court will strike out They do all agree, that the plea must be without
pretense in point of fact; but when we come to its legal nature, we find precedents for
setting aside both those which are plainly good, and others of a doubtful validity.
Sometimes the criterion is delay and expense; and sometimes ingenuity and delusion. In
truth, perhaps, no general rule can be laid down on the subject .... The power to set aside
sham pleas is now well established. The great object is to prevent delay and expense to the
plaintiff; and consuming the time of the courts in passing upon pleas which are a mere
fiction, and an unseemly and expensive encumbrance upon the record, and a fraud upon
the rule which allows double pleading.
Brewster v. Hall, 6 Cow. 34, 36-37 (N.Y. 1826). Professor Risinger believes that in America,
this practice of striking defensive pleas at common law was restricted to New York See
generally D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strilng"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1977).
123 Professor Risinger explains that at common law plaintiffs were not held to an honesty
or motive standard in the filing of suits:
During the 19th century, both in England and America, the term "sham" meant good in
form but false in fact and dishonestly pleaded for some unworthy purpose. Frivolous, on
the other hand, meant obviously false upon the face of a pleading.
The common law seems to have been procedurally concerned with dishonesty only
in the case of defensive pleas. Indeed .... the term "sham" only applied to defensive
pleadings. This was not necessarily because the common law system was plaintiff or
creditor oriented, though this may have been a factor. A more important factor may have
been the effect of the primary mechanism for obtaining honesty in litigation, the system of
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The practice of striking pleadings became more pervasive in America in the
late nineteenth century when many states adopted a new form of pleading called
"code pleading."124 The new code pleading rules expressly authorized courts to
strike "sham and irrelevant" defensive pleas but did not allow courts to strike a
complaint.125 Thus, to the extent that either system allowed courts to punish a
litigant by striking his pleading, the punishment was limited to defensive pleas
and rarely turned solely on motive.
Yet another traditional means by which courts avoided litigation abuse was
through a verification or signature requirement. The requirement varied
depending on whether the case was based in equity or in law. Beginning in the
early sixteenth century, in the days of Sir Thomas Moore, English chancery
courts required an attorney to sign every bill of complaint.1 26 The exact meaning
and effect of this early equity signature requirement are subject to debate-some
contend that a signature attested that "good ground" supported the pleading and
others say that it was merely an attestation as to form127-- but no one contends
fines and amercements.
The fines and amercements system reflects the common law's failure to distinguish
falsity and dishonesty in a very sophisticated manner. The losing party to a lawsuit had to
pay a sum of money to the king for having been in the wrong before the king's court In
some actions this money was called an amercement and in others it took the form of a
fine.... The private litigant who brought a sham suit merely to harass his opponent ran a
high risk for his pleasure, and the actual danger of civil "strike suits" therefore was
probably not very great. However, a defendant who was going to lose was going to be
amerced or fined in any event, and was likely to plead anything in order to buy time.
Risinger, supra note 122, at 17-19 (footnotes omitted).
124 Code pleading began with reforms proposed by David Dudley Field. In 1848, Field
revamped the New York system of procedure, and his new system became known as either the
"Field Code" or code pleading. See generally Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology
of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNEIL L.Q. 238, 242-44 (1942).
New York revised the code in 1852, and it was this 1852 variation that a number of other states
adopted as their system of procedure. See i.
12 5 Section 152 of the 1852 New York Code provided: "Sham and irrelevant answers and
defenses may be stricken out on motion, and upon such terms as the court may in their
discretion impose" Act of Apr. 16, 1852, ch. 379, § 152, 1852 N.Y. Laws.
126 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS ch. 11 § 47 (1838) ("We may conclude, what is
here said on the general structure and form of a bill, by the remark, that every Bill, whether
original or not, must have the signature of counsel annexed to it. This rule appears to have been
adopted at an early period, and at least as early as the time of Sir Thomas More. [1478-
1535]').
127 Justice Story claimed that the signature requirement assured that there was "good
grotmd for the suit":
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that the signature attested to the good motive of the pleader aside from the
merits.
As American law makers began to codify the general equity practice in the
early nineteenth century, they included the signature requirement in their new
rules.1 28 In 1842, Federal Equity Rule 24 provided that "[e]very bill ... contain
the signature of counsel. . . , which shall be considered as an affirmation on his
part, that upon the instructions given to him and the case laid before him, there is
good ground for the suit, in the manner in which it is framed."129 Though the
attorney had to attest to the merit of the pleading (i.e., it had "good ground"), he
did not have to vouch for his own or his client's motive.
On the law side, courts using common law pleading required an "offer of
proof' that announced that the plaintiff could produce proof of his charges. 130
The great object of this rule is, to secure regularity, relevancy, and decency in the
allegations of the Bill, and the responsibility and guaranty of counsel, that upon the
instructions given to them, and the case laid before them, there is good ground for the suit
in the manner, in which it is framed.
Id. Professor Risinger argues that Justice Story in this passage is rewriting history and
imposing a merits standard that did not previously exist:
In the quoted passage it seems as if the great man is as much dictating his view of
what the role of counsel's signature should be as narrating what that role was in equity
practice up to that time. It appears true that the rule stemmed from the time of Sir Thomas
Moore, but the requirement of counsel's signature was originally a boon rather than a
burden to counsel, for it ensured that they were consulted before a Bill was filed. Their
task was the quasi-judicial function of exarrining the Bill as to form, and their signature
certified nothing concerning the ground of the Bill, which apparently did not even have to
be laid before them. This was how the office of counsel's signature was understood by
Story's source, Cooper, and apparently by every other writer, but Story saw a better office
for it and gave his viewpoint the stamp of history. And, since Story was then on the
Supreme Court, it is not surprising that his vision was incorporated as Rule 24 in the
Equity Rules of 1842, which required counsel's signature as an affirmation of good
ground.
Risinger, supra note 122, at 10-13.
128 The first set of codified rules, the 1822 Federal Equity Rules of Practice, did not
contain any formal signature requirement, but courts sometimes required a signature as part of
general equity practice. The 1822 rules consisted of only 33 rules, but Rule 32 allowed the
equity courts to "make further rules and regulation, not inconsistent with the rules hereby
prescribed, in their discretion" FED. EQurrYR.P. 32,20 U.S. (7 Wheat) v, xiii (1822).
129 FED. EQUrrY R.P. 24,42 U.S. (1 How.) xli, xlviii (1842).
130At common law, however, all affirmative pleadings that did not put the matter "in
issue" had to include an offer of proof that took the form of a verification:
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This offer of proof did not attest to any motive of the plaintiff.13' The code
pleading systems required the plaintiff to "subscribe" the complaint, but left to
the plaintiff's discretion whether to also verify the complaint.132 The
subscription was merely a signature, and the optional verification attested to the
pleader's belief and knowledge as to the truth of the pleading and did not address
the motive of the pleader in filing suit.133 In sum, American courts in the late
Where an issue is tendered to be tried by jury, it has been shown that the pleading
concludes to the country. In all other cases pleadings, if in the affirmative form, must
conclude with a formula of another kind, called a verifications or an averment... The
common verification is... in the following form: 'And the said A.B. .... is ready to
verify....'
It was a doctrine of the ancient law... that every pleading affirmative in its nature must
be supported by an offer of some mode ofproof...
HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIvIL ACTIONS, 378-
79 (Samuel Tyler, ed., 3d Amer. ed. 1919); see also Henry Berry Pogson, Truth in Pleading, 8
N.Y.U. L.Q. 41, 43 (1931) ("Anciently it was essential to accompany every pleading,
affirmative in its nature, by an averment that the pleader was prepared to furnish proof ofa kind
or character adapted to the occasion .... These constituted the so-called common law
verification.").
131 Professor Pogson in 1931 noted some confusion as to the meaning of the verification
at common law, but he reported that plaintiffs did not attest to the "honesty" of their common
law pleas:
[Tjhere is noticeable during the lapse of the years the almost total discarding of any idea
that the plaintiff must authenticate his complaint for the benefit of the defendant in any
manner indicative of good faith or honesty in reasonable belief, other than by the
signature of his attorney of record or by his own signature thereto.
Pogson, supra note 130, at 46-47.
132 The New York Code originally required plaintiffs to verify all complaints, but one
year after its enactment, a revised code made verification permissive. See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, ETAL., Crvi PROCEDURE 271-73, nn.42 & 43 (3d ed. 1999). Section 156 of the
revised 1852 New York Code stated:
Every pleading in a court of record must be subscribed by the party, or his attorney, and
when any pleading is verified, every subsequent pleading, except a demurrer, must be
verified also.
Act of Apr. 16,1852, ch. 379 § 156, 1852 N.Y. Laws.
133 Section 157 of the 1852 New York Code stated the meaning of the verification:
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURATAL
nineteenth century were experimenting with a number of procedural tools to curb
litigation abuse, but none of these procedural devices punished plaintiffs solely
for their motives in filing the initial suit
The first use of motive as the sole criterion for filing a complaint apparently
was part of another movement, one that was closely related to, but separate from
the procedural reform--the legal ethics movement. This movement began
simply with lawyer oaths. Lawyer oaths date back to at least the thirteenth
century.' 34 Many early oaths were general-lawyers swearing to abide by the
law-but some early oaths were particularized and set out a number of ethical
precepts.' 35 Some mentioned motive, and although their exact meaning and
effect are open to question, they seemingly spoke to the lawyer's motive. For
example, a common lawyer oath in the late nineteenth century required a lawyer
to swear that he would not "encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of a suit from any motive of passion or interest .... 1136 The interest
language of the last clause reflects a concern about conflicts of interests and
suggests that the lawyer's personal motives, and not those of the client were at
issue.
The legal ethics movement gained significant momentum in the mid-
nineteenth century, primarily as a result of two influential legal essays by David
Hoffinan and George Sharswood. In 1836, Hoffman, a lecturer at the University
The verification must be to the effect, that the same is true to the knowledge of the person
making it except as to those matters stated on infonmation and belief and as to those
matters he believes it to be true, and must be by the affidavit of the party,.... When the
pleading is verified by any other person than the party, he shall set forth in the affidavit his
knowledge, or the grounds of his belief on the subject, and the reasons why it is not made
by the party ... The verification may be omitted when an admission of the truth of the
allegation might subject the party to prosecution for felony.
Id. at § 157. The New York Code did not define the meaning of "subscription." See generally
id. An 1854 legal dictionary definition of subscription suggests that the term was primarily
used in the field of contracts and meant merely a signature. 2 JOHN BOUVER, A LAW
DICTIONARY 555 (1854) ("SUBSCRIPTION, contracts. The placing of a signature at the bottom
of a written or printed engagement").
134 See Andrews, supra note 11, Part I.A.
135 See 31 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE THRTmTH ANNUAL MEETNG
OF THE AMEICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, apps. D, E, I, at 714-16, 735-36 (1907) [hereinafter
REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION] (surveying lawyers' oaths); LUCIEN H.
ALEXANDER, MEMORANDUM FOR USE OF ABA's COMMnrfrE TO DRAFT CANONS OF
PROFEssIONAL ETHICS Part V (1908) (collecting different forms of oath).
136 Alexander, supra note 135, at 112 (reporting that California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah stated this provision as of
1908).
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of Maryland, urged that lawyers should be filters for their client's actions and
that they should refrain from taking even legally meritorious positions if the
lawyer believed them to be unjust. Hoffman, for example, admonished that a
lawyer should not present the defense of statute of limitations if he believes that
the plaintiff's claim is otherwise good.137 In the same vein, Hoffmnan suggested
that lawyers should not take civil cases to further the client's, or the lawyer's, ill
motives. 138 Judge Sharswood, writing in 1854, instructed law students that
"truth, simplicity and candor" are the "cardinal virtues" of lawyers and that
lawyers should avoid practices, such as being "hired to abuse the opposite party,"
that would impugn his character.139
In 1887, Alabama enacted the first formal code of legal ethics, relying in
large part upon the writings of Sharswood and Hoffman. 140 The 1887 Alabama
code instructed, among other things, that "[a]n attorney must decline in a civil
cause to conduct a prosecution, when satisfied that the purpose is merely to
harass or injure the opposite party, or to work oppression and wrong.' 141 This
was significant in several respects. First, the rule's "satisfied" language seemed
to set a test for determining the client's motive. Second, the rule apparently
instructed a lawyer not to bring even a meritorious civil case if he believed that
137 See David Hoffinan, in REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note
135, app. H, at 717 (Res. No. 12) (1 will never plead the Statute of Limitations when based on
the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes the debt, and has no other defense
than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner in his knavery.").
138 Hoffman's second and tenth resolutions provided-
I will espouse no man's cause out of envy, hatred or malice toward his antagonist.
Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or frivolous and
vexatious defenses, they shall be neither enforced nor countenanced by me. And if still
adhered to by him from a hope of pressing the other party into a unjust compromise, or
with any other motive, he shall have the option to select other counsel.
Id (Res. Nos. 2 & 10). The first clause, Resolution No. 2, is somewhat ambiguous as to whose
motives are at issue, but, when juxtaposed against the Tenth Resolution, it seemingly addresses
the lawyer's motive.
139 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETIIICS 118, 169, reprinted in 32
REPORTS OF THE AiE ICAN BARASSOCIATION, supra note 135.
140 The man who drafted the Alabama Code for the Alabama State Bar Association,
Judge Thomas Jones, relied heavily on the Hoffman and Sharswood essays. See generally
Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics for the Alabama State Bar
Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471 (1998).
141 CODE OF ETHICS ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION No. 14 (Dec. 14, 1887),
reprinted in HENRY S. DRNQE, LEGAL ETICS app. F, at 352-63 (1953).
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his client had the specified ill motives. To be sure, the rule contained an
important qualifier "merely." In theory at least, a client could have the sole aim
to harass, even if his claim has legal and factual merit Finally, the rule spoke in
mandatory terms and thus departed from the often aspirational language of the
predecessor oaths. Indeed, the Alabama State Bar rejected proposals that would
have given the lawyer more leeway. The provision, as originally drafted, read
that the lawyer "may" decline the case, but the bar convention changed it to
"must."1 4 2
The Alabama Code took hold. Other states began to form bar associations
and enact their own codes modeled on the Alabama example. Eleven adopted the
Alabama mandate against taking a civil case for malicious purposes. 14 3 In 1908,
when the American Bar Association developed a national model for a legal
ethics code, it used the Alabama Code as its model and continued the theme of
lawyers acting only with the highest motives. 144 Canon 30 of the new ABA
Canons thus prohibited a lawyer from taking initial claims "when he is
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to
work oppression."1 45 Like the Alabama rule, Canon 30 was mandatory and
seemingly spoke to the client's intent without regard to the merit of the claim.
Interestingly, these ethical provisions may have been the catalyst for
142 The bar also deleted other language that bound a lawyer to avail himself of all lawful
advantages once he took a case. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ALA3AMA STATE BARASSOCATION 19 (1887).
14 3 See 31 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 135, at app. B, at
695(1907).
144 The Preamble to the 1908 Canons stated:
In America, where the stability of Court and of all departments of government rests
upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing
and dispensing justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that
the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration. The future of the republic, to a great extent, depends upon our
maintenance of justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct
and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all
just men.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Preamble (1908), reprinted
in REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION vol. XXXIII, at 575 (1908) (emphasis
added).
145 Canon 30 mandated that a lawyer decline a case when he is "convinced that it is
intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1908). See infra
Part mn.B.5.a-b for a discussion of the ABA Canons and their successor standards.
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broadening the procedural rules to ban improper purpose in filing complaints. In
1912, just four years after the ABA issued its national code of ethics, federal
rulemakers added a modest motive element to the signature requirement in the
equity rules. Rule 24 of the 1912 Federal Equity Rules stated that the signature of
counsel on a pleading certified, among other things, that he did not interpose the
pleading "for delay."146 Like the new ethics rules, Rule 24 applied to complaints;
it applied to all pleadings, including an otherwise meritorious complaint, if the
purpose behind its filing was delay. Despite its broader language, Rule 24, in
practice, was not an expansion beyond previous procedural rules. Rule 24, unlike
the ethics rules, outlawed only "delay" and, as evidenced by the previous
procedural practice, delay usually is a problem with defensive papers, not the
initial complaint.147 Moreover, in the twelve years in which the rule was in
effect, no court struck any pleading for a delay motive unless it also was
"false."148
Equity Rule 24 was just one step on the road to imposing unlimited
procedural motive restrictions on complaints. As I explain in detail below,
Equity Rule 24 soon evolved into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which in turn evolved into a much broader motive limitation: A
signature now acts as a certification that the pleadings, including a complaint, are
not presented for "any improper purpose." 149 Almost every state in turn has
followed suit and adopted this broad motive prohibition. 150 Similarly, litigants
and courts have begun to consider whether other laws also might bar a plaintiff's
146 The rule stated that the signature of counsel:
shall be considered as a certificate by each solicitor that he has read the pleading so signed
by him; that upon the instructions laid before him regarding the cases there is good
ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and that it is not
interposedfor delay.
FED. EQUrrY R.P. 24 (emphasis added).
147 Although delay is best seen in defensive motions, an initial complaint can likewise be
abused to cause delay. A plaintiff could file the complaint in order to delay matters collateral to
the litigation, such as the schedule of a construction project, or the plaintiff could frame the
complaint in such a way that it causes delay, such as filing multiple complaints and claims
rather than a simple, unified pleading.
14 8 See Risinger, supra note 122, at 15-16, 28 ("There is not one reported case prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules where a finding offalsity was not required before a plea
could be deemed a sham.").
149FED. p. CIV. P. 11(b). For the current version of Rule 11(b) see infra text
accompanying note 152.
150 See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
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bad purpose. Thus today, in a marked departure from historical practice, a
number of general laws, as well as procedural rules, arguably impose a
restriction on the plaintiff's motive in filing civil suit. They break down into two
broad categories: direct restraints on court access and general substantive statutes
that only indirectly govern a civil plaintiff's motive.
B. Current Direct Motive Controls on Court Access
The most obvious use of motive as a condition on court access is as a tool to
curb litigation abuse. Yet, as reflected by history of litigation rules and penalties,
use of motive alone is a relatively uncommon means of regulating court access.
The vast majority of court access regulations, whether an initial precondition to
filing suit or a subsequent penalty for abuse, set objective criteria.151 Only a very
few single out the plaintiff's motive and bar or punish the filing of an initial
claim based on that motive, regardless of the objective merit of that claim.
Moreover, courts rarely have invoked these rules and punished litigants based
solely on their ill motive. This reluctance may be due to the court's desire to
focus their limited resources on egregious cases where the litigants both have ill
motives and file meritless papers.
Nevertheless, a number of court rules, statutes, and legal doctrines would
permit use of motive as a condition on court access. Some, such as Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 (b)(1), unequivocally state that-a plaintiff must have proper
motive to file suit, and others, such as section 1927 of the Federal Judicial Code,
have ambiguous language that potentially limits court access based on motive
alone. I outline the prime examples of these "direct court access" statutes, rules,
and doctrines below.
1. Civil Pleading Rules-Rule 11 (b)(1)
Federal Rule 11 is the "ethics" rule of the federal procedural compilation. It
serves both as a precondition to filing suit and as a form of subsequent
punishment. Under Rule 11, a plaintiff must certify, before he files his
complaint, that he has a proper motive and that his paper has legal and factual
151 Most pleading rules, for example, set only objective criteria. See, e.g., FED. RL Civ. P.
8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends ... (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."); FED. R. CIv. P. 10(a) ("Every pleading shall
contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and
a [pleading type] designation....").
[Vol. 61:665
MOTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON COURTACCESS
merit, and the court later may sanction the plaintiff and his lawyer if their
certifications prove untrue.
The certification provisions of paragraph (b) are the heart of Rule 11:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper,
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.152
These four standards, joined by the conjunctive "and," seemingly require
that the pleader have a proper purpose in addition to a factual and legal basis for
his pleading. Nevertheless, confusion surrounds how, if at all, Rule 11 regulates
motive when a plaintiff otherwise has a meritorious paper. This confusion is
,widespread, most American court systems have rules identical to or modeled on
Federal Rule 11(b)(1) and therefore present the same issues.153 Because Rule
11 (b)(1) is the most prevalent form of motive restriction and because it is the
source of some confusion, I explore the evolution and application of the rule in
some detail.
a. The Evolution of the Rule 11 Improper Purpose Standard
Rule 11 came into existence in 1938 with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Prior to 1938, federal courts applied different procedural rules
152 FED. R Cwy. P. 1 l(b).
153 See infra part II. ml.C.
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depending on whether the cases were in equity or at law. Federal courts sitting in
equity applied federal rules of procedure, but when they heard cases at law, they
applied the procedure rules of the state in which they sat 154 Only the federal
equity rules required any form of certification or statement of good purpose in
filing a complaint-the delay standard of Federal Equity Rule 24- and even
they did so only from 1912 to 1938.155
In 1938, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect and
merged procedure for law and equity. The new rules retained the key
components of Equity Rule 24, including its delay standard, in Rule 11.156 The
1938 version of Rule 11 provided in part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, .... and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or
is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham
and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been
served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. 15 7
In addition to the delay clause, the 1938 rule had two other "subjective"
elements that addressed the state of mind of the signing party or attorney. One
was an "awareness" standard that addressed the merits of the pleading (i.e., "that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
154 Prior to the 1930s, Congress enacted "conformity" statutes that directed federal courts
in "actions at law" to use the procedure of the courts in the state in which the federal court sat.
See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). As to equity cases, Congress instructed
federal courts to use traditional rules of equity practice and authorized the Supreme Court to
alter those rules as it thought proper. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 61 (5th ed. 1994).
155 See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text
156 The advisory committee stated that it derived the Rule 11 provisions from former
Equity Rules 21 and 24. Federal Equity Rule 21 had provided that "the court may, upon
motion or its own initiative, order any redundant, impertinent or scandalous matter stricken out
[of pleadings].' FED. EQUrrY R.P. 21,226 U.S. 627, 654 (1912). But see Risinger, supra note
122, at 8-10 & n.20 (arguing that "Equity Rule 21 has nothing to do with Rule 11 as finally
promulgated" in 1938). The rulemakers also noted that many code pleading systems required
subscription of pleadings but, as discussed above, a subscription in the code pleading system
meant merely a signature. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. For example, one of the
code pleading provisions cited by the committee was a 1927 Minnesota rule, which like that in
the 1852 New York Code, see supra note 132, merely stated that "every pleading... shall be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, and may be verified" and did not spell out any unique
meaning to the term subscribe. MINN. STAT. § 9265 (1927).
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 11,308 U.S. 645,676 (1939).
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support it"). 58 This mirrored both the early equity signature and code pleading
verification standards as to merits and extended only to matters within the
knowledge and belief of the attesting party.15 9 A second subjective element
asked the court to consider whether the lawyer intentionally violated the rule's
other provisions. It allowed the court to strike a pleading if signed with an intent
to defeat the purpose of the rule, and it permitted "disciplinary action" against the
lawyer in cases of "wilful [sic] violation." 160 These two elements asked distinct
questions from the delay standard. That standard focused on whether the party
filed the pleading for delay, regardless of the party's knowledge or belief as to
the merits of that pleading.
For forty years, Rule 11 went virtually unnoticed. 161 In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, however, federal rulemakers became concerned about litigation
abuse and re-examined Rule 11. They concluded that Rule 11 was not curbing
abuse,162 and in 1983, they set out to strengthen Rule 11 through a major
overhaul of the rule.1 63 They viewed the subjective standard for determining the
158 Id
159 See supra notes 129, 133 and accompanying text (describing the equity rule and the
code pleading verification standard).
160 FED. 1 C1. p. 11, 308 U.S. at 676.
161 The 1938 version of Rule II in its entirety was rarely the subject of substantial
judicial or scholarly development. See Risinger, supra note 122 at 34-42 (criticizing the rule
and surveying the 23 reported cases prior to 1977 in which one party attempted to employ Rule
I I to strike the opponent's pleading); see also 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHuR R. MIER,
FEDERAL PRACncE AND PROcEDURE § 1331 at 10-11 (2d ed. 1990) (reporting that the 1938
version of Rule 11 was "rarely used").
162 In 1983, the federal rules advisory committee noted that "[e]xperience shows that in
practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses." FED. R Civ. P. 11, advisory
committee's note to 1983 amendment, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (citations omitted).
Professors Wright and Miller give their opinion as to why the early rule failed:
First, the element of the certification that the attorney had read the pleading basically was
meaningless in actual practice. Second, a subjective standard had evolved as the test of the
'good grounds' element of the certification and it had proven to be virtually
unenforceable. Third, the wording of the original rule limited malfeasance to delay, which
meant that other improper motivations for violating the certification requirement were
immune under a strict reading of the rule's language. Moreover, the original rule's
sanction provisions were useless as a practical matter. They called for a striking of the
offending document, which was too draconian, or, in the case of a 'willful' violation,
'appropriate disciplinary action,' which was too vague to be meaningful.
WRIGHT&MILLER, supranote 161 § 1331.
16 3 The 1983 version of Rule 11 read in part:
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merits of the pleading as particularly ineffective. Courts under the 1938 version
of the rule typically imposed sanctions only if the party acted in bad faith and
knew that the pleading was groundless,164 and, as one court noted, "there is no
position-no matter how absurd--of which an advocate cannot convince
himself."165 Accordingly, federal rulemakers in 1983 replaced the actual
knowledge standard of the 1938 rule with an objective "should have known"
standard for the factual and legal merit of the pleading. 166 The rule no longer
would tolerate ignorance and required parties to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the factual and legal bases of their pleadings. 167
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper;, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (1983 amendment).
164 See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that "Rule 11
speaks in plainly subjective terms"and that its "standard... is bad faith").
165 Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 n3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 106 F.RD. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
166 The Advisory Committee explained that the reasonableness of the inquiry required
under the new rule depended on the circumstances at the time the attorney or party filed the
paper:
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the
law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of
reasonableness under the circumstances. This standard is more stringent than the original
good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circumstances will
trigger its violation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99
(1983) (citations omitted).
167 The Second Circuit described the move to an objective awareness standard in Rule
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The supposed problem with the "willful" standard of the original rule was
not the standard itself. The problem instead was the vague and discretionary
result that it triggered-that the court "may" strike the pleading or the attorney
"may" suffer "appropriate" disciplinary action.1 68 Thus, the 1983 rule made
sanctions mandatory for all violations of the rule, regardless of whether such
violations were willful.1 69
Finally, the 1983 rule broadened the scope of prohibited motives beyond
delay and required litigants to certify that their pleadings were "not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation."' 170 The only possible problem cited by
the rules committee was that the delay element of the 1938 rule was too
narrow.171 Delay had been the only improper purpose that the 1938 rule
condemned, leaving other ill motives beyond the reach of the rule.172 Whether
this was actually a problem in practice is open to question; the only report of this
concern seems to be the advisory committee note itself.173 One critic had
complained that the rule was narrow in the sense that it punished delay only if
delay were the sole purpose behind a motion (i.e., a motion filed both for delay
The addition of the words 'formed after a reasonable inquiry' demand that we revise our
inquiry. No longer is it enough for an attorney to claim that he acted in good faith, or that
he personally was unaware of the groundless nature of an argument or claim. For the
language of the new Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty
on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is
signed. Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).168 Id.
169 See FED. R. CIV. p. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983) ("If a pleading...is signed in
violation of this rule, the ourt ... shall impose... an appropriate sanction... "); see also id.
at 200, advisory committee note (noting that the "reference in the former text to willfulness as a
prerequisite to disciplinary action has been deleted").
170 IaL at 167.
171 In 1983, when federal rulemakers expanded the clause, the advisory conmfittee's only
suggestion as to any problem with the delay clause of the 1938 rule was the following: "The
expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes
that the litigation process may be abused for purposes other than delay." See, e.g., Browning
Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977); FED. R. Crv. P. 11,
advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
172 See 5A WRIGHT & MRIER, supra note 161, § 1331.
17 3 See supra note 163 and discussion infra at notes 185-89 and accompanying text
(discussing advisory committee's statement of reasons for change).
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and for a legitimate purpose escaped sanctions),174 and another charged that the
delay clause was redundant, 17 5 but neither criticized the rule as too narrowly
defining the scope of prohibited purposes.
By 1993, the pendulum had swung the other way. Rulemakers were
concerned that the 1983 revision had unduly chilled litigation advocacy, and they
relaxed portions of Rule 11, principally the sanctioning provisions.176 Rule 11
now makes sanctions permissive rather than mandatoiy, 177 and courts imposing
sanctions may take into account a number of factors, including whether the
violation was willful. 17 8 However, the rulemakers kept intact the 1983 changes
174 In 1976, David Edelstein, then Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York,
wrote an article in which he pondered whether the delay clause of Rule 11 (the 1938 version)
might be too narrow in that it arguably punished motions only if they were filed solely for
delay; he proposed that the rule be amended to outlaw motions filed primarily for delay. See
generally David N. Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44
FORD. L. REV. 1069 (1976). Indeed, early drafts of the advisory committee notes
accompanying the 1983 rule amendment cited Judge Edelstein's article as support for its
proposal that the improper purpose clause refer to the "primary" motivation of the litigant See
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (on file
with author and available on CIS microfiche #7903-05) (stating that the proposed revised rule
"applies even when there is some other objective for the pleading, even a legitimate one").
However, Judge Edelstein's article addressed only delay in motion practice not other bad
purposes or other civil papers and pleadings.
175 Professor Risinger in a 1977 article noted, briefly, that the delay clause was flawed,
but he argued that it was unnecessary and redundant, not too narrow:
The insertion [in the 1938 rule] of the certification that the pleading has not been
interposed for delay seems logically redundant, since a pleading interposed only for delay
could not have 'good ground' no matter how that term is ultimately defined, and a
pleading with independent 'good ground' is not likely to be rendered improper because
tactical considerations of delay entered in to the ultimate decision of whether or not to file
an otherwise honest, meritorious, and proper pleading.
Risinger, supra note 122, at 8.
176 See FED. R. CIV.p. 11 advisory comrrittee's note to 1993 amendment ("This revision
is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in interpretation and application of the 1983
revision of the rule."). Some scholars claimed that the 1983 Rule was too harsh and had a
disproportionate effect on civil rights plaintiffs. See generally id (surveying authorities and
criticisms of the 1983 rule); 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 161, § 1332 (same).
177 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1(c) (providing that "the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction"). One of the conditions is a new "safe harbor"
provision which gives a party 21 days to withdraw offending pleadings and avoid sanctions.
See FED. R. CIV. P. l(c) (1)(A).
178 See FED. R_ CIV. P. 11 adivisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (noting that
the "rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in deciding whether
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to the other two "state of mind" elements of the nile. Although they clarified and
modified slightly the merits standards, now embodied in Rule 11(b), 179 they
retained the reasonable inquiry standard of the 1983 rule. Most importantly for
this discussion, the rulemakers kept the broad language of the improper purpose
clause, and they placed the clause in a more prominent position.180 The improper
purpose clause is now the first, rather than last, certification standard.
b. Interpretation and Application of the Rule 11 Improper Purpose
Standard
Although there has been a relative "outpouring of scholarly writing" and
litigation concerning Rule 11 since its overhaul in 1983,181 legal observers have
paid little attention to the improper purpose standard of Rule 11, in any of its
evolving forms.182 Instead, courts and scholars focus on the awareness element,
and many legal observers describe the post-1983 Rule 11 as imposing an
objective rather than subjective standard.183 This is an overstatement 184 To be
to impose a sanction or what sanction would be appropriate" and that a relevant factor is
"[w]hether the improper conduct was willful, or negligenf).
179 Rulemakers clarified the meaning of the merits portions of the certification. Rule
1 (bX4) now states a separate certification standard for denials of factual allegations, and Rule
I l(bX3) now requires that affirmative factual allegations have only "evidentiary supporf' (as
opposed to the "well grounded in face' standard of the 1983 rule) and allows some allegations
to be based on the reasonable belief that the pleader will obtain evidentiary support. See text
accompanying supra note 152 (stating Rule 11(b)).
180 The advisory committee notes do not explain why improper purpose was given first
priority. See FED. R Civ. P. 11(b) advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendment.
18 1 Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., The Use andImpact ofRule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943,
948 (1992) (reporting generally on the results of an empirical study of the impact of Rule 11 on
federal litigators and noting the growth in cases and scholarship concerning Rule 11 since its
1983 amendment).
182 One of the few pieces of academic literature to focus solely on the improper purpose
clause of Rule 11(bX1) is a student note: See generally Barbara Corrminos Kmzansky, Note,
Sanctions For Nonfrivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implication for the
Improper Purpose Prong ofRule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359 (1998).
183 See, eg., SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CpAL LIBERTIES LMGATION: THM LAW
OF SECrION 1983 § 1.47 (stating that under Federal Rule 11, "an objective standard is
applicable, not a subjective bad faith one); see also infra note 274 (statement of Geoffrey
Hazard). Perhaps the most influential of these statements was that of Judge William Schwarzer
in which he advocated that courts make only an objective rather than subjective inquiry, even
under the improper purpose clause. See William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The New
Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.RD. 181, 195-96 (1985) (stating that the court does
not need to decipher an "attorney's subjective intent" and that "[t]he record [and] surrounding
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sure, the willful and actual knowledge standards of the 1938 rule are gone, but
the rule retains a subjective element-the "improper purpose" clause. Under the
literal language of the rule, a plaintiff must certify both that he has conducted a
reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal merit of the complaint and that he is
not filing the complaint for any improper purpose. The problem is how to apply
this standard.
As noted above, the 1983 advisory committee did not shed much light on the
meaning of the expanded improper purpose clause other than its remark that
litigants abuse the system for more reasons than delay.185 The committee
obviously meant to stop litigation abuse generally, not just the isolated example
of delay, but it did not meaningfully define abuse, especially in the context of
filing an initial complaint. Is it an abuse to file an otherwise valid complaint
because you hate the defendant or because you want to obtain an advantage
outside of litigation?
The advisory committee's only other comment with regard to the improper
purpose clause-a case citation-merely confuses the question. The committee
cited Browning Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp.,186 a 1977 case in
which the Second Circuit split its decision regarding sanctions. It reversed
sanctions assessed against the plaintiffs for the initial complaint filing but upheld
sanctions for plaintiffs' subsequent litigation activity. DASA was not a case under
Rule 11; the court did not cite Rule 11 at all. Instead, the court relied upon its
inherent power to sanction litigants, and applied a two-part test for such
sanctions-the tactic must be both frivolous and in bad faith. 187 Thus, the court
would not sanction the plaintiffs for filing a colorable claim even though they did
so to achieve a collateral bargaining advantage,188 but it did sanction plaintiffs'
circumstances should afford an adequate basis for determining whether particular papers or
proceedings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in the cost of
litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked any apparent legitimate purpose').
184 See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.
1313, 1320 (1986) (noting that "[a]lthough courts and commentators have stressed that rule 11
introduces an objective standard to measure a lawyer's conduct, it is more accurate to say that
the rule adds an objective layer to the subjective core of traditionally sanctionable bad faith
conduct").
185 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
186 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
187 The court applied a two-fold test for awarding sanctions under its inherent power. "the
claim is entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or
delay, or for other improper reasons." l at 1088 (emphasis added). For further discussion of a
court's inherent power to assess sanctions generally, see infra Part 11H3.3.
188 Plaintiffs, holders of convertible corporate debenture bonds sued the issuing
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subsequent litigation tactics, which involved frivolous motions. 189
This was a fairly standard application of the court's inherent powers.190 The
more difficult question is what the advisory committee intended when it cited
this case in relation to its broadening of the improper purpose clause. Did the
committee mean to broaden Rule 11 to bar behavior that the Second Circuit's
common law power seemingly did not-the filing of colorable complaints for a
bad purpose? Or, did the committee merely use the case as an example of a bad
motive other than delay-obtaining a collateral bargaining benefit-that might
motivate frivolous filings?
Case law applying Rule 11(b)(1) does not offer much guidance as to its
meaning. Cases rarely present the improper purpose clause in isolation. Most
cases in which the improper purpose clause is implicated also involve pleadings
or motions that are factually or legally frivolous. This is especially true after the
1993 amendments, which reduced the opponent's ability and incentive to bring
Rule 11 motions. 191 It is a rare case in which a court considers whether a plaintiff
or other litigant should be sanctioned solely because of his improper motive.
Even the courts that have addressed the issue, primarily in dicta, are divided
in their view of the proper application of the improper purpose provision of Rule
11(b)(1). Some have refused to follow the literal letter of Rule 11 (b)(1), at least
as applied to the filing of the initial complaint, and hold that a colorable
complaint (as opposed to other litigation papers), no matter the plaintiffs
purpose, is not sanctionable under Rule 11. The Ninth Circuit is perhaps the
leading proponent of this view, beginning with its 1986 decision in Zaldivar v.
City of Los Angeles,192 and culminating in its 1991 en banc decision in
corporation, the bank trustee, and its accountant for fraud. The trial court entered judgment for
defendants, after trial on one count and summary judgment on all other counts, and awarded
attorneys' fees to defendants. See 560 F.2d at 1087-88 (for a complete description of the trial
court's decision).
189 Id. at 1088-89.
190 See infra Part Im.B.3.
191 Among other things, the 1993 revisions to Rule 11 made sanctions discretionary
rather than mandatory. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Rulemakers also gave litigants a 21-day safe
harbor period, during which they could withdraw an offending pleading or motion. See FED. K
Civ. P. 1(c)(IXA). Finally, the new rule presumes that monetary fines will be paid to the court
rather than the opposing party who files the Rule 11 motion. See FED. R. Civ. P.1 1(cX2).
192 780 F.2d 823, 831-35 (9th Cir. 1986). In Zaldivar, the Ninth Circuit reversed
sanctions against the Zaldivar plaintiffs because they presented a colorable claim and held that




Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.193 In Townsend, the Ninth Circuit
explained why it singled out complaints (and counterclaims) for this special
treatment under Rule 11:
The reason for the rule regarding complaints is that the complaint is, of course,
the document which embodies the plaintiff's cause of action and it is the vehicle
through which he enforces his substantive legal rights. Enforcement of those
rights benefits not only individual plaintiffs but may benefit the public, since the
bringing of meritorious lawsuits by private individuals is one way that public
policies are advanced. As we recognized in Zaldivar, it would be
counterproductive to use Rule 11 to penalize the assertion of non-frivolous
substantive claims, even when the motives for asserting those claims are not
entirely pure.
1 94
A few other circuits, including the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, also follow
this interpretation of Rule I 1 and do not allow sanctions for a plaintiff's
improper purpose if his complaint is otherwise meritorious.195
The precise position of the remaining circuits is difficult to discern because
the issue either has not been addressed by the court of appeals or has been stated
A more difficult question of interpretation exists as to whether a pleading or other
paper which is well grounded in fact and in law as required by the Rule may ever be the
subject of a sanction because it is signed and filed for an improper purpose. In short, may
an attorney be sanctioned for doing what the law allows, if the attorney's motive for doing
so is improper? The 'well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law' clause is
coupled with 'improper purpose' clause by the conjunction 'and.' By signing the pleading
or other paper, the attorney certifies to both, thus suggesting that the two clauses are to be
viewed independently.
For purposes of deciding this case, it is unnecessary to answer this difficult question
in other situations. We deal here with the signing of a complaint that initiates the action.
We hold that a defendant cannot be harassed under Rule 11 because a plaintiff files a
complaint against that defendant which complies with the well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law clause of Rule 11.
Id. at 832.
193 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
194 Id. at 1362. In a footnote to this passage, the court stated that the special rule would
also apply to counterclaims. Id at n.l.
195 See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450,458-59 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting split
in circuits and adopting Townsend); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216,223-24 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopting Zaldivar distinction between
complaints and subsequent papers in applying the improper purpose clause of Rule 11);
Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that if a plaintiff
filed a meritorious complaint "then any suggestion of harassment would necessarily fail).
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only in broad dicta. Nevertheless, the cases suggest that these other courts will
follow the literal terms of the rule and will sanction a plaintiff if he files a
complaint for an improper motive, even if the complaint states a colorable
claim. 196 The Seventh Circuit is cited as the leading proponent of this view.197 In
Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,198 the Seventh Circuit, in remanding
to the district court for more factual findings, gave the following guidance with
regard to application of the Rule 11 improper purpose clause:
196 For example, Justice Breyer, then sitting on the First Circuit, stated in dictum that
proper purpose was a requirement independent of and in addition to merit under Rule 11:
Although the wording of the amended Rule may possibly be ambiguous in this respect,
the historical context and advisory committee notes unquestionably override any
syntactical uncertainties. Not surprisingly, then, the amended Rule has rather consistently
been read by federal appellate courts to reach groundless but 'sincere' pleadings, as well
as those which, while not devoid of all merit, were filed for some malign purpose.
Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit likewise stated in
dictum that an improperly motivated filing of a meritorious complaint could subject the
plaintiffto Rule 11 sanctions. See In re Kuntsler, 914 F.2d 505,518 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[F]iling a
motion or pleading without a sincere intent to pursue it will gamer sanctions"); see also infra
note 204. The remaining circuits suggest that they would sanction plaintiffs for improper
motive in that they describe the certification elements of Rule 11 as independent standards. See
CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 1992)
(noting in dictum that "[e]ach duty is independent; the violation of one triggers Rule 11
sanctions"); INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391,402 (6th
Cir. 1987) (noting that motion "violates all three sanctionable circumstances of Rule 11,"
including "improper purpose of delaying the default judgment"); United States v. Milam, 855
F.2d 739, 742 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (noting in dictum that "at least three distinct, but at times
overlapping, types of conduct... might warrant the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions,"
including improper purpose). The Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit
apparently have not addressed the issue, but their district courts have suggested that they would
impose sanctions for bad motive alone. See Kemer v. Cult Awareness Network, 843 F. Supp.
748, 750 (D.D.C. 1994) (refusing sanctions based on lack of legal merit and noting that
"defendant's stronger charge is that plaintiff's suit... is motivated by an 'improper purpose");
Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665, 670 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (noting that even
if it found that the complaint had merit, '"he court would find that sanctions must be assessed
based on the Rule 11 language prohibiting the filing of a pleading for an improper purpose").
197 See Knzansky, supra note 176, at 1382-85 (stating that of the five circuit courts
addressing the issue only the Seventh Circuit has consistently held "that a court may freely
impose sanctions" for filing nonfrivolous complaints that were brought for an improper
purpose).
198 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Much of [plaintiff's] brief in this court is devoted to a demonstration that it had
an objectively sufficient basis for its claims of racial discrimination. Perhaps it
can persuade the district court that it did, but this is not enough. Because Rule 11
has a subjective component as well, the district court must find out why
[plaintiff] pursued this litigation. 199
But Szabo, like so many other cases touching upon the improper purpose clause,
did not directly apply the improper purpose clause to sanction an otherwise
meritorious complaint.
One of the rare cases in which a court relied solely upon the improper
purpose clause to sanction a plaintiff is Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp.2 00 There,
Stanley Ballentine, a manager of a Taco Bell restaurant, sued Taco Bell
Corporation and Denny Koenig, Ballentine's supervisor, for sexual
discrimination in staffig procedures.20 1 During discovery, Ballentine
acknowledged that he named Koenig as a defendant in order to harass Koenig
and to cause Koenig to lose his job.20 2 The court found that this intent warranted
sanctions under Rule 11 even though Ballentine's claim was arguably colorable
and even though Ballentine also had the legitimate motive of wanting to remedy
the alleged discrimination:
I found that Ballentine had made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law.
Despite this, I have found that Ballentine had a dual motive in filing the lawsuit
the legitimate purpose of seeking relief for the loss of his job and the improper
purpose of harassing Koenig. Under these circumstances, I conclude that even
though the pleading may have been well grounded in law or fact the fact that it
was filed for an improper purpose violates Rule 11.203
Ballentine highlights other problems in applying the improper purpose
standard. What type of motive is "improper" and must the bad purpose be the
only purpose in order to trigger Rule 11 sanctions? The Fourth Circuit has tried
to give some guidance on these questions and narrow the potential reach of Rule
l1(b)(1):
199 Id. at 1083. See also Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F2d 928, 931-32
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (stating that Rule 11 "has both a subjective and an objective
component" and that a paper filed for an improper purpose "is sanctionable whether or not it is
supported by the facts and the law, and no matter how careful the prefiling investigation").
200 135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
201 Ballentine charged that Koenig gave preferential schedules to a female manager
because she was female. Id. at 119.
2 02 Id. at 120.
203 Id. at 122.
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The factors mentioned in [Rule 1l(bXl)] are not exclusive. If a complaint is not
filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must be improper. However, if a
complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court; and also for some other purpose, a
court should not sanction counsel for an intention that the court does not
approve, so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not
so excessive as to eliminate a proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to vindicate
rights in court must be central and sincere.204
The literal terms of Rule 11, however, are not so limited. It bars "any"
improper purpose, and, unlike some of its state counterparts,205 it does not say
that the bad purpose must be the primary purpose.206 In sum, Rule 11 is broad-
sweeping. It has the potential for barring a plaintiff from filing a meritorious
complaint even if he has an actual desire to obtain redress, and also if he has
some unspecified "improper purpose."
204 In re Kuntsler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990). This declaration prompted the
Ballentine court to later supplement its findings to clarify that Ballentine's bad motive was his
primary motive:
Although Ballentine, at the time of the filing of the complaint, felt that he had a legitimate
claim, he also filed the suit in bad faith to harass and intimidate Koenig and in an attempt
to make Koenig lose his job with Taco Bell. Ballentine's central purpose in adding
Koenig to the lawsuit was to harass him. Ballentine's purpose in naming Koenig to the
lawsuit was so excessive as to eliminate any proper purpose. Ballentine's purpose of
vindicating rights in court was not central and sincere.
Ballentine, 135 F.R.D. at 125.
205 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 128.7(bXl) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring
certification that the paper is not filed "primarily" for an "improper purpose").
206 Federal rulemakers, in amending Rule 11 in 1983, considered but rejected adding the
word "primarily" to the improper purpose clause. A proposed draft required that a litigant
certify, among other things, that the pleading "is not interposed primarily for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay, or to increase the cost of litigation," but the advisory
committee changed the language by deleting "primarily" and by qualifying both the delay
("unnecessarily") and cost ('needless increase") clauses. See Letter of Walter R. Mansfield,
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982) (on file with author
and also available on CIS microfiche #7906-63). Among other things, critics complained that
the term "primarily" would immunize motions filed partly to harass or delay. See Summary;
classified by rule, of public comments on proposed Rule 11 (on file with author and also
available on CIS microfiche #7920-05). The advisory committee stated that the reason for the
change was "to eliminate any ambiguity arising out of the use of the word 'primarily."'
Mansfield letter supra.
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c. Other Civil Pleading Rules Based on Federal Rule 1l(b)(1)
A number of other procedural compilations have rules virtually identical to
Federal Rule 11 (b)(1). Even the federal courts have elsewhere implemented rules
identical to Rule 11.207 Most states model their procedural system on the federal
rules of civil procedure and thus have a rule that mirrors Federal Rule 11.208
Though some states have not yet "caught up" to the recent changes in Federal
Rule 11, almost all states have some form of motive standard modeled after the
federal rule, either the delay ban of the 1938 version209 or the broader "any
improper purpose" prohibition of the 1983 and 1993 versions.210 Only two states
207 Rule 9011 of the federal bankruptcy rules is an example. FED. R. BANKR. PROC. R.
(Supp. 9011, 11 U.S.C.A. app. IV 1998).
208 See generally Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous"
Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L.
REV. 1067 (1994) (listing and discussing the state versions of Federal Rule 11); JEROLD S.
SOLOVY Er AL., SANCTIONS IN FEDERAL LIGATION app. A (1991) (surveying state sanction
provisions).
20 9 Thirteen states and Puerto Rico have rules that contain certification standards that
mirror the delay clause in the 1938 version of Federal Rule 11. See AIA. R. CIV. P. 11; CONN.
SUPER. Cr. R. Civ. §4-2; FLA. P, JUD. ADMIN. 2.060(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-1 l(a) (1999);
IND. R. Civ. TRIAL P. 11; ME. R. Civ. P. 11; MD. CODE ANN. 1-311(b); MASS. R. CIv. P.
1l(a); Miss. R. Clv. P. l1(a); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-011; OHIOR. CIV. P. 11; PENN. R. CIV. 11;
PUERTORICO R. Civ. P. 11; S.C. R. Crv. P. 11.
210 Twenty-four states have certification provisions similar to that in the 1983 version of
Federal Rule 11. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11; ARIZ. R. Ci. P. 11; ARK. R. CIV. P. 11; CONN.
SUPER. Cr. R. Civ. §4-2; HAw. R. Civ. P. 11; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 11; ILL. SUP. Cr. F- 137; IOWA
R. Civ. P. 80; KAN. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-211 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); KY. P- Civ.
P. 11; LA. C.C.P. ART. 863; MICH. P Civ. P. 2.114(D)(3); MNN. R. Civ. P. 11; MONT. R. CIV.
P. 11;NEV.R. Civ. P. 11; N.C.R. CIv. P. 11; OR.R. CIV. P. 17; R.I.R. Civ. P. 11; S.D.R. Cr.
15-6-11(a); UTAH R. CIV. P. 1 l(bXl); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1; WASH. P, CIV. P. 11; W.
VA. F- CIV. P. 1 l(b)(1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 802.09. Eight states, the District of Columbia and
the Virgin Islands have a certification provision similar to that in the 1993 version of Federal
Rule 11. See DEL. SUPER. Cr. R. Civ. P. 1 l(bXl); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Cirv. P. 1 l(b)(1); Mo. R.
CIV. P. 55.03 SS.03(bX1); NJ. Cr. R.1:4-8; N.D. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2011 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); TENN. K, Civ. P. 11.02(1); VT. R. CIV. P. 1 l(b)(1); V.I.
R. Civ. P. 11; WY. R. Civ. P. 11. California's certification standard is almost identical to the
1993 federal rule except that it narrows its improper purpose clause to papers filed "primarily"
for "an" improper purpose. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 128.7(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000). Nebraska
instructs a court to assess attorney's fees and costs if the court finds that "the action or any part
of an action was frivolous or that the action or any part of the action was interposed solely for
delay or harassment." NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-824(4) (Michie 1995). New York does not
have an attorney signature requirement but instead retains the verification rule of Code
pleading and has no motive element. N.Y. C. P.L.R. § 3020 (McKinney 1991). However, New
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do not have pleading rules that require a plaintiff to have a proper motive,
irrespective of the merit of the suit.211 Thus, in almost every court in the nation,
plaintiffs face an initial procedural ban on access to court if they have "any
improper" motive 212
2. State Statutory Efforts to Curb Litigation Abuse
In addition to their procedural rules, some states have enacted statutes to
curb perceived litigation abuse. The statutes vary as to their approach and
application. Some set out certification standards, similar to Rule 11, some
provide for postlitigation sanctions, and a few take more innovative approaches,
such as redefining the underlying suit Some apply only to particular types of
lawsuits or litigants. I do not outline all of the state statutes, but instead discuss a
few key examples, all of which have one common element: they potentially
restrict or penalize a plaintiff for filing a meritorious suit for an improper motive.
York does have a sanctions provision that roughly approximates the standards of Rule 11 and
allows a court to impose sanctions for frivolous conduct, which it defines as:
[Clonduct is frivolous if. (1) it is completely devoid of merit in law and cannot be
supported by a reasonable argument for an extension or reversal of existing law; (2) it is
undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or
maliciously injure another, or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG. tit. 22, § 130-1.1.
211 New Hampshire imposes sanctions against only losing parties and allows a court to
enter summary judgment or impose attorney's fees and costs if "it clearly appears... that the
action or any defense is frivolous or intended to harass or intimidate the prevailing party." N.H.
REV. STAT. AN. § 507:15 (1999) (emphasis added). Texas's certification provision links
improper purpose with lack of factual and legal merit so that a court must make both findings
before it may impose sanctions. Tsx R. Civ. P. 13 (the attomey signature certifies that the
action is "not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of
harassment!).
212 As is the case in federal court, only a very few state courts have addressed whether the
state provision will support sanctions against a plaintiff who files an otherwise colorable claim
for an improper purpose. The New York courts, however, have so applied the New York
statute. See Tyree Brothers Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Ferguson Propeller, Inc., 669 N.Y.S.2d 221,
222 (App. Div. 1998) (stating that "the prosecution of a colorable claim for primarily improper
purposes constitutes frivolous conduct within the meaning of the court rule [N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REG. tit. 22, § 130-1.1, discussed supra note 210]"); Gordon v. Marrone, 616
N.Y.S.2d 98, 101-02 (same).
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a. General Sanction Statutes
A number of states supplement their procedural rules with sanction statutes
that apply to all civil filings. These statutes are aimed at curbing litigation abuse
generally.21 3 Many apply to egregious cases, such as claims lacking any
merit,2 14 but some outlaw improper motive, independent of the merit of the
action. Two states at the top of the alphabetical listing, Alabama and Arizona,
provide examples.
Alabama's Litigation Accountability Act provides for sanctions against "any
attorney or party, or both, who has brought a civil action... that a court
determines to be without substantial justification."215 The statute in turn defines
"without substantial justification" as an action that is "fivolous, groundless in
fact or in law, or vexatious, or interposed for any improper purpose, including
without limitation, to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation."216 No reported decisions record the Act's application to a meritorious
complaint filed for an improper purpose-indeed, there are very few reported
decisions addressing the statute in any application-but the statute's broad terms
leave open that possibility.
Arizona has a similar statute.217 It instructs the trial and appeal courts to
assess attorney's fees and expenses and punitive damages in the form of "double
damages" if an attorney or party does any of a list of proscribed acts,218
including bringing "a claim solely or primarily for delay or harassment"2 19 As
in Alabama, there are no reported cases of an Arizona court assessing damages
against a plaintiff who filed a meritorious complaint for a bad purpose, but the
statute suggests such an application. This pattern is repeated in other states.220
213 Most of these statutes are supplements to the state's modified version of Rule 11. See
supra notes 209-10. See generally Keeling, supra note 208 (surveying and discussing the state
supplemental sanctions provisions).
214 Many, however, trigger sanctions on the merit of the complaint, or both the merit and
the motive of the plaintiff. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000)
(instructing the court to award attorney's fees only to the prevailing party and only where the
court finds "that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised
by the complaint... of the losing party").
215 ALA. CODE § 12-19-272 (a) (1995).
2 16 Id. § 12-19-271(1) (emphasis added).
217 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-349 (West 1992).
2 18 Id. § 12-349(A).
2 19 1d § 12-349(AX2).
220 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.211 (West Supp. 2000) (providing a sanctions
procedure almost identical to the 1993 version of Federal Rule 11 in addition to the Minnesota
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b. Vexatious Litigant Statutes
Some states have enacted statutes aimed at repeat abusers of the judicial
system. California's Vexatious Litigant statute, enacted in 1963, is the prime
example.22 1 It sets forth a procedure by which a court may declare a person to be
a "vexatious litigant" and thereafter limit the litigant's access to California state
courts. The court can limit access through one of two methods: the court in
pending litigation can require the vexatious litigant to post security to cover
defendant's costs,222 or the court can condition the filing of new suits upon prior
court approval.22 3 This procedure may raise other First Amendment concerns,
such as the presumption against prior restraints, but it raises the motive issue in
two respects.224
First, the statute defines a vexatious litigant based on the litigant's motive. A
"vexatious litigant" includes any person who in representing himself in litigation
"repeatedly files unmeritorious... pleadings... or engages in other tactics that
are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."2 25 Second, the
statute restricts that litigant's subsequent court access based again on his motive.
A court may allow a new complaint by this litigant "only if it appears that the
litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment and
delay."2 26 Presumably if someone files a meritorious complaint for the purpose
of harassing the defendant, that individual cannot go to court. Thus, though the
statute is aimed at litigants who file repeated frivolous pleadings, its literal
language could restrain plaintiffs based on their motive alone.
rule of procedure that is modeled on the 1983 version of Rule 11). See generally Keeling,
supra note 208 (listing and discussing the state versions of Rule 11). Some states express the
motive standard in a way that is capable of objective interpretation; in other words, whether the
effect is one of harassment or delay. See IDAHO CODE § 12-123(b) (1998) (defining "frivolous
conduce' as conduct that, among other things, "obviously serves merely to harass or
maliciously injure another party").
221 CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 391 et seq. (West 1973 & Supp. 2000).
222 Id § 391.1-391.6.
223 This procedure was added to the security provisions in 1990. See id § 391.7.
224 The federal courts sometimes issue injunctions against those who abuse the systems,
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994), but these restraints apparently do not tum
on motive. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the All
Writs Act is a "remedy" that must be "narrowly tailored' when used to enjoin "the filing of
meritless pleadings") (emphasis added). The propriety of such prior restraints is beyond the
scope of this article.
225 CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 391(bX3) (emphasis added).
226 Id § 391.7(b).
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c. Substantive Sanction Statutes
Some sanction provisions apply only to particular types of lawsuits and are
part of the substantive codes. New Mexico, for example, has a provision in its
securities laws that imposes sanctions against plaintiffs in state security suits who
bring suit "for purposes of harassment."227 Because these laws are usually
included within the particular substantive codes, they are difficult to collect and
accurately categorize. Nevertheless, as the New Mexico statute illustrates, they
too potentially penalize a plaintiff for having a wrong motive when filing suit.
d. Anti-SLAPP Statutes
Finally, some states have enacted a very specific form of restriction on court
access, the anti-SLAPP statute. These laws are aimed at a unique harm-the use
of lawsuits to deter persons from exercising their First Amendment right to
petition. The lawsuits at issue are "SLAPP" suits--suits against public (or
political) participation-the paradigm of which is a defamation or trespass suit
brought by a real estate developer against persons who protest his
development.228 The supposed intent of the SLAPP plaintiff (the real estate
developer) is not necessarily to recover on the claim, but instead to punish or at
least deter the protesters through imposition of the cost and burden of defending
civil litigation. These suits and the state efforts to regulate their use thus raise
First Amendment and Petition Clause issues on behalf of both the plaintiff and
the defendant.
Most anti-SLAPP statutes protect defendants through extension of a form of
statutory petitioning immunity.229 In other words, the laws create an absolute or
qualified immunity to suits based on the exercise of a person's petitioning
right.2 30 They resemble to some extent the protection in New York Times, applied
227 N.M. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40 (H) (1978).
228 The term "SLAPp" was coined in 1988 by Professors George Pring and Penelope
Canan. See generally Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SoC'Y
REV. 385 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, 35 Soc. PROBS. 506 (1988). Many other scholars have joined in the analysis of
such suits in the last decade. See generally Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on
SLAPPS: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine Years After Ping and Canan First Yelled "Fire!", 9
U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 85 (1997) (collecting SLAPP commentary).
229 For a survey and discussion of the various anti-SLAPP statutes, as of January 1998,
see generally Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment
Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587 (1998).
230 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.03 (West Supp. 2000) ("Lawful conduct or speech that
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to petitions in McDonald v. Smith, in that a person cannot be held liable in tort
for certain exercises of their First Amendment rights of free speech or
petition 231 Most therefore define the substantive cause of action and do not
purport to directly regulate the motive of the SLAPP plaintiff.2 32
Georgia is an exception. Georgia has an anti-SLAPP statute that turns on the
SLAPP plaintiff's motive. 233 Georgia requires a person who is asserting a
SLAPP claim, which it defines as a claim premised on the defendant's exercise
of his First Amendment rights of speech or petition, to accompany the complaint
with a written verification. That verification mirrors the certification standards of
Federal Rule 11 and requires the SLAPP plaintiff to certify "that the claim is not
interposed for any improper purpose such as to suppress a person's or entity's
right of free speech or right to petition government, or to harass, or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation 234 Thus, this
statute theoretically imposes a motive restriction on filing suit even if the suit is
otherwise meritorious. 235
3. A Court's Inherent Power to Sanction
In addition to the authority conferred by procedural rules and statutes, courts
is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action is immune
from liability, unless the conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a person's
constitutional rights.").
231 For a discussion of New York Tunes and McDonald, see supra notes 97-100; infra at
notes 346-54 and accompanying text.
232 In this article, I address only motive restrictions and do not address the propriety of
such restrictions.
2 33 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 1999).
2 34 I§ 9-11-11.1(b).
2 35 The Georgia statute has a complex structure, and its application to an otherwise
meritorious complaint is not readily apparent First, the statute applies only in cases in which
the plaintiff is asserting a claim premised on the defendant's arguable exercise of his right of
speech or petition. See id. Second, the verification standard requires such a plaintiff to verify
his proper motive and the other elements of the Federal Rule l1(b) certification, and also to
certify that "the act forming the basis of the claim is not a privileged communication under
paragraph (4) of Code section 51-5-7?' Id Third, § 51-5-7 defines privileged comnnunications
to be "[s]tatements made in good faith" as part of an exercise of the speech or petition rights "in
connection with an issue of public interest or concern." Id §§ 51-5-7 & 9-11-11.1 (c). Thus, the
statute could bar a SLAPP plaintiff's access to court, based on his motive alone, if his suit
states either a nonfrivolous claim based on the defendant's bad faith exercise of the speech or
petition rights or a nonfrivolous claim based on the defendant's exercise of speech or petition
rights on nonpublic issues. In these instances the statute would impose a motive restriction on
the SLAPP plaintiff.
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have inherent power to sanction litigants who abuse the court system.236 The
sanction takes many forms, including an award of attorney's fees. 237 Most
courts, as reflected in the DASA case discussed above,2 38 impose such sanctions
only in extraordinary cases, for example, when the party has acted in bad faith
and filed a frivolous pleading.2 39 Under this majority approach, this form of
sanction does not restrict court access based solely on the plaintiff's motive.
However, case law and academic commentary suggest that a court could use
its inherent power to sanction a litigant solely for his motive. One such
suggestion came from the Supreme Court, in dictum in Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc.240 There, the Court affirmed the continuing power of federal trial courts to
invoke their inherent power, as opposed to Rule 11 and other procedural rules
and statutes, to impose sanctions against a litigant who has "acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reason. '241 In a footnote, the Court
equated this sanction to the improper purpose clause of Rule 1 l(b)(1): "the bad-
faith exception resembles the third prong of Rule lI's certification requirement,
236 Most discussions of the inherent power of the court to sanction have addressed the
power of federal courts to do so. State law would determine the ability of state courts to
exercise a similar power.
237 This inherent power is one of the few exceptions to the so-called American rule
against imposition of attorney's fees. The Court's most thorough discussion of the American
rule and its exceptions is in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). There, the Court noted that a court may award attorney's fees "when the losing party
has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons."' Id. at 258-59; see
also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (noting in dictum that
attorney's fees can be awarded when "the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons').
238 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
239 The Second Circuit is a leading proponent of this view:
To ensure... that fear of an award of attorneys' fees against them will not deter persons
with colorable claims from pursuing those claims, we have declined to uphold awards
under the bad-faith exception absent both 'clear evidence' that the challenged actions
'are entirely without color, and [are taken] for reasons of harassment or delay or for other
improper purposes,"' and 'a high degree of specificity in the factual findings of [the]
lower courts.'
Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S-A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also discussion of DASA case supra at notes 186-90.
Even the Court in Alyseka referred to the bad faith exception as applying against losing parties
and thus suggested at least a winning claim limitation on the ability of courts to sanction parties
for their motives. 421 U.S. at 258-59.
240 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
241 Id. at 50.
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which mandates that a signer of a paper filed with court wan-ant that the paper 'is
not interposed for any improper purpose.' 242 Though no court apparently has
used this power to sanction a plaintiff who filed a meritorious complaint for a
bad reason,243 this dictum and a few other authorities suggest that it is a
possibility even against plaintiffs who prevail on their claims.2 "
4. State Common Law Tort ofAbuse ofProcess
States also punish plaintiffs through a variety of litigation torts in which the
original defendant sues the former plaintiff for damages arising from the prior
suit The common law245 tort of abuse of process applies to litigants who use
litigation for ulterior purposes. The Restatement defines the tort as "[o]ne who
uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to
242 501 U.S. at 46 n.10. This was dictum. The defendants in Chambers engaged in a
number of activities outside court in order to frustrate the proceedings, but the trial court
concluded that Rule 11 did not apply to these acts because the rule reached only court filings.
The Supreme Court stated that trial courts retain additional "inherent power" to sanction
litigants for such activity. Id. at 50.
24 3 A few courts have assessed attorney's fees against prevailing parties, but these awards
have been against winning defendants who somehow abused the litigation process on their way
to victory. See Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1362 (3d Cir. 1980) (assessing fees against
prevailing defendants who unjustifiably delayed in raising defense of nonretroactivity);
McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (1st Cir. 1971) (assessing fees against
defendant college trustees who ultimately prevailed on a dismissed professor's employment
claim, but who unreasonably forced plaintiff to file suit to get a statement of the reasons why
his contract was not renewed).
244 See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441,445 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting in dictum that a court's
inherent power to sanction has alternative objective and subjective components and allows
imposition of attorney's fees, like damages in the tort of abuse of process, against a plaintiff
"who pursues a plausible claim because of the costs the suit will impose on the other side,
instead of the potential recovery on the claim"' and against "[e]ven those who prevail"); Wright
v. Jackson, 522 F2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) (characterizing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421
U.S. 240 (1975), discussed supra note 237, as creating an "obstinacy" exception to the
American rule and noting that "even a winner may have to pay obstinacy fees").
Commentators argue that a court has power to sanction even meritorious filings if they were
made in bad faith. See SOLOVY, supra note 208, § 4.03, 4-4 to 4-5 (1991) ("under the inherent
power of the court, harassment and obstructive conduct may result in sanctions regardless of
the merits of any positions taken"); JOSEPI, SANCIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF ABUSE § 26(C)
(2d ed. 1994) (noting language in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., discussed supra note 237, that
awards are to be made only to losing parties and stating that "inherent power sanctions,
however, are not so limited" and "culpable prevailing parties may be sanctioned").
245 Some states have codified this tort and condensed it with others to create a single
statutory cause of action. See GA. CODEANN. §§ 51-7-81 & 51-7-85 (Supp. 1999).
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accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the
other for harm caused by the abuse of process."246
The tort of abuse of process is related to the tort of "wrongful civil
proceedings," formerly called malicious prosecution,247 but the tort of wrongful
civil proceedings requires that the underlying suit be brought "without probable
cause," or, in other words, that the suit be without objective merit.248 Thus,
liability under that tort requires lack of merit. By contrast, motive, not merit, is
the distinctive element of the tort of abuse of process:
The gravamen of the misconduct [in the tort of abuse of process] ... is the
misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than
that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the
process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings
that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the
proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them.249
246 RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
247 The Restatement defines the tort of wrongful civil proceedings as:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil
proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful civil
proceedings if.
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based, and
(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the
person against whom they are brought.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674.
248 The Restatement defines "Probable cause!' using a reasonableness standard of merit:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of civil
proceedings against another has probable cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in
the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and either
(a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts the claim may be valid
under the applicable law, or
(b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of counsel, sought in good
faith and given after full disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge
and information.
Id. § 675.
249 Id. § 682, crnt. a. The Restatement comments further explain the nature of the tort:
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Indeed, Professor Prosser credits this distinction as the reason why English
courts created the tort of abuse of process in the mid-nineteenth century. 250
Many courts are reluctant to apply the tort of abuse of process to the filing of
a suit that is otherwise meritorious but done for an ulterior purpose. Some courts
base this limitation on the reasoning that the abused "process" must come from
the court, not the party, and therefore does not include the party's filing of a civil
suit 251 Other courts reason that when a plaintiff serves process on a defendant,
The significance of [the word "primarily"] is that there is no action for abuse of
process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an
incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant. Thus... the
instigation ofjustified bankruptcy proceedings [does not] become abuse of process merely
because the instigator hopes to derive benefit from the closing down of the business of a
competitor.
For abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate
purpose other than that for which it was designed and intended. The usual case of abuse of
process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pressure upon the other
to compel him to pay a different debt or to take some other action or refiain from it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b.
250 Professor Prosser describes the history of the tort of abuse of process:
The action for malicious prosecution, whether it be permitted for criminal or
civil proceedings, has failed to provide a remedy for a group of cases in which legal
procedure has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with
ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for
which it was not designed. In such case a tort action has been developed for what is called
abuse of process. In the leading English case [Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838)]
the defendant had the plaintiff arrested under civil process in order to compel him through
duress to surrender the register of a vessel, without which the plaintiff could not go to sea.
Although malicious prosecution would not lie because the proceeding had not been
terminated, the court refused to permit its process to be misused for such an end, and held
the defendant liable. This decision has been widely followed, and the tort is now well
established.
W. PAGE KEETON, E'At., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 121, at 897 (5th ed.
1984). See infra note 426 (discussing the Grainger case).
25 1 See Blue Goose Growers, Inc. v. Yuma Growers, Inc., 641 F.2d 695, 697 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that the abuse of process tort "focuses on '[t]he purpose for which the process is
used, once it is issued,"' and that for the same reason, the filing of a suit is not enough);
Business Publications, Inc. v. Stephen, 666 A.2d 932, 933-34 (N.H. 1995) (holding that the
institution of a suit is an action by the party, not a process of the court, and that the mere filing
of a suit therefore cannot support the tort of abuse of process); Holiday Magic Inc. v. Scott, 282
N.E.2d 452, 456 (111. App. Ct. 1972) ("Pleading must be distinguished from
process.... Process is issued by the court, under its official seal.").
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
he is fulfilling the purpose of process and therefore is not "abusing" process.2 52
Still others distinguish between an outside threat-one akin to extortion-and
the filing of the underlying suit and hold that the threat, not the complaint filing
alone, constitutes the tort.253 Finally, some courts hold that application of the
abuse tort to the filing of a meritorious complaint would improperly side-step the
stricter standards of the tort of wrongful civil proceedings--primarily, the
probable cause or merit standard-thereby rendering the latter tort superfluous
and weakening its protection of plaintiffs.2 54 This rationale resembles the right to
petition argument 2 5 5 which I explore in more detail in Part IV of this Article.
252 See Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265,268 (Vt. 1988) ('he filing of the lawsuit and
the summons which notified plaintiff of the action accomplished that which the law intends.
There was no improper or unauthorized use of legal process.").
253 The New Hampshire Supreme Court explained this view of the abuse tort:
[Jmproper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not
properly involved in the proceeding itsel, such as the surrender of property or the
payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club. There is, in other words,
a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the
issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.
Cabletron Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 662 A.2d 304, 306 (N.H. 1995) (quoting KEErON, Er AL supra
note 250). See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486 n.5 (1994) ("It is true that favorable
termination of prior proceedings is not an element of that cause of [an abuse of
process] action .... The gravamen of that tort is not the wrongfulness of the prosecution, but
some extortionate perversion of lawfully initiated process to illegitimate ends.").
2 54 The California Supreme Court explained this rationale for limiting the tort of abuse of
process:
If, as [the plaintiff] maintains, the filing of an action for an improper 'ulterior' purpose
itself sufficient to give rise to an abuse of process action, the 'lack-of-probable-cause'
element of the malicious prosecution tort would be completely negated .... Because the
lack-of-probable-cause requirement in the malicious prosecution tort plays a crucial role
in protecting the right to seek judicial relief, [the court] agree[s] with the prior decisions
which have concluded that this element may not be circumvented through expansion of
the abuse of process tort to encompass the alleged improper filing of a lawsuit.
Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. 728 P.2d 1202,
1209-10 (1986).
255 The court in Baker Driveaway Co. v. Bankhead Enterprises, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 857
(E.D. Mich. 1979), for example, dismissed claims for abuse of process, as a "thinly veiled'
claim for malicious prosecution:
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Despite this reluctance, some courts hold that the tort of abuse of process
may be premised on the mere filing of a suit, even one that is successful and even
when the plaintiff has mixed motives in filing suit.256 hi Poduska v. Ward, an
employer and his former employee fought over who had to pay operating
expenses of an airplane.257 The employer sued for breach of contract, and the
jury awarded him slightly over $1000.259 The employee counter-claimed for
abuse of process, and the jury awarded the employee almost $22,000 on this
claim of abuse.259 The employee's only evidence of abuse was that the employer
gained emotional satisfaction from the suit and wanted to cause the employee to
feel awkward in the industry.260 The First Circuit affirmed the award for abuse
of process, even though the employer had won the underlying claim.261 The
At the outset, the court would like to emphasize the fact that the actions complained
of in count 2 involve exclusively the efforts of the defendants to convince a governmental
agency to exercise its power in certain ways. Our system of government places a high
value on the freedom of the public to petition the government, and such activity will not
be curtailed without some extraordinary showing of abuse.
Id at 859 (citing California Motor Transport and Noerr). See also Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542
A.2d 265, 268, 269 (Vt. 1988) (holding that the tort of abuse of process did not apply to the
mere filing of a complaint, even if done maliciously: "Free and uninhibited access to the courts
is an important right of all citizens.... Remedies are available to those who are harmed by
abuses of this right of access to legal process. However, those remedies are carefully limited so
as not to produce an unwarranted chilling effect on the exercise of the right.!).
256 An interesting example of this position is Grip-Pak Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1983). There, Judge Posner in dictum used the tort of abuse of process
as a basis for arguing that the Petition Clause does not immunize all meritorious pleadings:
If all nonmalicious litigation were immunized from government regulation by the
First Amendment, the tort of abuse of process would be unconstitutional-something that,
as far as we know, no one believes. The difference between abuse of process and
malicious prosecution is that the former does not require proving that the lawsuit was
brought without probable cause.
Id. at 471.
257 895 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1990).
258 Id at 855.
259 Id
260 Id at 856.
261 The court seemed to rely on the fact that the employer's recovery-$1,105.80-was
small in comparison to his original claim-in excess of $70,000--and that the employee had
conceded that he owed small amounts of operating expenses. Id. at 857. Nonetheless, the court
noted that under the Restatement, recovery, in any form, does not defeat the tort of abuse of
process. Id.
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employer's "bad" motive constituted abuse. Thus, at least some courts impose
liability under the tort of abuse of process against a plaintiff who files a winning
claim if that plaintiff had an abusive motive in filing the suit.
5. Regulation ofLawyers
Most states and court systems also regulate court access by setting standards
of conduct for lawyers and thus the plaintiffs they represent. This regulation of
lawyers takes place primarily at the state level. States differ in the format and
content of their rules of conduct, but most loosely follow one of the American
Bar Association's model proposals-either the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.262 In addition, the
federal government regulates lawyers to some degree, but this regulation tends to
mirror that of the states. A notable exception is section 1927 of the Federal
Judicial Code, which punishes lawyers who unnecessarily prolong litigation in
federal court.
a. State Codes and Rules of Professional Conduct
As I discuss in Part U-LA, the legal ethics codes may have been the origin of
the duty not to bring civil claims for bad motives. Over the years, notions of
proper lawyer behavior have changed. The ethics codes are moving away from
lofty statements of aspiration toward more precise and practical rules. As part of
this reform, the American Bar Association has suggested that it wants an
objective, rather than subjective, standard for establishing the circumstances
under which a lawyer may properly file a complaint. Thus, ironically, the ethics
codes which started the motive restriction on filing complaints are now
abandoning that admonition. Yet despite these efforts at reform, the improper
motive standard arguably survives in most codes of professional conduct. 263
As I note in my discussion of the history of motive restrictions, the ABA's
first statement of legal ethics, the 1908 American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics, followed the Alabama example and stated, in Canon 30, a
262 Most states use the Model Rules format which the ABA adopted in 1983, as a
replacement for the 1970 Model Code. The Model Code replaced the 1908 Canons. See
generally STEPHEN GILLERs & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWIERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS (1999). The ABA currently is reassessing the Model Rules in a project called
'Ethics 2000." For the ABA website that reports on the status of this reform see
American Bar Assoc. Commission on the Evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Cond
uct (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http'JAvww.abanetorg/pr/ethics2k1html>.
263 For a detailed discussion of the motive elements in the professional rules, see
Andrews, supra note 11.
[Vol. 61:665
MOTIVE RESTRCTIONS ON COURTACCESS
motive limitation on filing civil suits.264 In 1970, when the ABA issued the
replacement to the Canons, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, it
modified slightly this motive prohibition. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(1) of
the Model Code provides that in the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
"[fjile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."265
The meaning of this rule is open to question. DR 7-102(A) departs from the
"intended merely to harass" language of Canon 30,266 and substitutes a "serves
merely to harass" standard language that would seem to suggest an effect test.
Nevertheless, DR 7-102 arguably also would bar an attorney from filing a
complaint for the sole purpose of harassing the defendant. As was true with the
Alabama Code,267 the "obvious" language would suggest that the client's
purpose is key. In other words, if the lawyer knew that his client wanted only to
harass the defendant then the lawyer would know that the pleading would serve
merely to harass.268 To be sure, this is not the only reading of DR 7-102(A), but
a lawyer might so interpret the rule.
In 1983, the ABA again revamped its code in an effort to move to more
concrete rules. The new "Model Rules of Professional Conduct" adopted a
supposed "frivolous" standard for filing claims. Model Rule 3.1 states: "A
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.' 269 This move, however, did not spell the end for motive restrictions in the
professional rules of conduct
First, not all states have adopted Model Rule 3.1. Some states continue to
follow the Model Code and thus impose the "harass and maliciously injure"
standard.2 70 In addition, some states have adopted the Model Rules format but
2 64 See supra note 145.
26 5 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESpONSIBMrY DR 7-102(AX1) (1970).
266 See supra note 145.
267 See supra note 141.
26 8 On the other hand, if the lawyer, as opposed to the client, wanted to harass the
defendant, and the client had a good intention to recover, the pleading likely would not meet
the rule's qualification that the pleading serve merely to harass.
2 69 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 3.1 (1999) (entitled "Meritorious
Claims and Contentions").
270 New York, for example, still generally follows the Model Code approach and retains
its version of Model Code DR 7-102(AXI). See N.Y. CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPoNsmIrr
DR 7-102(AXI) (1993); see also GUILERS & SIMON, supra note 262 (reporting that as of 1999,
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have retained the Model Code rule for filing claims. For example, Alabama has
adopted the Model Rules generally, but it has modified its version of Rule 3.1(a)
so that it is virtually identical to the DR 7-102(A)(1). 271
Moreover, even Model Rule 3.1 arguably retains a motive prohibition. The
official comments to Model Rule 3.1 define a "frivolous" suit as including an
improperly motivated but otherwise meritorious claim:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not
frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or
because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such
action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position
ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires
to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.272
The comment clarifies the ambiguity of its predecessor DR 7-102(A).
Purpose, and not mere effect, is an element and the relevant purpose is that of
"about forty jurisdictions have adopted substantial portions of the Model Rules" and that
"several states, including California, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, have rejected the
Model Rules" though some have included isolated portions of the Model Rules).
271 ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 3.1(a) (1990). The only
difference is that Alabama has made the rule's language gender neutral.
272 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1, cmt. 2 (1999) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Model Rules, in comparing Rule 3.1 to the Model Code, state that:
Rule 3.1 is to the same general effect as DR 7-102(A)(1), with three qualifications. First,
the test of improper conduct is changed from "merely to harass or maliciously injure
another" to the requirement that there be "reasonable basis for" the litigation measure
involved that is "not frivolous." This includes the concept stated in DR 7-102(A)(2) that a
lawyer may advance a claim or defense unwarranted by existing law if "it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." Second, the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective test, whereas DR 7-102(A)(1) applied
only if the lawyer "knows or when it is obvious" that the litigation is frivolous. Third,
Rule 3.1 has an exception that in a criminal case... the lawyer may put the prosecution to
its proof even if there is no nonfrivolous basis for defense.
Ia at 16--17. This description of the change could be read as retaining the subjective element of
the code. Under this view, the "first" change expanded the definition of prohibited claims to
include all frivolous claims, but it also included those brought to harass or injure. The "second"
change substituted a "should have known" standard for the former standard of actual
knowledge or reckless lack of knowledge (i.e., the "obvious" clause).
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the client.
Although this comment is not binding authority,273 it certainly could prompt
a reasonable lawyer or court to read Model Rule 3.1 as imposing a motive barrier
to filing factually and legally meritorious claims. The history of the rule does
little to refute this reading. One report says that the intent of the ABA rulemakers
in drafting Model Rule 3.1 was to track the law of procedure,274 but as discussed
with respect to Rule 11 above,275 the procedural law imposes both an objective
standard for merit and a broad improper purpose prohibition. In sum, a motive
element still lingers in most state professional rules for lawyers, whether under
the Model Code or the Model Rules approach. Virtually all lawyers are under a
professional obligation to not file civil suits, even meritorious and winning
claims, for an improper motive.
b. Federal Rules ofProfessional Conduct
The federal government sets ethical standards for lawyers practicing before
federal courts or agencies. 76 These standards, however, do not significantly
depart from that of the states with regard to motive limitations on civil filings.
Most federal courts simply adopt the rules of conduct applicable in the state in
273 The "Scope" section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains that the
comments "are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative."
Id at 8.
274 At the February 1983 Midyear Meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the Comnission on Evaluation of Professional Standards,
described the Commission's aim in drafting Model Rule 3.1:
Professor Hazard pointed out that the proposed rule required a minimum of merit
with regard to both claims in litigation and contentions outside the litigation sphere on
behalf of a client A "not frivolous" standard was adopted rather than one based on the
concepts 'harass" or 'maliciously injure" to track the standard generally used and defined
in the law of procedure.
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr: THER DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HousE OF DELEGATES
119 (1987).
275 See supra Part lUlB.1.
276 The federal government also sets ethical standards for lawyers who are employed by
the government, but these typically address questions of confidentiality and conflicts of interest
and do not set standards for the filing of a civil complaint. See generally GLERS & SIMON,
supra note 262, at 631-93 (describing and collecting selected federal statutes and regulations
governing conflicts of interests and confidentiality of federally employed lawyers).
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which they sit and some use the ABA Model Rules.2 77 Though there is some
effort to develop one national set of rules of professional conduct for lawyers
practicing in federal court, the concept is subject to debate and a national code
has not yet come to pass. 278 This means that a lawyer who practices in federal
court is under essentially the same standards as when he is practicing in state
court, including an arguable ban on harassing intent.
c. The Federal Vexatious Lawyer Statute (Section 1927)
Congress also has enacted section 1927 of the Judicial Code, a national
procedural statute that regulates the conduct of lawyers in federal courts.279 The
statute imposes sanctions on lawyers (not their clients) who unnecessarily
prolong judicial proceedings. It provides: "Any attorney or other person admitted
to conduct cases in any court of the United States... who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct."280 Courts have long debated how
277 For example, the local rules of all three United States District Courts in Alabama
provide that attorneys admitted to practice in the respective districts shall be governed by the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any
other local rules of the district See RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRiucr OF ALABAMA, Rule 83.1(f) (1993); RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
DISRIcr COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, Rule 83.1(0 (1998); RULES OF THE
UNTED STATES DmriCr COURT FOR THE SoUHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, Rule 83.5(f)
(1979). The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, uses both the ABA's Model Rules and state
rules, but provides that the Model Rules will govern when there is a conflict See RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ADDENDUM EIGHT: RULES
GOVERNING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVNTH CIRCurr Rule 1 (1987). For a listing and discussion of the approach of each federal
court as of 1995, see Linda Mullinex, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 89,98-113 (1995).
278 Compare Fred Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335,345 (1994)
(advocating a national code of conduct for lawyers practicing in all courts) with Geoffrey
Moulton, Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV.
73, 117 (1997) (criticizing the federalization movement).
279 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). The predecessor to § 1927 was enacted in 1813. The 1813
version provided that any person who "multiplied the proceedings in any cause fore the
court... so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously" could be held liable for "any
excess of costs so incurred" Act ofJuly 22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21.
280 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). Congress also amended § 1927 in 1980 in order to allow an
award of attorney's fees, following the decision in Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 759 (1980), in which the Court construed the original statute as allowing only taxable
costs, not attorney's fees. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1234, at 8-9 (1980); see also JOsEPH,
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to interpret and apply section 1927 and that debate includes whether its sanctions
apply to meritorious complaints.
First, the circuits are split as to whether the filing of any initial complaint as
opposed to later pleadings and papers, is sanctionable under section 1927.281
Those that say the filing of a complaint is not sancitonable rely on the language
of the statute and hold that an initial complaint commences rather than
"multiplies" a proceeding.28 2 The apparent majority of scholars and courts,
however, rely upon the history of the statute and hold that section 1927 may
apply to the filing of some initial complaints. Congress enacted the statute in part
due to a concern that United States Attorneys were filing piecemeal litigation in
order to earn higher compensation.2 83 Some observers read this history as
allowing sanctions against complaints generally,284 but others read it more
narrowly and limit section 1927 sanctions to the relatively rare cases in which the
plaintiff filed unnecessary multiple complaints rather than a single suit.2 85
Second, even if the initial complaint is subject to section 1927, authorities
are split as to whether mere bad motive is enough to trigger its sanctions. The
statutory test is whether the lawyer "multiplies the proceedings... unreasonably
supra notes 244, at 315-18.
281 See JOSEPH, supra note 244, at 351-53, 383-87 (surveying split in authorities).
282 See Yagran v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165, 1187 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Section 1927 does not
apply to initial pleadings, since it addresses only the multiplication of proceedings."); Sussman
v. Bank of Israel, 154 F.R.D. 68, 71 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying Rule 11 sanctions to
nonfrivolous complaint filed for an improper purpose, but adopting a "stricter construction" of
§ 1927 and holding that a complaint is not sanctionable because it "initiates a proceeding" and
does "not 'multiply' an existing one"), rev'd on other grounds, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.
1995) (affirming denial of§ 1927 sanctions on ground that filing of complaint at issue was not
in bad faith or for other bad purpose).
2 83 See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 759 n.6 (recapping the history of § 1927 and
noting that United States Attorneys "who were paid on a piecework basis, apparently had filed
unnecessary lawsuits to inflate their compensation").
2 84 See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1985) (reviewing 1980 legislative
history and holding that a court has authority to issue § 1927 sanctions for the filing of the
initial complaint because "Congress rejected the theory that the common litigant gets one free
pleading"); In re Keegan, 154 F.R.D. 237, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that though the
"statutory language implies that it covers conduct taking place during the pendency of an
action, it has also been applied to the improper filing of a complaint").
285 See Kemer v. Cult Awareness Network, 843 F. Supp. 748, 750 (D.D.C. 1994)
(refusing to impose sanctions under both Rule 11 and § 1927 but noting that § 1927 sanctions
might be applicable to the "filing of identical lawsuits .... in various jurisdictions..." if
"plotted... in bad faith"); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(imposing sanctions under Rule 11 and § 1927 for the filing of a lawsuit that raised virtually
identical claims to those previously raised and rejected in other state and federal suits).
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and vexatiously." One interpretation of the "unreasonably" language is that the
motion or pleading must be objectively baseless. In other words, an otherwise
meritorious motion or pleading cannot "unreasonably" multiply the proceedings.
A few circuits follow this view,286 but the majority appears to hold that a filing
made for the purpose of delay violates section 1927 even if the filing has
merit.287 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in dictum, interpreted section 1927 as
potentially subjecting winning papers and pleadings to liability. The Court stated
that "section 1927 does not distinguish between winners and losers, or between
plaintiffs and defendants. The statute is indifferent to the equities of a dispute and
to the values advanced by the substantive law. It is concerned only with limiting
the abuse of court processes. 2 88
Finally, to the extent that section 1927 addresses subjective motive, it is
ambiguous as to whether that proscribed motive is that of the lawyer or his client
It unquestionably would pick up the lawyer's motive, since the rule is aimed at
lawyers, but it likely also would bar a lawyer who acts to fulfil his client's ill
motive. Thus, section 1927 could impose liability on a plaintiff who files a
complaint for the improper purpose of delay or imposition of costs even if that
complaint states a winning claim.
C. Potential Indirect Controls on Court Access
In addition to the court procedure and professional rules, many laws and
statutes outside of the litigation context arguably limit the motives with which a
plaintiff may permissibly file a civil lawsuit. These laws are aimed at general
"evils," such as discrimination, and not the integrity of court process. These
substantive statutes typically define the prohibited conduct broadly as
2 86 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
sanctions under § 1927, like those under the court's inherent power, require "that the
challenged actions [be] entirely without color" and taken for improper reasons) (quoting Dow
Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. RascatorMaritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329,344 (2d Cir. 1986).
287 See, e.g., Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1187 ("[D]amages under section 1927 are appropriate
where there is no obvious violation of the technical rules, but where, within the rules, the
proceeding is conducted in bad faith for the purpose of delay or increasing costs."); In re TCI
Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 441-47 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[e]ven those who prevail may be
liable for fees if in bad faith they cause their adversaries to bear excessive costs'); see also
JOSEPH, supra note 244, at 392 ("conduct that, viewed under an objective standard, evinces the
intentional or reckless pursuit of a claim, defense of position (1) that is, or should be, known by
the lawyer to be unwarranted in fact or law, or (2) that is advanced for the primary purpose of
obstructing the orderly progress of a litigation"); Schwarzer, supra note 183, at 195 (noting that
the improper purpose clause of Rule 11 "is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 192T').
288 Road way Express, 447 U.S. at 762.
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"intimidation" or "interference," often with motive being the only narrowing
factor in the statute. In each, the proscribed motive is targeted to the substantive
issue at hand. The precise number of these laws may be impossible to determine
because they are spread throughout the code compilations of every jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, innovative plaintiffs have already identified some key examples by
attempting to base liability on the defendant's earlier filing of civil claims against
them. In most of these cases, courts have limited application of the law so as to
avoid a Petition Clause problem. In other words, at least some courts already
have done what this Article argues all courts should do. I list the statutes here
because the narrowing interpretation is not yet uniform and because the literal
terms of the laws could prohibit the filing of a complaint for an improper purpose
regardless of the merit of the complaint.
1. Antitrust and Unfair Trade Statutes
Absent the restrictive reading dictated in California Motor Transport and
Professional Real Estate Investors, the antitrust laws would punish the filing of a
meritorious civil lawsuit for an anticompetitive motive, if such filing met the
other elements of an antitrust violation. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce."289 Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce .... 290
State antitrust laws, as well as other state unfair trade laws, have similar
provisions.2 91
These laws have the potential for restricting court access because a lawsuit
could constitute a restraint of trade, an attempt at monopolization, or other unfair
trade practice. Take, for example, a group of truckers, who file adjudicatory
protests in order to block issuance of operating licenses to a competing trucker.
They would violate the literal terms of the Sherman Act if they intended to
restrain competition and were successful. This is what happened in California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.292 There, the truckers' claims were
baseless,2 93 but without a narrowing construction of the Sherman Act, its terms
would apply equally to meritorious claims, even protests that ultimately
289 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
290 Id. § 2.
29 1 See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTTrmusT LAW, ch. 2B
(Aspen Supp. 1997). See also cases collected at note 59.
292 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
293 See id. at 509.
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prevailed. To be sure, the Supreme Court has limited the federal antitrust laws to
avoid such a result, but the Court did not address and therefore did not purport to
so limit the many state antitrust and related laws.
2. Labor Statutes.
The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board narrowly read the NLRA to avoid collision with the Petition Clause. The
NLRA provides that it is an "unfair labor practice for an employer-
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in [section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees the right to
self-organize, form unions, and engage in other concerted actions of their mutual
aid or protection]; [or] ... to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this chapter. 2 9 4
By stating its prohibitions in broad terms, such as "interfere" or "otherwise
discriminate," the Act sweeps up any number of activities, including the filing of
a lawsuit, if done for retaliatory purposes.
Bill Johnson's Restaurants provides a good example.295 In that case, the
employer filed a defamation claim against its employees, and the National Labor
Relations Board found that it did so with the intent to penalize employees for
picketing and filing a complaint with the Board. The Board declared the
employer's suit to be an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. This
finding did not depend on the status or success of the underlying defamation
claim, but instead turned principally on the "retaliatory purpose" of the
employer. 296 Indeed, it was the position of the Board that retaliatory motive, not
lack of merit of the underlying suit, was the "only essential element.... 97
Again, the Court's holding in Bill Johnson's Restaurants avoids a Petition
Clause problem with the federal NLRA, but the ambiguity of its literal terms and
that of similar statutes remain.
29429 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
295461 U.S. 731 (1983). See supra notes 49-53, 83-84 and accompanying text; infra
notes 398-403 and accompanying text.
2 96 The Administrative Law Judge and the Board attempted to examine the merits of the
underlying claim and pronounced the claim baseless "in Wact," 461 U.S. at 737, but they
overlooked that the employer's defamation claim had survived summary judgment in the state
court and had been ordered for trial. See id at 736 nn.2-3.
2 97 Id. at 740.
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3. Civil Rights Statutes
Many federal (and state298) civil rights laws present the same problem-
they could potentially apply to the act of filing a civil lawsuit if done with the
requisite discriminatory intent Section 1983 is a general federal civil rights
provision and the most common basis for civil rights suits.299 Section 1983 does
not itself create any right but instead imposes a remedy for deprivation of civil
rights elsewhere protected under the Constitution or by statute. The section
states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States .... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... 300
Though section 1983 is rarely invoked to attach liability to the bringing of a
meritorious lawsuit, it has that possible application. It could apply whenever a
person acting under color of state law sues another with an allegedly
discriminatory aim, or where a private person allegedly conspires with local
governmental personnel to bring such suit These possibilities have prompted
courts and scholars to argue that Noerr petitioning immunity limits section 1983
claims.301
298 1 discuss primarily the federal civil rights statutes here, but many states have their own
civil rights statutes, some of which are broader than the federal statutes and protect persons on
bases not protected under federal law (e.g., sexual orientation). I mention a few state statutes in
connection with the Court's rulings as to whether the state statutes unduly infringe on the right
of association. See infra notes 444-57 (discussing Minnesota and Massachusetts statutes).
299 For an in-depth discussion of§ 1983 litigation, seeNAHMOD, supra note 183.
300 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. Im 1997).
301 See Boulware v. State of Nevada Dep't of Human Resources, 960 F.2d 793, 800 (9th
Cir. 1992) (affirming summaryjudgment entered against a § 1983 claim in which the plaintiff
contended that defendants, in bringing a state court action against him, had violated due
process: "activity protected by Noerr-Pennington cannot form the basis of Section 1983
liability"); NAHMOD, supra note 183 § 2:20 (stating that "[a]fter Professional Real Estate
Investors, a plaintiff who alleges that the defendant instituted litigation violative of... § 1983
will be confronted by Noerr-Pennington immunity of the defendant unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the defendant's litigation was a sham within the meaning of the Courts' two-
part test'). Most courts that have looked at the issue have done so in the context of petitioning
activity other than the filing of civil litigation. These courts have split as to whether the Petition
Clause immunizes lobbying or other petitioning activity done for and with a discriminatory
effect. Compare LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.DN.Y. 1991)
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Other civil rights laws regulate the behavior of private persons (not just
persons acting under color of state law).302 These laws typically bar a particular
type of discrimination, and most narrowly define the prohibited act-such as an
employment decision-and thus exclude the act of filing suit.30 3 But other civil
rights laws speak in broad terms, such as "interference," and could apply to the
act of filing a civil action. The federal Fair Housing Act, for example, makes it
unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of [their rights under the Housing Act]," including their
right not to suffer discrimination in housing on the basis of sex, religion, and
race.304 If a landlord or neighbor brings a claim against a person for one of these
discriminatory aims, he has violated the literal terms of the Act regardless of
whether his claim had merit.30 5 Indeed, the government has prosecuted persons
under the Fair Housing Act because they filed lawsuits against their neighbor for
an allegedly discriminatory intent.30 6
(holding that the Petition Clause does not protect from § 1983 liability defendants who
petitioned for incorporation as a village and zoning laws limiting places of worship for the
alleged purpose of excluding orthodox Jewish persons from their village) with Barnes Found.
v. Township of Lower Merion, 927 F. Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (dismissing § 1983 and
1985 claims against neighbors who petitioned for zoning enforcement allegedly with the intent
to discriminate and stating: "It is irrelevant that the neighbors' petitioning may have been
motivated by racism .... As long as there is petitioning activity, the motivation behind the
activity is unimportant").
302 For an overview and analysis of the various federal civil rights acts, see RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FED AL CrviL RIGHTs Acrs (3d ed. 1999).
303 Title VII, for example, outlaws discriminatory employment practices, such as
discharge or refusal to hire based on a person's "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Because the filing of a civil action by itself is not a discharge,
refusal to hire or other banned employment practice, Title VII likely would not place a motive
restriction on filing suit
304 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1994).
305 For a discussion of the interplay between the Fair Housing Act and court filings, see
Franklin, supra note 4. See also supra note 86.
306 The government's efforts to prosecute persons for allegedly discriminatory petitioning
activity has sparked controversy and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has issued guidelines directing HUD investigators not to pursue complaints based on
any petitioning activity, including nonfrivolous lawsuits. However, the Justice Department has
not limited its staff in this way. See generally Katherine Pfleger, Rights in Conflict, GOV'T
EXEC. Nov. 1995, at 54; Sigfredo A. Cabrera, Rule of Law: HUD Continues its Attack on Free
Speech, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1995, at A15; Nat Hentoff, HUD's Attack on the First
Amendment, WASH. POST. Sept. 17, 1994, at A15.
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4. Obstruction of Government Statutes
Most obstruction of government statutes is narrow and specifically defines
the obstruction as particular conduct, such as violence or bribery, and thereby
does not outlaw the filing of a civil suit.30 7 Nevertheless, some statutes outlaw
"interference" and are broad enough to encompass the filing of a civil suit, if
done for the requisite purpose of impeding government operations. An example
is the provision within the Internal Revenue Code that outlaws interference with
Internal Revenue Agents in the performance of their duties. Section 7212
provides:
Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force... endeavors to intimidate or
impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official
capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of
force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes,
or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more
than 3 years, or both. ..308
In United States v. Hylton, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the literal terms
of section 7212 were broad enough to encroach upon the petitioning rights of
citizens.309 There, a rebellious taxpayer filed criminal trespass charges against
IRS agents who came on her property to investigate her son. The County
Attorney found, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that her "complaint was filed upon
accurate factual allegations that did constitute a basis for a criminal trespass
complaint."310 Yet, the federal government prosecuted her under section 7212
for criminal interference with IRS investigations.311 Both the district court and
the Fifth Circuit held that her acts constituted a "technical violation" of section
7212, but that such application of the statute would infringe on her right to
307 For example, the general federal statute outlawing obstruction of criminal
investigations defines the prohibited conduct to be '"bnbery" 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1994).
Likewise, the Model Penal Code provision entitled "Obstructing Administration of Law or
Other Governmental Function" limits the outlawed obstruction to that done "by force,
violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act
." MODELPENAL CODE § 242.1 (1980).
308 I.RC. §7212 (1994).
309 See United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1983).
3 10 Id at 1111.
311 The government also charged Ms. Hylton under a general obstruction statute, 15
U.S.C. § 1510, but these charges never went to trial. See id at 1109-10. As noted, supra at
note 307, § 1510 outlaws only obstruction through bribery.
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petition the government.312 Without this narrowing construction, therefore, this
and similarly worded obstruction statutes, also could apply to a plaintiff who
files a meritorious civil suit against a government agent.313
5. State Common Law Tort ofIntentional Interference with Contractual or
Economic Relations
Like the obstruction of justice statutes, the common law "interference" torts
possibly could intrude on the right of court access. The Restatement generally
defines the interference torts as intentionally and "improperly" interfering with
the performance of a contract (or prospective economic relations) between other
persons? 14 The key to the tort is whether the interference is "improper," and the
Restatement sets out several factors, such as the motive of the actor, that govern
312 710 F.2d at 1110-12 (finding a technical violation because she had the motive to
impede the IRS investigation and achieved that goal).
313 Cf Quifion v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 86 F.3d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing Hylton and holding that the filing of a motion to disqualify judges "cannot, taken alone,
form the basis for a legitimate obstruction ofjustice investigation").
314 The Restatement states three closely related torts, which I discuss collectively as the
"interference tort' in the text All three assume a contract, or potential contract, between the tort
plaintiff and a third person. The first two torts address the defendant's interference with an
actual contract between the (interference tort) plaintiff and a third person, the only difference
being whose performance is fiustrated-that of the third person or of the plaintiff himself.
Section 766 addresses cases in which the defendant intentionally interferes with the third
person's performance of a contract:
[O]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract... between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third
person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766 (1979). Section 766A addresses the cases where the
defendant interferes with the plaintiff's performance:
[O]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
ontract ... between another and a third person, by preventing the other from
performing the contract or causing his performance to be more expensive or
burdensome, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to him.
ME § 766A. Finally, § 766B sets out a similar tort for interference with relations not yet reduced
to contract. See i. § 766B ("One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation... is subject to liability... .').
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this question 15 This approach is different than the Restatement's approach to
other torts because it contemplates a case-by-case analysis to determine whether
the action is improper, and does not set out specific exceptions or "privileges" to
act 316 Because the tort turns on a weighing of interests, it is possible that one
who files a civil suit, for the motive of impairing and frustrating another's
contract rights, might under particular circumstances, be subject to liability.
The comments to the Restatement recognize that the bringing of civil suits
may constitute actionable wrongful interference:
Prosecution of civil suits. In a very early instance of liability for intentional
interference, the means of inducement employed were threats of 'mayhem and
suits,' and both types of threats were deemed tortious. Litigation and the threat
of litigation are powerful weapons. When wrongfully instituted, litigation entails
harmful consequences to the public interest in judicial administration as well as
to the actor's adversaries. The use of these weapons of inducement is ordinarily
wrongful if the actor has no belief in the merit of the litigation or if, though
having some belief in its merit, he nevertheless institutes or threatens to institute
the litigation in bad faith, intending only to harass the third parties and not to
bring his claim to definitive adjudication. (See § 674-681B). A typical example
3 15 See id § 767 (listing seven factors, including "the nature of the actor's conduct," "the
actor's motive," and "the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other"). The comments explain that the actor's motive to interfere
with the contract need not be his sole motive:
[l]n determining whether the interference is improper, it may become very important to
ascertain whether the actor was motivated, in whole or in part, by a desire to interfere with
the other's contractual relations. If this was the sole motive the interference is almost
certain to be held improper. A motive to injure another or to vent one's ill will on him
serves no socially useful purpose.
The desire to interfere with the other's contractual relations need not, however, be
the sole motive. If it is the primary motive it may carry substantial weight in the balancing
process and even if it is only a casual motive it may still be significant in some
circumstances.
I cmt. dL
3 16 The Restatement explains this case-by-case approach:
mhis Section is expressed in terms of whether the interference is improper or not, rather
than in terms of whether there was a specific privilege to act in the manner specified. The
issue in each case is whether the interfere is improper or not under the
circumstances .... The decision therefore depends upon ajudgment and choice of values
in each situation.
Id, § 767 cmt. b.
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of this situation is the case in which the actor threatens the other's prospective
customers with suit for the infringement of his patent and either does not believe
in the merit of his claim or is determined not to risk an unfavorable judgment
and to rely for protection upon the force of his threats and harassment 317
This comment is unclear as to whether improper interference includes the
filing of an otherwise meritorious civil suit. The comment's citation to sections
674 through 681B of the Restatement refers to the discussion of the tort of
wrongful civil proceedings, which requires that the underlying suit be "without
probable cause" or merit.318 On the other hand, these comments nowhere except
meritorious civil suits and instead emphasize the intent to harass.
The Restatement elsewhere accepts, as a defense, situations where the actor
has a bona fide claim.3 19 Because the defense applies to an assertion of a "legally
protected interest," it would seem to encompass and therefore immunize
meritorious litigation. But that is not the only prerequisite to application of the
defense. It applies only if the original plaintiff asserted his claim in "good
faith."320 Thus, a plaintiff's bad faith seemingly would disqualify him from
using the defense even if he has a meritorious or winning claim.
Few courts have addressed the question. Most all of those that have done so,
however, have refused to premise the interference tort on meritorious litigation.
3 17 Id. § 767, cmt. c (emphasis added).
318 See id. §§ 674,675, reproducedsupra notes 247-48.
319 Section 773 states the defense of "Asserting Bona Fide Claim":
One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening
in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third
person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation
with another does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes
that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of the
contract or transaction.
RESTAIEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 773.
320 The conments to § 773 explain the defense:
The rule stated in this Section gives to the actor a defense for his legally protected interest
It is of narrow scope and protects the actor only when (1) he has a legally protected
interest, and (2) in good faith asserts or threatens to protect it, and (3) the threat is to
protect it by appropriate means. Under these circumstances his interference is not
improper although he knows that his conduct will cause another to break his contract or
otherwise refuse to do business with a third person. If any of these elements is lacking, the
nile stated in this Section, does not apply but he may have some other justification.
Id. § 773 cmt. a.
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Some courts may balance the Restatement factors so that the tort does not reach
civil court filings, but others have expressed their concern that an expansive
reading of the interference tort would undermine the tort of wrongful civil
proceedings and its protection of plaintiffs.321 Nevertheless, because the
Restatement approach to this tort involves a balancing of interests rather than
clear rules or privileges, it is possible that some courts will apply the interference
tort to the filing of a meritorious lawsuit.322 Indeed, a number of courts have felt
compelled to limit the interference tort to avoid violating the Petition Clause
right of court access.3 23 In the next Part, I discuss whether this is a proper
321 In Blake v. Levy, 464 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 1983), for example, the court held that
previous litigation that ends in a settlement cannot support a claim for tortious interference with
contract:
In suits for vexatious litigation [wrongful civil proceedings], it is recognized to be sound
policy to require the plaintiff to allege that prior litigation terminated in his favor. This
requirement serves to discourage unfounded litigation without impairing the presentation
of close but uncertain causes of action to the courts ....
When a lawsuit ends in a negotiated settlement.. .[it] will not support a subsequent suit
for vexatious litigation .... This conclusion recognized that the law favors settlements,
which conserve scarce resources and minimize the parties' transaction costs, and avoids
burdening such settlement with the threat of future litigation.
Id. at 56. Cf. KFErON ET AL, supra note 250, § 129 at 992 ("The bulk of the cases involving
interference as distinct from inducement involve.., the commission of some independent
tort .... Thus in many cases interference with contract is not so much a theory of liability in
itself as it is an element of damage resulting from the commission of some other tort").
322 See Powers v. Leno, 509 N.E.2d 46 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing claims for abuse
of process and tortious interference to proceed based on allegations of ulterior purpose in filing
a judicial appeal of zoning decision without consideration of the merit of the appeal). Cf
C.N.C. Chemical Corp. v. Pennwalt Corp., 690 F. Supp. 139 (DI. 1988) (dismissing claims
for malicious prosecution because prior litigation had not ended in current plaintiff's favor but
allowing claim for tortious interference with contract to proceed).
323 See, e.g., Phillips v. MacDougald, 464 S.E.2d 390, 395-96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that "proliferation of unnecessary causes of action for the alleged improper filing of
lawsuit would have a chilling effect on the exercise by citizens of their right of access to the
courts" thereby "precluding a claim of tortious interference as a remedy for the alleged
improper or unwarranted filing of a lawsuit!"); King v. Levin, 540 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (holding that First Amendment limits and creates a conditional privilege from tort of
interference with prospective economic advantage); Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265, 268 (Vt.
1988) (applying state right of court access to "hold that a claim for tortious interference with
contractual relations cannot be predicated upon an allegedly improper filing of a lawsuit!' and
that the "appropriate remedy, if any, lies in an action for malicious prosecution"). See also
supra note 59 (collecting cases applying Petition Clause to narrow interference tort).
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reading of the Petition Clause, not only with respect to the interference torts, but
also as to all motive restrictions.
IV. A FIRST A MENDmFNT ANALYSIS OF MOTIVE R RiCTONS ON COURT
AccEss
Motive restrictions present an interesting case study under the Petition Clause.
They appear to be "easy" cases because they are what prompted the Court to
recognize and apply an individual right of court access in Professional Real Estate
Investors and Bill Johnson's Restaurants. In both cases, the Court held that ill
motive alone could not subject a plaintiff to liability. The Court similarly has
rejected motive restrictions on speech. Although these holdings suggest that all
motive restrictions are invalid, the Court has never directly stated that the First
Amendment bars the government from ever imposing motive restrictions on First
Amendment freedoms.
In this Part, I examine whether the Petition Clause properly should override
motive restrictions on filing civil suit. I begin by surveying the methodology of
First Amendment analysis. I next review the Court's specific holdings with regard
to motive and First Amendment rights. I then apply the Court's general First
Amendment tests, such as strict scrutiny and breathing room analysis, to
independently test motive restrictions on court access. I conclude that motive is
rarely a permissible basis on which to regulate civil court filings.
A. The Methodology ofFirst Amendment Analysis
In analyzing the right to petition courts here and in my other articles, I follow
the Court's example in its cases under the Petition Clause and borrow from
speech cases. I use as my guide the general approach of the Court, rather than its
specific rules and doctrines. Unfortunately, however, the Court's approach in
speech cases is not easy to discern. The Court's decisions under the Speech
Clause have always presented a complex matrix of rules and doctrines, and the
Court recently has complicated the question by suggesting changes in its
approach to analyzing government regulation of speech.
Theoretically, the Court's standard for regulation of speech has always been
a single test-the strict scrutiny test, which requires a narrowly tailored
regulation of speech based on a compelling state interest.324 The Court, however,
has instead tended to categorize speech and develop specific rules to govern
those categories. Thus, in the New York Times line of defamation cases, the
324 This was the holding of the Court in 1945, in Thomas v. Collins. See discussion supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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Court holds first that false speech is a category of speech not within the absolute
right of free speech. 25 It next looks to whether certain types of false speech
nevertheless merit some First Amendment protection against governmental
interference so as not to chill the exercise of the protected right of true speech
(what I term the breathing room approach). The Court also has suggested that
speech on the other side of the line-true speech-merits (nearly) absolute
protection. 326
Recently, however, members of the Court have suggested changes to this
approach. Perhaps the most significant statement was issued in 1992, by Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court in R.A.V v. St. Paul, a case testing a hate speech
ordinance. 327 Justice Scalia's majority opinion suggested that all speech may be
potentially protected or proscribed, depending on the regulation at issue and the
outcome of strict scrutiny analysis.328 This opinion sparked sharp dissent by
325 For a discussion of New York Mines, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text;
infra notes 462-63. This is just one example of the Court's categorization of speech. The Court
also groups speech according to whether it is "commercial" speech and whether it is spoken in
a private or traditionally public forum. The government has greater leeway in regulating
commercial speech and speech in private fora. See generally SMOLLA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
supra note 101.
326 The Court has not been consistent or precise in addressing whether speech on the
other side of the line--speech, such as a true statement, that is within the narrow right protected
by the First Amendment-is absolutely protected or protected through the strict scrutiny test,
which at least opens the door for some regulation. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the majority improperly applied the strict scrutiny test to legislation
that regulated speech by content and that the strict scrutiny test found its way into First
Amendment jurisprudence only "by accident').
327 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
328 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, acknowledged that the Court had previously said
that certain "categories of expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech,"' but he instead characterized the cases as follows:
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment,
be regulated because oftheir constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation,
etc.)--not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that
they may made the vehicle for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively
proscribable content Thus, the government may prescribe libel; but it may not make the
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.
Id. at 383-84. Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the First Amendment may
permit content and viewpoint discrimination as to speech but only if the regulation passes strict
scrutiny. Id. at 395-96. The statute at issue was a St. Paul ordinance that outlawed hate speech.
The majority held that the law punished speech on the basis of the content and viewpoint of the
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members of the Court, who argued that Justice Scalia's majority, departing from
the Court's long-standing approach, protected speech not traditionally considered
worthy ofprotection.329
In the ensuing years, however, RA. V has not caused a marked change in
First Amendment analysis. A number of factors explain why. First, the Court's
traditional approach already included heightened scrutiny; many of the Court's
doctrines, such as the prior restraint and vagueness rules, could be characterized
as particular applications of a form of strict scrutiny.330 Furthermore, the Court
in R.A. V was concerned about a type of speech regulation-content and
viewpoint discrimination against speech-that always has been suspect, even
under the Court's traditional approach.331 Indeed, Justice Scalia claimed that he
was following existing speech doctrine,332 and even he continued to put speech
into categories.333
speech and that such regulation did not survive strict scrutiny. For a more detailed discussion of
the statute and the majority's holding, see infra Part IV.C.3.b.
329 Justice White wrote the lead dissenting opinion in R.A. V.:
This Court's decisions have plainly stated that expression falling within certain
limited categories so lacks the values the First Amendment was designed to protect that
the Constitution affords no protection to that expression ....
The present Court submits that such clear statements 'must be taken in context' and
are not "literally true."
To the contrary, those statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical
approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 399-400 (White, J., concurring); see also Andrea L. Crowley, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul:
How the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. REv. 771, 797 (1993)
(arguing that the Court "distorted traditional First Amendment jurisprudence in R.A. V.').
330 See generally SMOLLA, supra note 101, ch.2 (providing an overview of free speech
methodology and noting that the term "heightened scrutiny" describes the Court's approach in
most speech cases).
331 See id ch. 3 (surveying the Court's treatment of laws that regulate speech based on
content or viewpoint).
332 Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he proposition that a particular instance of speech can be
proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g.,
opposition to the city government) is commonplace and has found application in many
contexts." 505 U.S. at 385.
333 Justice Scalia, for example, concluded that the St. Paul ordinance did not come within
"any of the specific exceptions" to the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 387-
90, 393; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing R.A.V for the proposition that "a few categories of
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Nevertheless, R.A. V may change the approach in one type of case: where the
government regulates, on the basis of content or viewpoint, speech that the Court
previously had described as outside the protection of the First Amendment. The
RA. V case itself involved such a category-fighting words-but the change in
approach may be easiest to see in the defamation context The potential change
would arise where the government makes a distinction in the type of false and
defamatory speech it seeks to punish and bars only such speech critical of a
particular view. The RA. V majority would analyze such a restraint under strict
scrutiny. In contrast, the traditional categorical approach would start with the
proposition that such speech is outside protection of the First Amendment
because it is false, and then look to whether the punishment of false speech
would unduly chill the exercise of true speech. The Court applies a balancing
approach in deciding whether to extend "breathing room" to true speech by
protecting some forms of false speech from punishment.334 Although, as
discussed below,3 35 the two approaches likely will reach the same result, to the
extent that they are different, the traditional breathing room balancing is
seemingly more forgiving than the R.A. V strict scrutiny analysis. 33
6
Finally, other members of the Court also have hinted at new approaches to
First Amendment analysis. Justice Breyer, for example, recently has written
influential opinions in which he balances a number of interests.3 37 It is still too
speech... can be proscribed"); Stephen Reinhardt, The First Amendment: The Supreme Court
and the Left-With Friends Like These, 44 HASTIGS LJ. 809, 822 (1993) (observing that "[i]n
R.A. V, Justice Scalia creates sub-categories of unprotected speech and then distinguishes
among them" and that "[m]ost people have difficulty in understanding the R.A. V doctrine").
334 Justice White, in his concurring opinion in R.A. V., suggested that the categorical
approach meant either no protection at all, or, heightened strict scrutiny protection, depending
on which side of the line the speech fell. He stated that "[t]his categorical approach has
provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing between expression that
the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the basis of content only
upon a showing of compelling need." 505 U.S. at 400 (White, J., concurring). This is not a
correct statement of the Court's speech doctrine, at least as applied to defamation, where the
Court has extended some protection, under the New York 77res breathing room doctrine, to
false speech. See infra notes 346-54.
335 Seegenerally infra Part IV.C.3.a-b.
336 Some observers find irony in the fact that the majority opinion in R.V, written by
and joined in by the more "conservative!' members of the Court (Justice Scalia writing the
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Souter, and Kennedy joined),
set a standard of review that is more protective of speech-strict scrutiny rather than a
balancing analysis of traditionally nonprotected speech-than that advocated by the dissenting
members. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 333.
337 See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (upholding federal "must-carry" provisions under which cable
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early to determine the exact nature and application of his balancing approach.
Justice Breyer uses "strict scrutiny" terminology and claims that his approach is
not a replacement for existing doctrine but instead a tool by which the Court
should carefully approach novel questions of speech, such as cable access,
especially where they involve competing First Amendment concerns.338
Nevertheless, other members of the Court and academic commentators have
argued that his approach is a new, reduced form of scrutiny.339
Thus, an analyst, today, cannot easily determine the proper approach to
speech cases, let alone how that approach should apply to the right to petition
courts. 340 In my previous article, I generally took a categorical approach, similar
systems must include local station broadcasts); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc., 518 U.S. at 727 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (upholding portions of FCC orders allowing
local operator to ban patently offensive material and invalidating provision that required
segregation and blocking of same material).3 38 In Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., a cable access case, Justice
Breyer described his approach as follows:
Over the years, this Court has restated and refined these basic First Amendment
principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of competing interest and the
special circumstances of each field of application....
This tradition teaches that the First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to
protect speech from Government regulation through close judicial scrutiny, thereby
enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without imposing judicial formulae so rigid
that they become a straightacket that disables Government from responding to serious
problems.. .. [A]ware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology,
and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, we believe it unwise and
unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now....
Rather than decide these issues, we can decide this case more narrowly, by closely
scrutinizing [the governmental restriction] to assure that it properly addresses an
extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an
unnecessarily great restriction on speech.
Id at 740-43 (citations omitted).
3 39 Id. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Breyer's plurality opinion
"cannot bring itself to apply strict scrutiny, yet realizes it cannot decide the case without
uttering some sort of standard; so it has settled for synonyms [of 'strict scrutiny']"); see
generally Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First Amendment
Doctrine: Justice Breyer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998)
(discussing Justice Breyer's approach and comparing it to historical and modem levels of
scrutiny).
340 For further discussion of the difficulty in deriving one approach to speech cases see
generally Alan E. Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16
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to the Court's traditional approach in defamation cases, in that I first defined
what form of civil court filings are within the core right to petition: winning
claims. I then suggested that courts look to whether the exercise of the narrow
right to file winning claims needed breathing room via some protection of the
ability to file losing suits. I also suggested that any regulation that purported to
directly restrict the core right to file winning claims mandated strict scrutiny. My
suggested approach simply extended what the Court already has done in petition
cases, such as Button, McDonald and Bill Johnson's Restaurants.3 41
In this Article, I conduct the same analysis, using the traditional categorical
approach. However, because motive restrictions raise some of the same concerns
as the viewpoint discrimination at issue in RA. V, I analyze motive restrictions
under R.A. V as to the one area in which RA. V might change the analysis-the
question of motive restrictions on nonwinning claims. I do not attempt to
replicate the balancing approach of Justice Breyer, but to the extent that his
approach advocates caution in applying existing speech doctrines to new issues, I
heed his concern. As I argued in my first article, the Court's speech doctrines
must not be blindly applied to court access questions but instead should be only a
general guide.342
However, before I begin my own analysis, I highlight the Court's existing
jurisprudence regarding motive and the exercise of the speech or petition
rights.3 43 For the most part, the Court's motive cases are difficult to characterize
CONST. CoMMENr 101 (1999) (review essay of DANMEL FARBER, THE FrST AMENDMENT
(1998)).
341 In NAACP v. Button, the Court first looked to see if the activity at issue---the
NAACP's organization of school desegregation litigation-was within the protection of the
First Amendment See 371 U.S. 415,429-31 (1963). Concluding that it was so protected, the
Court then applied a number of protective doctrines, such as the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, see id, at 432-33, and strict scrutiny, see id. at 438-44. In McDonald v. Smith, the
Court categorized false and defamatory speech in petitions as outside the absolute protection of
the First Amendment, but allowed breathing room through the use of the New York Thnes
actual malice standard. See 472 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1985); see also discussion of McDonald,
supra notes 97-100; discussion of New York Tmes, infra notes 346-54. In Bill Johnson's
Restaurants v. NLRB, the Court categorized civil complaints as being within or outside
protection of the Petition Clause, depending on the status of their proceeding and on the merit
of the underlying claim. See 461 U.S. 731,747 (1983). It simply pronounced a "rule' and did
not purport to label its analysis as strict scrutiny, breathing room, or application of any other
specific doctrine. For further discussion of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, see supra notes 49-53
and accompanying text, 81-86 and accompanying text; infra notes 398-403 and
accompanying text.
342 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 673-76.
343 The Court also has addressed regulation that touches on the religious motive or beliefs
of the action. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
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as taking a particular approach. The Court rarely applies strict scrutiny or the
breathing room doctrine, in their formal sense, to test motive restrictions on
speech or petitioning. The Court merely has invalidated use of motive as the sole
criterion for exercise of the right, without giving much guidance as to how to
analyze motive restrictions.
B. The Court's Treatment of Motive and the Exercise of First Amendment
Freedoms
Any assessment of the Court's view on the propriety of motive restrictions
requires an understanding of the multiple roles that motive can play in protecting
or regulating First Amendment freedoms.344 Motive or another state of mind
element can protect First Amendment values by narrowing the circumstances
under which the government may restrict exercise of the right Thus, in some
cases, the Court affirmatively uses the state of mind of the speaker as a
prerequisite for, and therefore a guard against, the state's imposition of liability.
On the other hand, motive can act to restrict activity if it is the lone factor
distinguishing permissible and impermissible behavior. The Court permits this
use of motive, so long as it punishes only "conducf outside the literal protection
of the First Amendment The Court, however, is hostile to use of motive as the
sole criterion for limiting or punishing the exercise of a First Amendment
freedom. The restrictive use of motive is my focus in this article,345 but I review
its other functions in order to distinguish and give insight into the restrictive use.
(1993) (invalidating, under the Free Exercise Clause, ordinances that outlawed animal sacrifice
performed for religious ceremony). However, because protection of freedom of religious belief
is separately protected by the First Amendment, under the Free Exercise Clause, such cases are
not generally applicable to regulation of other motives, and I do not address them here. The full
text of the First Amendment is reprinted at supra note 1.
344 In conducting First Amendment analysis, one must distinguish 'motives" not only as
to the state of mind of the speaker or the petitioner (i.e., the person attempting to exercise the
First Amendment freedom), see supra note 6, but also as to the governmental purpose or aim
behind a particular regulation. All such intentions or purposes are potentially relevant, but
unfortunately the terms often are used loosely without sufficient thought as to their different
meaning. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Mysteiy of Motive, Private and Public: Some
Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 5
(noting that "motive is by no means a unitary concept, and that the First Amendment has very
different implications depending on what aspect of an actor's motive is being singled out for
punishment, and what is meant by motive!).
345 All of the laws outlined in Part H have the potential for using motive to restrict
activity-the filing of winning claims-that is within the narrow right to petition.
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1. The Court's Holdings Regarding Motive and Freedom of Speech
An obvious starting point for assessing the proper role of a speaker's state of
mind and the protection of speech is New York Times v. Sullivan,346 the Court's
seminal case concerning free speech and defamation liability. There, Sullivan, a
Montgomery, Alabama city commissioner sued and won a $500,000 defamation
verdict against the New York Times, based on a political advertisement that the
newspaper published concerning civil rights events in Montgomery.347 The
newspaper conceded that some of the factual statements were false but contested
the judgment as an infringement of the First Amendment 348 The Court reversed
and held that the First Amendment mandates a number of protections before civil
liability may be imposed against speech. One protection is the "actual malice"
standard, under which a speaker of false speech cannot be liable for defamation
unless he spoke with actual malice or reckless disregard for the falsity of his
statement.34 9
Although the Court called this protection the "actual malice" standard, it is
not a test of ill will, but instead an awareness standard. It specifies the degree to
which the speaker must appreciate the falsity of his speech. To be liable under
New York Times, the speaker's statement must not only be false (and otherwise
defamatory), but the speaker also must actually know, or recklessly disregard,
that it is false. A speaker could have ill will toward the plaintiff but not
appreciate that his statement is false and thus not be liable. Indeed, the Court in
Becldey Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks,350 held that it was "clearly impermissible"
to confuse "bad or corrupt motive," "personal spite," and "ill will" with the "high
degree of awareness of probable falsity demanded by New York Times."351
346 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
347 See id. at 256.
348 See i at 258, 265-68.
349 The Court summarized this standard:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal Rule that prohibits a public
official form recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Ia at 279--80. The Court also imposed an additional protection in New York Times: it required
that the defamation plaintiff prove actual malice under a higher standard of proof-clear and
convincing evidence-than the usual preponderance of evidence standard applicable in civil
cases. See id at 285.
350 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam).
351 Id. at 82, 84.
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The actual malice standard avoids the chilling effect that a negligence
standard might have on speech. If a speaker fears that he could be held liable for
speech that he does not know was false, he might not speak at all.352 But,
because the standard acts to protect speech not otherwise within the ambit of the
First Amendment (i.e., false speech), the Court uses the actual malice standard
only where there is a particularly strong interest in not chilling speech. Take, for
example, the Court's treatment of the same issue as applied to private individuals
in Gertz v. Welch.353 The Court held that where the defamation plaintiff is a
private person, the balance of interests does not mandate the same protection as
in New York Times, where the plaintiff was a public official. 354 In other words,
the defendant-speaker does not get the protection of the awareness standard and
can be held liable for merely negligent false speech.
The actual malice standard is an additional protection of speech. It is a
supplement to other standards, such as the requirements that the speech be both
false and defamatory. In New York Times, the speech had to be false, defamatory,
and spoken with actual malice before the state could impose civil liability. In
Gertz, the Court merely chose not to require the added protection of the actual
malice standard. It did not eliminate the other prerequisites for liability, such as
falsity.
The flip side of the New York Times issue is whether defamation liability can
be based on the speaker's motive alone, regardless of the character of the speech
(e.g., whether it is true or false). The Court has addressed this question in only a
few isolated settings. One was Garrison v. Louisiana.3 55 Louisiana outlawed true
speech if it was defamatory and spoken with malice.356 New Orleans District
Attorney, Jim Garrison, spoke out against the conduct of sitting judges, and the
state prosecuted and convicted him of criminal defamation?5 7 The Court
reversed, holding that the First Amendment barred criminal sanctions against a
speaker whose statements were true but spoken with ill will:
352 The Court explained that a "rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount-leads to... 'self-censorship."' Id at 279.
353 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
354 !d at 344-46.
355 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
356 The statute defined "defamation" to be, among other things, expression of "anything
which tends" to "expose any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule" or to "injure any
person... in his... business." Id at 66 n.1 (reprinting LA. REV. STAT. 1950, tit. 14 § 47). It
further provided that if the defamatory speech was false, it was presumed to be malicious, but
that if true, the state must prove actual malice to convict See i d
357 See id at 64-66.
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[W]e hold that the Louisiana statute... incorporates constitutionally invalid
standards in the context of criticisms of the official conduct of public officials.
For, contrary to the New York Times rule, which absolutely prohibits punishment
of truthful criticism, the statute directs punishment for true statements made with
'actual ice.'358
The Garrison Court, however, expressly limited its holding to statements
about the performance of public officials in their jobs. As in New York Times,
these statements involve the "paramount public interest in a free flow of
information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. '359 This is a
significant limitation. Gertz, and other cases following New York Times,
demonstrate that the same standards of protection do not necessarily apply to
speech about private persons or private issues. Indeed, the Garrison Court noted
that twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia at that time (1964) made
truth a defense only if spoken with good motives. 360 Thus, in these twenty-eight
jurisdictions, bad motive could render a speaker liable for true but defamatory
statements. Yet, the Court did not suggest that the statutes were invalid in all of
their applications.361
Twenty-five years later, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,362 the Court
extended the doctrine to public figures and to civil liability other than
defamation. Hustler Magazine published a parody that, among other things,
suggested that Jerry Falwell had a drunken incestuous relationship with his
mother.363 Falwell sued the magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, for libel,
invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress. The trial court directed
358 Id. at 78.
359 Id. at 77.
360 Id. at 73 n.7.
361 The Court, however, adopted an 1837 statement of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court which was not limited to public defamation:
If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has published the truth, and no
more, there is no sound principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by
express malice ...
It has been said that it is lawful to publish truth for good motives, and for justifiable ends.
But this rule is too narrow. If there is a lawful occasion-a legal right to make a
publication-and the matter true, the end is justifiable and that, in such case, must be
sufficient.
Id. at 73 (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34,42-43 (1837)).
362 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
363 See id. at 47-48.
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the verdict on the privacy claim, and the jury went against Falwell on the libel
claim, finding specifically that the parody could not be reasonably understood as
communicating actual facts. 364 The jury, however, awarded Falwell over
$100,000 and additional punitive damages on the emotional distress claim.3 65
The Court reversed, holding that this emotional distress award impermissibly
infringed speech protected by the First Amendment
A critical question before the Court was whether motive, or more precisely
intent to cause harm, could serve as the basis for imposing liability on speech.3 66
The parody was not subject to defamation liability because it was opinion, not a
statement of facts. 367 But unlike defamation, the Virginia tort of emotional
364 See id at 48-49.
365 See id. at 49.
36 6 The Court questioned in oral argument whether intent alone could ever trigger civil
liability for speech and struggled with the proper relationship, if any, of the New York Thnes
actual malice standard to this intent issue. See RODNEY SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY
FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDVIENT ON TRIAL ch. 37 (1988) (reprinting excerpts of oral argument).
For example, Justice Scalia asked:
[W]hy can't [the New York imes] principle be extended to say you can cause emotional
harm to your heart's content, just as you can state falsity to your heart's content, but where
you intend to create that emotional harm, we have a different situation? Isn't that a
possible line?
Id. at 268. Flynt's attorney, Alan Issacman, argued that intent to cause harm should not by itself
be enough, but that knowing falsity may be. See id. at 269.
367 This distinction between fact and opinion and its import under the First Amendment,
like so much else in the Court's speech jurisprudence, are "elusive' concepts. See generally
RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION ch. 6 (1998). In Gertz, the Court strongly suggested
such a distinction when it stated in dictum:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements offact.
418 U.S. at 339-40 (emphasis added). This and similar statements prompted courts and
scholars to make distinctions between fact and opinion, but the Court in 1990 unsettled this
approach by noting that the Gertz passage was dictum and that the Court did not mean to create
"a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion."' Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). But the Court's substituted test-whether the
statement "could be provable as false"--works to achieve the same result as the fact versus
opinion distinction in most cases. Id. at 19-20. In Falwell, for example, the jury found that the
statements in the magazine parody could not reasonably be read to be statements of actual
facts. See 485 U.S. at 49.
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distress turned on intent (as well as the "outrageous" character of the speech),
regardless of whether the speech was true, false, or opinion.368 Flynt admitted in
deposition that he intended to "assassinate" Falwell's integrity through his
magazine parody.369 The Court held that this intent alone could not subject his
speech to liability:
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional
distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite
understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly
culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently 'outrageous.' But in the
world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less
than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In [Garrison], we held
that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his
expression was protected by the First Amendment .... Thus, while such a bad
motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of
the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of
public debate about public figures.3 70
This passage contains a key qualifier-the reference to public figures. In oral
argument, members of the Court pondered whether, and Flynt argued that the
First Amendment protected all parody, regardless of intent and regardless of
whether it concerned a public or private figure.371 But the Court limited its
holding to the facts before it-protection of improperly motivated speech
concerning a public figure-and left unaddressed whether a speaker's intent or
ill motive might in other circumstances be a proper basis for civil liability.
The question remains unanswered, though the Court has come close to
foreclosing motive as a basis of liability, at least as to true statements. The Court
repeatedly has suggested that truth is an absolute defense to defamation liability,
even as to speech about private persons. In Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v.
Hepps, for example, the Court held that the First Amendment required a private
368 "[] n the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict
emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no
constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or
false." Id. at 52-53.
369 See SMOLLA, supra note 367, at 59-60. The jury found that Flynt intended to cause
Falwell emotional distress, a necessary element of the claim. See 485 U.S. at 49-50 & n3.
370 Id at 53.
371 When questioned in oral argument by Justice White on the extent of the argument,
Flynt's attorney, Alan Issacman, stated: "I would say that if it does not contain a false statement
of fact or something that can be perceived as a false statement of fact, then even if it's a private




figure plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement (as opposed to placing the
burden of proof and risk of doubt on the speaker).372 Implicit in this decision is
that truth is an absolute defense. If this is the case, true speech motivated by ill
motive, such as hatred, is not subject to liability. However, even the Hepps
decision leaves some gaps. The case involved a media defendant and speech of
public concern, and the Court limited its holding to these facts.373 Thus, the
Court has not stated expressly that all true speech is absolutely immune from
civil liability, regardless of the motive of the speakers.
But it likely would do so. The balancing done by the Court to reach
distinctions between private and public speech under New York Times and its
progeny is part of the Court's process to determine how much protection to give
to false speech, speech not otherwise protected by the First Amendment Even
Hepps involved protection of false speech; its assignment of the burden of proof
on the plaintiff meant that some false speech, that which the plaintiff cannot
prove is false, is protected.374 True speech, however, is within the core right of
free speech, which the Court has suggested merits greater (and perhaps absolute)
protection than a mere balancing of interests. 375
Finally, the Court recently has addressed motive in relation to criminal laws,
most notably laws outlawing hate crime or hate speech. These are interesting
cases because they do not typically involve the public versus private distinction
at issue in the defamation setting. Indeed, the speaker and target or "victim" of
such speech are typically private individuals. When it comes to regulating
speech, a private individual's interest in compensation differs from the state's
interest in avoiding violence and racial hatred.
The Court makes an important distinction in these hate crime cases. To the
extent that the law uses motive as a basis for isolating a speaker's viewpoint-
racial hatred-and outlaws expression advocating that viewpoint the law
violates the First Amendment. Thus, in R.A. V, 3 76 the Court held that a St. Paul,
Minnesota ordinance that prohibited messages based on "bias-motivated hatred"
and "virulent notions of racial supremacy" violated the First Amendment
372 See 475 U.S. 767,768-69 (1986).
373 Id. at 778 & 779 n.4.
374 Te Hepps Court acknowledged this effect: "[W]e recognize that requiring the
plaintiff to show falsity will insultate from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably
so." d at 778. The Court accepted this result because "[t]he First Amendment requires that we
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters." Id. (quoting Gertz v. Welch,
418 U.S. 323,341 (1974)).
3 75 For further advocacy of this position, see SMOLLA, supra note 367, ch. 5.
3 76 RAV. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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because it barred speech based on content and viewpoint3 77 On the other hand,
as the Court explained in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the government may
appropriately use the same motive as a penalty enhancement where the
underlying conduct outlawed by the statute is not itself within the protection of
the First Amendment.378 Thus, Wisconsin may use the actor's racial hatred to
enhance the penalty for a crime such as battery, even if the state uses the actor's
speech to prove his racial motive.379
The key is whether the underlying act is a protected First Amendment
activity. R.A. V would suggest that if the act is protected speech, as opposed to
other conduct, then motive cannot be a limitation on the exercise of that act But
R.A. V is not necessarily a motive case. Though the Court and Minnesota state
courts had characterized the ordinance as outlawing racially motivated messages,
the actual terms of the statute addressed the effect and content of the
expression. 380 The ordinance outlawed, among other things, the placement of a
"symbol" that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender."381 It did not outlaw speech based solely on the
377 This was the characterization of the Minnesota statute made by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and used by the United States Supreme Court. As noted by the Court, the
Minnesota Supreme Court "repeatedly emphasized" that the statute was "a prohibition of
fighting words that contain... messages of 'bias-motivated' hatred and in
particular... messages 'based on virulent notions of racial supremacy."' Id at 392 (quoting In
re RA.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,508,511 (Minn. 1991)).
378 508 U.S. 476,479 (1993).
379 Id. at 487 (distinguishing R.4. V on the ground that the Minnesota statute in RA.V
"was specifically directed at expression" but the Wisconsin statute in Mitchell was "aimed at
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment').
380 The actual text of the statute did not speak directly to the speaker's motive:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swasta,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouse anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
505 U.S. at 380 (reprinting ST. PAUL MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02); see also id at 391 (noting
that "[i]n its practical operation... the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to the actual viewpoint discrimination"); Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at
487 (noting that the statute in R.A. V "violated the rule against content-based discrimination");
SMOLLA, supra note 101, § 3.10 (noting that the Court in R.A. V "appeared close to adopting a
per se rule or, at the very least, an extremely heavy presumption against' viewpoint
discrimination).
381 505 U.S. at 380.
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racial hatred of the speaker. Such a statute would be technically neutral as to the
content of the speech, and could outlaw even pleasant words if spoken with hate.
The Court may invalidate this type of restriction as well, but, as in the context of
civil liability, the Court has not yet closed the door and pronounced all such
motive laws to violate the Speech Clause.382
2. The Court's Holdings Regarding Motive, The Right to Petition and
Court Access
The Court's cases addressing motive under the Petition Clause follow the
same general pattern as the speech cases. The Court's treatment of motive and
court access is best seen in Professional Real Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, but it begins with Noerr.383 In Noerr, the Court noted in dictum that
not all activity that resembles petitioning is immune from antitrust liability;
"sham" petitions are not protected. In making this determination, the Court
distinguished between the motive of the defendant railroads in lobbying the
govemor---"to destroy the truckers as competitors for the long-distance freight
business"--and their genuine intent to influence government action.384 Because
"the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law
enforcement practice," their lobbying did not constitute "sham" petitioning and
was protected.385 So long as the railroads were seeking to influence
governmental action, their actual motive in doing so was irrelevant; they could
not be liable under the antitrust laws, despite their anticompetitive intent.
The Court blurred this distinction in California Motor Transport.3 86 There,
the Court extended the Noerr petitioning immunity and its sham exception to
adjudicatory petitioning but caused a great deal of confusion as to both the
definition of sham petitioning and the proper role of motive. The Court held that
the trucker defendants' previous litigation efforts-judicial and administrative
protests to the issuance or transfer of operating licenses to their competitors, the
trucker plaintiffs-were a sham and not protected. 387 However, in describing
these litigation efforts, the Court suggested a number of ways in which they were
sham. The Court, for example, seemed particularly concerned about the intent of
3 82 For a frther comparison of motive and veiwpoint regulation under RA. V, see infra
Part IV.C.3.b. notes 479-93.
383 Eastern RR Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). See discussion supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
3 84 Id. at 138.
385 ld at 144.
386 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
387/Id. at 516.
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the trucker defendants to deprive the plaintiffs, their competitors, of meaningful
access to the agencies and courts in order to acquire licenses.388 Yet, the Court
also emphasized that their pleadings lacked merit.
38 9
This imprecise definition of sham litigation led to a conflict in the circuits
and to scholarly debate as to what constituted sham litigation.390 Was a sham
lawsuit defined by its lack of merit, the plaintiff's ill motives, or both? Twenty
years later, in 1993, the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors granted
certiorari to answer the question "left unresolved" in California Motor
Transport: "whether litigation may be sham merely because a subjective
expectation of success does not motivate the litigant" 391 The Court answered no.
The Court acknowledged that in California Motor Transport it had used
both subjective and objective terminology to describe the sham cases.392 Yet, in
the years following California Motor Transport, the Court had not used intent to
define what petitioning activity would be permitted. It stated that "[w]hether
applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other contexts, we have
repeatedly reaffirned that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone
388 The Court stated:
More critical are other allegations,... which elaborate on the 'sham' theory by stating
that the power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used to harass and deter
respondents in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them
'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals. The result,... was that the machinery of the
agencies and the courts was effectively closed to respondents, and petitioners indeed
became 'the regulators of the grant of rights .... '
Id. at 511.
389 See id. at 512 (stating that the "petitioners instituted the proceedings and
actions ... with or without probable cause and regardless of the merits of the cases'); see also
id. at 513 (suggesting that defendants' actions constituted "a pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims"). The Court also suggested that sham litigation might include activities-unethical or
fraudulent acts-that might merit protection if part of political lobbying efforts, such as those
in Noerr, as opposed to litigation. See id. at 512-13.
390 See Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Law, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 39,
47 (1980) (discussing the "perplexity" of California Motor Transport); William R. Jacobs, The
Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional
Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 281, 301 (1973) (noting
problems created by California Motor Transport).
391 Professional Real Estate Inv. Inc., v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 57
(1993); see also id at 55 (noting that "[t]he courts of appeals have defined 'sham' in
inconsistent and contradictory ways").
3 92 See id at 57, 58.
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cannot transfonn otherwise legitimate activity into a sham."393
The Professional Real Estate Investors Court explained that some of the
confusion may have resulted from the Court's earlier use, beginning in Noerr, of
the term "genuine" to denote the opposite of sham. Though "genuine" may be
thought of as a subjective term, it has both objective and subjective components,
as does "sham." 394 The Court clarified that sham litigation must be objectively
baseless and improperly motivated:
We now outline a two-part definition of 'sham' litigation. First, the lawsuit must
be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit
is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized
under Noerr, and an antitrust claims premised on the sham exception must fail.
Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham,
the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor' through the
'use [of] the government process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-
as an anti-competitive weapon.' 395
Because sham litigation must have both components, litigation with
objective merit is protected, regardless of the actual motive of the plaintiff. The
Court's definition of the second element of motive is significant. The second
prong-motives that are irrelevant if the claim has objective merit-includes not
only an intent to harm a competitor through the ultimate judgment but also the
intent to use the process as a weapon regardless of the ultimate outcome. The
Court thus departed from its prior suggestions that abuse of process was a form
393 Id at 59.
3 94 The Court explained the subjective and objective components of both the term
"genuine" and "sham" litigation:
Some of the apparent confusion over the meaning of 'sham' may stem from our use of the
word 'genuine' to denote the opposite of sham.... The word genuine has both objective
and subjective connotations. On one hand, 'genuine' means 'actually having the reputed
or apparent qualities or character.' 'Genuine' in this sense governs Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, under which a 'genuine issue' is one 'that properly can be resolved only by
a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved in favor of 'either party." On the
other hand, 'genuine' also means 'sincerely and honestly felt or experienced.' To be
sham, therefore, litigation must fail to be 'genuine' in both senses of the word.
d at61 (citations omitted).
3 95 Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted).
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of sham petitioning and not protected 96 Under Professional Real Estate
Investors, so long as the underlying claim has requisite merit, the litigation is
immune from antitrust liability even if the original plaintiff intended to use the
process of litigation to inflict harm on his competitor.
Unfortunately, Professional Real Estate Investors did not completely end the
confusion with regard to the plaintiffis motive. The Court in the quoted passage
used the term "expect' to define objective merit. In addition, the Court,
elsewhere in the opinion equated the objective first prong with the "probable
cause" inquiry in the tort of wrongful civil proceedings: "a 'reasonabl[e] belie[f]
that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held valid upon adjudication."'' 397
The terms "belief' and "expectation" traditionally connote a subjective state of
mind, but not here. The belief or expectation is not the actual belief of the
plaintiff, but instead what a reasonable person would expect or believe. Thus, it
is an objective standard used as a test of merit, not of the motive of the plaintiff.
The Court used a different objective test of merit in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, depending on the status of the litigation, but objective merit
nevertheless was the essential prerequisite to petitioning protection.398 Indeed,
the issue as stated by the Court was the propriety of the NLRB's position that it
can base NLRA liability solely on the employer's retaliatory motive in filing suit,
regardless of the merit of the underlying claim.399 However, "weighty
countervailing considerations," particularly the First Amendment right of access
to courts, mandated that the Court reject the Board's position. 400 Thus, Bill
396 In California Motor Transport, the Court suggested that abuse of process constituted
sham litigation. 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (noting that the line between legitimate resort to
litigation and abuse of process is difficult to draw, but that "once it is drawn, the case is
established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring
respondents from access to the agencies and courts"). In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), a lobbying case, the Court stated that sham lobbying
"encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the
outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon." Id. at 380.
397 508 U.S. at 62-63 (citation omitted).
398 See supra Part II.C. The standard for completed suits was whether the plaintiff won or
lost, and the standard for ongoing suits was whether the suit had sufficient merit to withstand
summary judgment. See supra note 83.
399 The Court summarized the Board's position: "[T]he Board does not regard lack of
merit in the employer's suit as an independent element of the § 8(aX) and § 8(aX4) unfair
labor practice. Rather, it asserts that the only essential element of a violation is retaliatory
motive." 461 U.S. at 740.
4001Te Court explained the relationship of motive and the right to petition courts:
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Johnson's Restaurants and Professional Real Estate Investors have a common
element-an objective standard. The government can punish (under the antitrust
and labor laws) a plaintiff for having improper motives only if his claim lacks the
requisite merit, regardless of his motives.
The question is whether the First Amendment requires an objective merit
standard. As I discuss above, both Professional Real Estate Investors and Bill
Johnson's Restaurants were exercises in statutory interpretation based on both
policy and the Petition Clause.401 Just as I contend that policy prompted the
Court to grant added protection to losing but meritorious claims in Professional
Real Estate Investors, it is possible that policy, and not the First Amendment
prompted the Court to hold that bad motive alone could not render a plaintiff
liable under either statute.
This possibility is best assessed under Bill Johnson's Restaurants, which
gave the least amount of protection. There, the Court said that both the First
Amendment and the state interest in providing a civil remedy to its citizens drove
its decision to override the Board's imposition of liability based solely on
motive.40 2 As a result of these two influences, the Court set a dual standard for
protection, liability could not be imposed unless the employer had bad motive
and lost the suit One could argue that the First Amendment, when viewed in
isolation, requires only one of the two before the government may punish a
plaintiff for going to court, the "fault" can be either filing a losing claim or filing
In California Motor Transport... we recognized that the right of access to the courts is
an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Accordingly, we construed the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a
lawsuit regardless of the plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless
the suit was a 'mere sham' filed for harassment purposes .... We should be sensitive to
these First Amendment values in construing the NLRA in the present context... The
right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the
ground that what is sought in the court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected
right
Id. at 741 (quoting Peddie Buildings, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973)); see also id. at 743 ('The
filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor
practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's desire to retaliate
against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the Act").
401 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
402 See 461 U.S. at 742-43. The Court described the state interests as "maintenance of
domestic peace," the need to provide "a civil remedy for conduct touching interests 'deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility,"' and 'protecting the health and well-being of its
citizens."' Id at 741-42 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1959) and Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25,
430 U.S. 290,302-03 (1977)).
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any claim, even a winning claim, for a bad motive.403 This is a doubtful
interpretation of Bill Johnson's Restaurants. The state interests that the Court
relied upon in Bill Johnson's Restaurants-providing a forum for civil
remedy-mirror the First Amendment's interest in safeguarding court access.
They are not sufficiently distinct to justify the argument that they together
require the two standards of protection (losing the suit and bad motive), but alone
only one.
In sum, these cases likely provide the "easy" answer to the question that I
address in this Article. The Court has strongly suggested that the government
cannot use a plaintiff's motive to limit the plaintiff's ability to file a civil
claim.404 Nevertheless, because the Court has not completely foreclosed such a
restriction, some doubt remains as to the proper role of motive and court access
under the Petition Clause. In the next Part, I fill these gaps by testing the laws
under the Court's general analytical framework for protecting First Amendment
freedoms.
403 Justice White pondered a similar possibility with respect to speech in the oral
argument in Falwell. See supra note 371. The Court rejected such a motive standard for speech
about public figures. See supra notes 362-71 and accompanying text.
4 04 In 1996, the Court again expressed its view that motive should not limit the ability to
file an otherwise valid claim, but it did not base this view on the First Amendment. In Lonchar
v. Thomas, a state prisoner filed a federal habeas petition and admitted that he was litigating his
many claims "only to delay his execution, with the hope that the State would change the
execution method to lethal injection so he could donate his organs." 517 U.S. 314,318 (1996).
The Court held that the district court must use only specific habeas rules and not general
equitable doctrines in deciding whether to dismiss his habeas petition. See id. at 1303. In
dictum, the Court noted that Lonchar's motive in filing his petition was irrelevant:
Normally courts will not look behind an action that states a valid legal claim on its
face in order to try to determine the comparative weight a litigant places on various
subjective reasons for bringing the claim. A valid antitrust complaint or
environmental actionfor example, does not suddenly become invalid simply because
the litigant is subjectively indifferent about receiving the requested equitable relief
but instead primarily wants to please his or her family or obtain revenge. More
importantly, litigation about a petitioner's subjective motivations risks adding to the
complexity of habeas litigation, asking a subjective question (about the petitioner's
true motives) that is often unanswerable and the very asking of which may
encourage and reward the disingenuous.
Id at 332 (emphasis added).
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C. Testing Motive Restrictions on Court Access
I analyze the propriety of motive restrictions in four steps. First, I look to
whether motive might define the right or in other words, whether an improperly
motivated complaint is a "petition for redress of grievances" within the meaning
of the First Amendment This requires an analysis of the text, history, and policy
of the Petition Clause and of court access generally. Furthermore, as will become
apparent, it requires a distinction between the intent to abuse the process of
litigation and the intent to obtain favorable relief for ill motives. I conclude that
neither state of mind defines the right and that a winning claim is part of the right
to petition courts regardless of the plaintiffs intent in filing the claim.
Second, I take the right as defined-without any form of motive element-
and examine whether the government might still impose a motive restriction.
This requires a "strict scrutiny" analysis of the law: Does the government have a
compelling interest in barring poorly motivated winning claims and has it
narrowly tailored the law to reach that aim? I conclude that motive restrictions do
not survive such scrutiny to the extent that they punish a plaintiff for having an
improper motive in filing a winning claim.
Third, I apply the traditional breathing room doctrine. In this analysis, I
assume that the law is rewritten to apply only to nonwinning claims. I look to
whether motive restrictions on the ability to file losing suits might have an undue
chilling effect on the ability to file winning claims. I conclude that some, but not
all, motive restrictions have an undue chilling effect on the ability to file winning
claims and therefore must be narrowed.
Fourth, I look at this same hypothetical law, one that restricts motive only as
to losing claims, under the Court's approach in RA. V I look to see whether the
RA. V analysis might change the result of my preceding breathing room analysis.
I conclude that it does not.
In all steps of this analysis, I use as my foundation the right to petition courts
as I narrowly defined the right in my previous article-the right to file a winning
claim. I recognize that this is a controversial definition and that an argument can
be made to expand the right to include all nonfrivolous claims regardless of
whether they ultimately prevail.405 In some respects, the merit standard does not
affect my analysis of motive restrictions because the laws that I outline above in
Part HI are indifferent to merit, regardless of how merit is defined. Yet, use of a
particular merit standard is essential for much of the analysis because both strict
scrutiny and breathing room analysis requires an identification and balancing of
interests. The government's interest in restricting a claim necessarily varies with
405 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 648-64.
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the merit of the claim-it has less interest in restricting winning claims than it
does in restricting losing claims, and the substance of the analysis thus will
change with a different merits standard.
1. Determining Whether Motive Defines the Right to Petition Courts
The first step is one of definition. In other words, if the plaintiff has an
improper motive, is he filing a petition within the meaning of the Petition
Clause? If not, a restriction against bad motives is likely not a problem. Such
laws, by definition, would not infringe the exercise of any activity protected by
the First Amendment Thus, strict scrutiny and most other protections of First
Amendment rights would not apply.4 6
The best argument for defining the right to petition courts to exclude
improperly motivated complaints is textual. It rests primarily on defining the
word "for" to mean the petitioner's intent 407 If a plaintiff does not genuinely
seek relief from his claim, regardless of its merit, he arguably does not petition
'for redress for grievances." 408 This argument extends only to a very specific
motive or state of mind of the plaintiff-the absence of intent to obtain a
judgment (although such intent usually is accompanied by an intent to use the
litigation for some other purpose such as to harm the defendant). If a plaintiff
does not actually want relief, his claim (no matter how meritorious) arguably is
not a petition "for" redress of grievances, but if he wants relief and acts out of
some other ill motive, his claim nevertheless is "for" redress. Thus, there may be
some textual basis for excluding cases where the plaintiff has no intention of
actually obtaining judgment, but there is no such support for excluding cases
where the plaintiff has an ill motive in addition to the intent to obtain relief.40 9
406 The breathing room doctrine might apply. This doctrine protects activity at the fringe
of the absolute right, false speech for example, in order to not chill exercise of the absolute
right See discussion supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.C3.a. In other
words, the ability to file a properly motivated claim (if that were the constitutional definition of
the right to petition courts), might require some breathing room, such as a ban on punitive
damages for some ill motives.
407 A late eighteenth century dictionary defines the word "foe' as meaning, among other
things, "for the reason:' SAMUEL JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1784)
[hereinafter JOHNSON's DICIONARY].
40 8 The Court suggested this narrow reading of the Petition Clause in its definition of
sham petitions in Noerr, by excluding from petitioning immunity certain "sham" petitions that
were not genuinely aimed at influencing governmental action. 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
409 For the same reason, there is no basis to exclude petitions in which the lawyer, not the
client, has a bad motive. If the client has a good motive, his winning claim still is a petition for
redress regardless of whether his lawyer has ill motives. See infra notes 421-23 and
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Because of this difference, I separately analyze the two states of mind.
I start with the plaintiffs who have bad motives but who still want judicial
relief. What is the policy basis for protecting these plaintiffs? The Court in Noerr
gave the practical explanation that most petitions are accompanied by some
selfish or other "less than ideal" motive:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their
desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be
made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for
people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an
advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors .... A
construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taling a
public position on matters in which they are financially interested would thus
deprive the government of a valuable source of information and, at the same
time, deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which
that right may be of the most importance to them. 410
This practical reality extends to judicial petitions. Rarely will a civil plaintiff
have only good feelings about the defendant. In fact, plaintiffs and defendants
often are hostile to each other. If a plaintiff could avail himself of the courts only
when he had good feelings for the defendant, the courts might very well be idle.
It is precisely when the plaintiff bears ill feelings for the defendant that a court is
needed. Indeed, one of the primary policy bases for extending the right to
petition to the courts-the opportunity for peaceful resolution of disputes-
assumes such hostility.
The First Amendment protects petitions for the further reason that they
inform the government and thus create the potential for advancement of the law
and cure of societal problems. These aims are achieved by the filing of a winning
claim, no matter what the plaintiff thinks. Indeed, society might be deprived of
important changes if the right to go to court were limited by the plaintiff's
motive. Often, only one who has strong feelings will be willing to expend the
time, effort, and resources necessary to prosecute a civil claim. Take, for
example, the civil litigation that victims of Klan violence instituted in the 1980s
against the United Klans of America.41I The attorneys leading the litigation
accompanying text, 440-42 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the attorney
motive); see generally Andrews, supra note 11, at HIA.3.
410 365 U.S. at 139.
4 11 Beulah May Donald brought civil claims against the United Kans of America, the
oldest and largest Klan organization in the nation, for its role in the murder, via beating and
hanging, of her teenage son in Mobile, Alabama. She won a $7 million verdict. See generally
Frank Judge, Slaying the Dragon, THE AMEUCAN LAWYER, Sept. 1987, at 83.
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admitted to motives that might run afoul of some court rules-a desire to burden
and destroy the defendant financially.412 The unspoken motives and feelings of
the plaintiffs, the victims of Klan persecution, undoubtedly were more hostile.
They won and, as a result, the United Klans is considerably weaker 4 13 Had the
plaintiffs paid more attention to and worried about court rules regarding their
motives, they might not have filed suit.
Moreover, the idea that motive might limit the right to petition seems
inconsistent with the freedom of thought inherent in the First Amendment 414
Implementation of the Petition Clause, like the Speech Clause, demands
neutrality. Use of motive to restrict exercise of the right to petition courts creates
the risk of imposing community preferences. 415 Today, society might applaud a
4 12 Morris Dees, of the Southern Poverty Center in Montgomery, Alabama, spear-headed
the litigation. See id. Dees described his litigation strategy as an effort "to drain the Klan's
financial resources" and said that "we never entered this lawsuit to get any money, the purpose
of the verdict is punitive." See Walter W. Miller, Slain Youth's Mother Gets Klan Building,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTMUrON, May 20, 1987, at A2; Strat Douthat, Suit Knocks Wind Out
of Klan Sheets; Hard Tunes for KKK in Stomping Grounds, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1987, at
F10.
4 13 The United Klans of America could not pay the $7 million judgment to Ms. Donald,
so it had to deed its headquarters to her, which, as Dees described it, was a"virtual death blow"
to the United Klans. Miller, supra note 412, at A2. Dees has kept up the pressure by bringing
and winning other civil suits against the Klan. See Douthat, supra note 412, at F10.
4 14 In this respect, motive resembles the "viewpoinf' regulation on speech that the Court
usually invalidates. For a further comparison of motive, viewpoint, and belief, see infra Part
IV.C.3.b.
415 Unlike the use of the speaker's state of mind as an awareness standard to put the
speaker in control of his First Amendment rights, this use of motive limits the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms and raises the specter of thought control. Professor Tnbe analyzes these
different functions of motive and their implications on the First Amendment in his essay on
public and private motives. See generally Tribe, supra note 344. He concludes that government
may use motive to define what facts the actor knows and what he perceives about his injury,
but not to regulate his beliefs:
[Even this justification for inquiring into motive stops short of a general invitation to
unearth the inner belief systems that give to particular facts their motivating effect
for... actors. It is true that, in relatively rare circumstances, one might be able to justify
focusing on these belief systems in the private context as the only practical way of
distinguishing isolated violations from violations that are likely to recur, and that one may
thus be able to justify a differential response, on grounds of deterrence, to private acts
motivated by different underlying beliefs. But few rights, if any turn on the beliefs or
values that make various perceptions count for the people who act on them. On the
contrary, one of the presumptive rights people... have under our constitutional system is
that their values and beliefs ordinarily should not define what they are pennitted to do, or
shape the consequences that attach to how they choose to act.
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plaintiff who wants to destroy the Ku Klux Klan or the big tobacco companies
through the filing of a winning claim and frown upon plaintiffs who have the
same intentions with regard to an hourly wage earner or a political protester.416
But society in a different time or place might have an opposite reaction. The
availability of the courts to hear winning claims should not turn on such mood
swings and popularity contests. For the same reasons that the First Amendment
right of speech is not defined by such community preference, 417 the right to
petition courts should not be.
Historical practice likewise supports the view that a plaintiff's motive in
seeking relief does not define the right to petition the courts. As discussed in Part
MI above, the requirement that the plaintiff have a proper motive in filing suit is a
modem one.418 Such standards apparently began in the late nineteenth century as
an effort to improve the ethics of lawyers and did not appear in the procedural
Id at 35-36.
416 These are real examples. The societal approval of litigation is demonstrated by the
positive publicity surrounding Ms. Donald's and Morris Dees' other litigation against the Klan,
see supra notes 411-413, and the movie The Insider, where the audiences applaud litigation
efforts against the cigarette manufacturers. The societal disapproval of litigation is
demonstrated by the NLRB's efforts to apply the NLRA to protect the hourly wage earner in
Bill Johnson's Restaurant, see supra notes 49-53, and by the state anti-SLAPP statutes
designed to protect political protesters from litigation. See supra PartLILB.2.d.
4 17 Professor Post argues that this is the reason for the result in Falwell v. Hustler. See
generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV. 603
(1990). See supra notes 362-71 for a discussion of Falwell. Professor Post argues that
"[b]ecause it enforces a civility rule, the intent element at issue in Falwell maintains a particular
vision of community life, and so is inconsistent with the neutrality necessary for public
discourse." Post, supra, at 648. He also explains how this type of motive element is distinct
from the New York Times actual malice standard, which he views as protective of speech:
The reason the use of an intent requirement is constitutionally impermissible in the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, but constitutionally acceptable in the
actual malice standard, is that the latter does not use the criterion of intent to enforce a
civility rule .... The purpose of the actual malice standard is not to demarcate any such
'boundary between morally acceptable and unacceptable modes of political discussion;' it
is rather to forge 'an instrument of policy, to attain the specific end of minimizing the chill
on legitimate speech.' The element of intent in the actual malice standard accomplishes
this objective by placing a defendant, to the maximum extent possible, in control of the
legality of his own speech.
Id at 649 (citations omitted).
418 The practice likely was the same for judicial petitions presented to legislative bodies.
In England and colonial America, when legislatures heard judicial petitions, they generally
followed court practice. See supra note 85.
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rules until federal wlemakers added the delay element to the 1912 Federal Equity
Rules. 419 Application of other laws, such as the civil rights statutes, to punish
meritorious but poorly motivated complaints are either recent developments or,
in some cases, merely theoretical applications of the laws.420 Put simply, until
relatively recently, courts did not seem to care why the plaintiffs themselves
came to court, so long as the plaintiffs met other requirements as to matters such
as pleading and merit.
Some lawyer oaths prior to the adoption of the First Amendment may have
imposed a motive restriction on lawyers who filed civil claims. 421 However,
such a restraint did not seem to define the right to petition. First, it restricted only
the lawyer from assisting the client and did not directly bar the plaintiff from
petitioning the government. Even a complete bar on lawyer assistance would not
have been a significant impediment to court access in colonial America. Early
Americans usually represented themselves, without the help of lawyers 422
Moreover, these early oaths likely spoke to the motives or self-interests of the
lawyer, not of the client, and thus would have barred the assistance only of
lawyers who personally had ill intentions. 42 3 Thus, the text, policies, and history
of the Petition Clause and court access all argue against narrowly defining the
right to petition to exclude plaintiffs who have ill motives but nevertheless seek
relief through winning claims.
The other type of case, where the plaintiff does not want relief but instead
intends to use the process of civil litigation as a weapon, presents a closer
question of definition. First, as explained above, there is a good textual argument
for excluding this case because the plaintiff is not filing his petition "for" redress
of grievances. However, this is not the only possible reading of the Petition
Clause. "For" could be descriptive in the sense that it distinguishes one form of
petition from another-those that request relief and those that do not.424 The
Petition Clause arguably does not include petitions that do not, in some loose
form, ask for relief, whether legislation or civil relief. A complaint that states a
winning claim certainly requests relief, regardless of whether the plaintiff
419 Seesupra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
420 See supra Part I.--C.
421 The use and meaning of motive oaths in early America is open to question and
warrants further study. See discussion supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
4 22 See generally CHARLEs WARREN, THE HISTORY OF ThE AmFRICAN BAR 4-8 (1911)
(describing the lawyers' disrepute in colonial America and their absence from the legal system
of the time).
42 3 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
424 The 1784 dictionary lists "with respect to" as an alternative meaning of the word
"for." JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 409.
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actually wants or expects that relief.
The policy arguments likewise are mixed as to this form of motive. A claim
that the plaintiff filed with the sole aim of using the process to harass the
defendant does not advance the plaintiff's interest in peaceful resolution of his
suit because he does not care about the resolution. The filing of such a claim is
an alternative to force, but this policy is less compelling where that alternative is
used to inflict another form of injury (i.e., the burdens and costs of litigation
rather than physical injury). But the differences end there. Assuming, as we must
here, that the suit states a winning claim, it serves the other aims of the Petition
Clause irrespective of the plaintiffs intent to use the process as a weapon.
Winning claims will inform the government of problems, may advance the state
of the law, and may help other persons who might suffer similar wrongs at the
hands of the defendant or others. They serve these aims even if the plaintiff
himself wants to use the prosecution of his winning claim to harass the
defendant. To use the Klan example, the benefits of ultimately winning would be
the same, regardless of whether the plaintiffs originally intended only to use the
suit as a form of harassment or weapon to harm the Klan.
Finally, historical practice suggests that courts and legislatures were as
indifferent to this motive as they were to other ill motives of the plaintiff. As
noted above, courts and legislatures prior to the nineteenth century typically did
not care what motivated a plaintiff.425 The tort of abuse of process, designed to
redress the use of process as a weapon, is a relatively modem creation. English
courts developed the tort in the mid-nineteenth century, to cover situations not
addressed by the tort of malicious prosecution (today called wrongful civil
proceedings).426 Even today, application of the tort of abuse of process to the
425 See supra Part MA.
426 Professor Prosser credits the 1848 English case of Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep.
769 (1838), as the origin of the tort of abuse of process. See supra note 250, at 897; see also
Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265, 267 (Vt 1988) (noting that "[t]he tort known as abuse of
process first appeared in Grainger v. Hil'). The Grainger court described the new cause of
action as follows:
Mhis is an action for abusing the process of the law, by applying it to extort property
from the Plaintif and not an action for a malicious arest or malicious prosecution, in
order to support which action the termination of the previous proceeding must be proved,
and the absence of reasonable and probable cause be alleged as well as proved.
Grainger, 132 Eng. Rep. at 773. One of the several judges deciding the case stated that it was
one of first impression:
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filing of an otherwise meritorious lawsuit is not universally accepted. 427
In sum, the arguments are mixed as to whether the single purpose of abusing
process might take a winning claim outside the protection of the Petition Clause.
However, given the textual argument that a winning claim is always a claim for
redress, the policy that winning claims, regardless of motive, serve some social
function, and the absence of such limitation in historical practice leads me to
conclude that a motive limitation is not inherent in the right to petition courts. A
plaintiff s bad motive does not take his claim outside of the protection of the
First Amendment so long as his suit states a winning claim.
2. Strict Scrutiny ofMotive Restrictions on Winning Claims
That a claim is protected by the First Amendment does not mean that it is
free from any form of regulation or limitation. The government may regulate
exercise of the right to petition courts so long as the regulation passes strict
scrutiny analysis: The government must have a compelling interest in imposing
its restriction, and the regulation must restrict no more First Amendment activity
than necessary to achieve that aim. The process of strict scrutiny is neither
simple nor analytically precise. For example, the Court and its observers
seemingly cannot agree on what constitutes strict scrutiny, as opposed to some
'lesser" form of review or absolute protection 428 In addition, courts often
confuse the two prongs of strict scrutiny, considering the same facts under both
prongs. 429 Nevertheless, strict scrutiny, in broad strokes, requires that any
governmental restriction on a First Amendment right both have a compelling aim
and be narrowly tailored to achieve the aim.
Because strict scrutiny depends on the aims and effects of the statute, it
necessarily requires an examination of each law in isolation. As outlined in Part
[1]his is a case prinr impressionis, in which the Defendants are charged with having
abused the process of the law, in order to obtain property to which they had no colour of
title; and, if an action on the case be the remedy applicable to a new species of injury, the
declaration and proof must be according to the particular circumstances.
Id. at 773 (Park, J.) (emphasis added).
427 Many courts rely on policy and doctrinal grounds other than the Petition Clause and
refuse to extend the tort of abuse of process to the filing of a meritorious complaint for an
abusive purpose. See supra Part UHL.4.
428 The debate concerning Justice Breyer's analysis in the cable access cases is an
example. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
4 29 For an example of such confusion, see the discussion of the Court's treatment of civil
rights laws against challenges based on the right to assemble infra notes 443-59 and
accompanying text
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IMI, however, there are countless laws that arguably regulate the motive of a
plaintiff. Thus, in this Part, I address the issue of motive restrictions in the two
broad categories in which I previously outlined them: the direct court access
restrictions, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1), and the indirect
restrictions, such as the civil rights laws. I start with the direct court access
regulations.
a. Court Access Rules
The first question is to determine the governmental interest behind the court
rules that regulate motive. This is easily answered. Most systems describe the
aim of these laws as deterring abuse, principally frivolous lawsuits. 430
Deterrence of baseless litigation is likely a compelling state interest. Frivolous
litigation causes a number of harms that the government legitirmately may seek to
avoid. First, the government has an interest in ensuring that the limited resources
of the courts are not consumed by frivolous claims. As noted by the Court in
United States v. Harriss431 (a Petition Clause challenge to federal restrictions on
lobbying), the government has a "vital" interest in ensuring that the voices of all
of the people are not drowned out by some of the people.4 32 A restriction against
frivolous claims conserves judicial resources and helps guarantee that persons
with meritorious claims have access to court.
A baseless lawsuit also can harm the defendant in a number of ways. He can
suffer the same reputational harm that a defamation plaintiff suffers, as well as
4 30 The advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 11 state the
aims of the rule and its revision:
Since its original promulgation, Rule I 1 has provided for the striking of pleadings and
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of pleadings.
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses.
Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of
sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 amendment). See also supra Part 1m1B.1.a.
431 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
432 See id at 625-26 (stating that Congress had a "vital national interest ' in regulating
lobbying to prevent the voice of the people from otherwise being "drowned out by the voice of
special interest groups").
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the considerable expense of defending a suit. The taxpayers similarly pay a high
cost They must, through their government build court houses, hire judges and
court staff, and otherwise process every claim, but these efforts are virtually
wasted if a claim is baseless.
The conclusion that the government has a compelling interest does not end
the analysis. The restriction also must pass the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test. That is the problem here. Motive restrictions are not narrowly tailored to
achieve the end of avoiding frivolous claims. To be sure, motive restrictions
penalize some frivolous lawsuits. Many improperly motivated claims are also
factually or legally frivolous, but a motive restriction is not necessary to curb
frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, many of the laws that contain a motive restriction
independently prohibit frivolous claims. The second and third clauses of Federal
Rule 11(b), for example, bar claims that do not have evidentiary support or are
not supported by the law.433 The addition of a motive restriction accomplishes
nothing other than prohibition of meritorious and winning claims. In sum, if
deterrence of frivolous claims is the sole interest behind motive restrictions, they
fail strict scrutiny.
The analysis now returns to the first prong. Does the government have any
direct interest in restricting a plaintiff's motive in the filing of winning claims?
One possibility is the interest in avoiding use of the litigation process as a
weapon. The state certainly has some interest in requiring that plaintiffs not use
its courts as a weapon. Such a prohibition maintains the integrity of courts and
protects citizens from this type of harm. In the end, however, this interest does
not justify restriction of winning claims.
By definition, the activity at issue in this analysis is narrow-the filing of a
winning claim with the intent to use the process of litigation as a weapon. Such
claims do not present the type or degree of harm presented by frivolous claims.
Other plaintiffs suffer no more from these filings than they do with any other
winning claim. The defendant certainly suffers when the plaintiff strives to use
the process of litigation as a weapon, but the defendant incurs the expense and
burden of litigation any time a plaintiff files a winning claim. Absent some other
wrongful act, the plaintiff's ill motive alone does not add any harm to the
defendant, other than perhaps emotional harm if the defendant knows the
plaintiffs ill feelings. The taxpayers pay a cost, as they do with every claim, but
they also get the benefits arising from the filing of a winning claim: advancement
in the law and a cure of wrongdoing by the defendant or by others. In short, it is
difficult to conclude that the state has a compelling interest in avoiding the filing
of any winning claim, no matter what the plaintiff's actual motive is in doing so.
433 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 1(bX2), (3), reprinted in text accompanying supra note 152.
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The government may have a compelling interest in avoiding other abuses of
its process, such as violation of its court rules, undue expansion of the suit, or
outside threats and extortion related to litigation. Indeed, this is often the
definition of the tort of abuse of process. 434 But the motive restrictions as I
define them (and identify them in Part DI.B) are not narrowly aimed to achieve
this interest. They potentially bar the filing of winning claims. They are not
limited to cases where the plaintiff violates rules or makes outside threats.
Instead, they may apply based solely on the plaintiff's motive in filing the
original complaint, even if the plaintiff otherwise behaves properly.
Another justification for at least some of the motive restrictions, those that
apply to the plaintiff's lawyer, is the professionalism of the plaintiff's lawyer and
the integrity of the legal profession as a whole. Interestingly, as noted in Part
IlI.A, this concern, embodied in lawyer oaths and early ethics codes, apparently
was the catalyst for more wide-spread adoption of motive restrictions on
complaint filings. The concern about the ethics of lawyers is at least as strong
today as it was in the nineteenth century.435 The government continues to have
an interest in maintaining the integrity of and public confidence in the legal
profession, and lawyers who act with spite, ill will, or other bad motives certainly
undermine that aim.
The issue here is more complex than it might seem. Analysis of the
sufficiency of the interest requires a further breakdown of the state's
professionalism concern. One such concern might be that baseless lawsuits
damage the reputation of lawyers. If this is the concern, the motive restrictions
fail. They are not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of deterring baseless
suits. 4 3 6
Another concern might be that poor motives alone hurt the profession. The
Court's decisions in the group litigation cases of the 1960s, however, suggest that
such general professionalism concerns usually are too speculative to support a
significant intrusion on the right to petition courts.437 In those cases, the states
sought to use their professional regulations to bar the NAACP and labor unions
from encouraging and sponsoring litigation among its members.438 The
434 Seesupra Part llI.B.4.
435 The outcry about professionalism among lawyers has become so great that in 1993,
the ABA created a special committee to engage in a two-year study of professionalism among
American lawyers. See Teaching and Learning Professionalism, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSION TO BAR 1, 2-3, nn.5-7, app. G (listing recent literature on
professionalism).
436 See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
437 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing group cases).
438 See United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217
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purported justification was the state's interest in regulating lawyers and, more
specifically, in avoiding conflicts of interests and baseless litigation. The Court
held that these concerns were "too speculative" to justify the substantial intrusion
into First Amendment rights. 39
Whether motive restrictions similarly fail under this justification depends on
the motive the rule seeks to regulate. If the rule regulates the motive of the client,
as opposed to the lawyer, the danger to the profession is too remote to justify
such a broad ban on the client's access to court. A lawyer who personally has
pure motives will not do much, if any, harm to the profession when he files a
winning claim, even if his client has ill motives.
This is not to say that reputational concerns are never enough.440 To the
(1967) (invalidating application of the state unauthorized practice of law statute to enjoin union
employment of lawyers to advise and represent members on worker compensation claims);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (invalidating application of
Virginia statutes against solicitation and unauthorized practice of law to enjoin union advisory
and referral service for members' FELA claims); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
(invalidating application of a Virginia statute against solicitation of legal business to bar
NAACP from advising Virginia citizens of potential grounds for litigation to achieve school
desegregation).
439 The Court in United Mine Workers ofAmerica described the holdings in Button and
Railroad Trainmen and its own:
[In Button], we held the dangers of baseless litigation and conflicting interest between the
association and individual litigants far too speculative to justify the broad remedy invoked
by the State, a remedy that would have seriously crippled the efforts of the NAACP to
vindicate the rights of its members in court Likewise in the Trainmen case there was a
theoretical possibility that the union's interests would diverge from that of the individual
litigant members, and there was a further possibility that if this divergence ever occurred,
the union's power to cut off the attorney's referral business could induce the attorney to
sacrifice the interest of his client Again we ruled that this very distant possibility of harm
could not justify a complete prohibition of the Tmrinmen's efforts to aid one another in
assuring that each injured member would bejustly compensated for his injuries.
We think that both the Button and Trainmen cases are controlling here.
The decree at issue here thus substantially impairs the associational rights of the
Mine Workers and is not needed to protect the State's interest in the high standard of legal
ethics.
389 U.S. at 223, 225.
440 The Court, in the group litigation cases easily dismissed such concerns, but it recently
seemed to resurrect the "reputational" interest as a possible justification for limitation of lawyer
commercial speech. In Florida Bar v. Went Forlt, 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court relied in part
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
extent that the state is concerned that the lawyer's own motives might damage
the profession, the concern may be sufficient to justify the limitation. The impact
of such a rule would have negligible impact on the client He could hire another
lawyer without these personal motives. More importantly, such a rule would
benefit most clients by avoiding the conflict inherent in a representation where
the lawyer is burdened by personal ill motives.441 The problem with most motive
rules, however, is that they are not narrowly tailored to address only the lawyer's
ill motives.442
In sum, none of the purported justifications for the direct motive controls on
court access justify the broad impact of such rules on court access. The first
category of motive restrictions therefore fail strict scrutiny.
b. Substantive Statutes
The second broad category of motive restrictions--those not aimed directly
at controlling court access but instead at "substantive evils"-present a closer
case under strict scrutiny. The governmental purpose behind such laws is
markedly different than that behind court rules. The government's interest is not
in judicial management or regulation of the legal profession, but instead in
stopping persons from acting with racial hatred, anticompetitive intent or
retaliatory aims in employment Because the civil rights laws protect against
discrimination and arguably present the most compelling justification for
governmental action, I use them as the basis for my evaluation. If the civil rights
laws fail to justify governmental limitation on the right to file winning claims, as
on such an interest in upholding a 30-day waiting period on lawyer solicitation of accident
victims and surviving family members. Id at 631-32. The Court noted that the state presented
substantial record evidence of "the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession
that the practice of direct solicitation only days after accidents has engendered," id. at 631, and
concluded that the state "has a substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from
invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that
such repeated invasions have engendered." Id. at 635. This prompted some Justices to dissent;
they challenged reliance on the "reputation and dignity of the legal profession" as antithetical
to the First Amendment principles of free expression. Id at 639-40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
This debate, however, arose in the context of commercial speech, on which the Court has more
freely allowed regulation than on traditional speech, which the Court subjects to strict scrutiny.
See supra note 325.
441 The rules barring conflicts of interests might bar such a representation. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
442 See generally supra Part .B. Rule I l(bX1), for example, apparently applies to both
lawyers and litigants and seemingly prohibits both from filing for "any improper purpose." See
supra text accompanying note 152. For a more detailed discussion of the breadth and impact of
the professional rules of conduct for lawyers, see generally Andrews, supra note 11.
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I conclude they do, the other laws that I list in Part III.C fail strict scrutiny as
well.
The government has a strong interest in stopping discrimination-the
interest in protecting basic human dignity and in avoiding the societal problems
caused by discrimination. The civil rights laws attempt to assure that persons are
judged and treated based on their actions and abilities, not their race, sex, or
religion. Although we all might suffer adverse employment or housing decisions,
we should not have to suffer them solely because we are black, female, or of the
Jewish faith. Congress has wisely chosen to protect us from these special harms.
But housing and employment decisions are not protected by the Bill of Rights.
The question here is whether the government can insist upon a nondiscriminatory
motive in exercise of a First Amendment freedom, such as speech or the right to
file a winning civil claim. In other words, does the government's interests in
stopping discrimination override the individual's interests in these basic
freedoms?
The Court has given little guidance on this issue. Where the Court has
considered civil rights laws that impact First Amendment rights (most notably,
the right of association) the key factor in its analysis has been the degree to
which the civil rights law affects core activity protected under the First
Amendment. A civil rights law that substantially intrudes on the First
Amendment does not pass muster, but one that has lesser effect will survive strict
scrutiny. Seemingly, this factor would be relevant to the second prong of strict
scrutiny-the statute is not narrowly tailored if it intrudes "substantially" on First
Amendment freedoms-but the Court has suggested it under the first prong as
well-the government does not have a compelling interest in regulating core
First Amendment activities, even if its aim is to promote civil rights. Two cases
illustrate this "substantial intrusion" test.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,4 3 Minnesota applied its "Human
Rights Act' 444 to compel the Jaycees to accept women as members, and the
Jaycees challenged the order as a violation of their First Amendment right of
association. The Court rejected their claim, and in doing so, went to great pains
to assess the effect on First Amendment freedoms. First, the Court distinguished
between forms of association. If the association is particularly intimate, such as
that in marriage and family, or if the association is for the purposes expressed in
the First Amendment, such as speech, religion, and petition, the Court extends
443 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
444 The Minnesota Human Rights Act is an example of the public accommodations laws
that some states enacted a decade before the federal government passed the Civil Rights Act of
1875. Minnesota progressively has broadened the statute, adding sexual discrimination in
1973. Id at 624.
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greater protection than to other forms of association 45 According to the Court,
the Jaycees were not an intimate form of relationship,446 but they did engage in
some expressive activity that the state impaired through its order that the Jaycees
admit women.447
Second, the Court looked at the degree of this impairment and balanced it
against the state interest behind the intrusion. This was in essence its strict
scrutiny analysis. The Court concluded first that Minnesota's interest "in
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens... plainly serves
compelling interests of the highest order. '448 Second, the law, as applied to
compel admission of women, did not impose "any serious burdens on the male
members' freedom of expressive association."449 The Jaycees could still
continue its creed of promoting the interests of young men and exclude persons
with ideologies different from its existing membership. Thus, the state's
44 5 The Court explained these distinctions:
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 'freedom of
association" in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that
choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secure
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal
liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment--speech,
assembly, petition for redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving
other individual liberties.
Idt at 617-18.
446 The Court found that "the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective"
and that "much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association
involves the participation of strangers to that relationship" Id at 621.
447 Id at 622-23.
448 Id at 623-24. The Court examined the history of the Minnesota law and other civil
rights laws and noted that they protect citizenry from both personal and societal harms:
[Tjhis Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor
under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities. It
thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of
wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life.
Id. at 625. The Court emphasized that these "concerns are strongly implicated vith respect to
gender discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and services." Id.
44 9 Id. at 626.
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requirement that they not exclude women based solely on their sex (as opposed
to their ideology) did not work a substantial intrusion on the Jaycees' expressive
activity and therefore passed constitutional muster4 50
The Court came to the opposite conclusion-that a civil rights law was too
intrusive-in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston.451 There, private organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston
refused to allow a gay and lesbian group (GLIB) to participate in the parade as a
separate marching unit with its own banner. The Massachusetts courts, relying
on a Massachusetts statute that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation,
ordered the sponsors to include GLIB in the parade.4 52 The Supreme Court
reversed.
The Court acknowledged Massachusetts' strong interest in remedying
discrimination but held that interest was not enough.453 Because the formation of
the various parade units, including their banners, were inherently expressive
activity, the forced inclusion of GLIB and its banner would impede the sponsors'
freedom to shape their own expressions4 5 4 Unlike that in Roberts, this
application of a civil rights law substantially intruded on expression. The Court
suggested that the problem was under the first prong of strict scrutiny. The
Massachusetts statute did not announce a purpose to regulate expressive activity,
450 In Hishon v. King & Spalding, the Court conducted virtually the same analysis to
uphold application of Title VII of the federal civil rights laws. 467 U.S. 69, 73-78 (1984). Title
VII bars discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
A female lawyer at an Atlanta law firm sued the firm, charging that the firm failed to promote
her to partner because of her sex. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72. The firm argued that application
of Title VII would infringe upon its partners' constitutional rights of expression and
association. Id. at 78. The Court summarily rejected this argument, noting, as in Roberts, that
application of the statute to force the firm to consider Ms. Hishon for partner on her merits, as
opposed to her sex, would not impede the firm's ability to function as lawyers or to express
ideas:
Although we have recognized that the activities or lawyers may make a 'distinctive
contnbution.., to the ideas and beliefs of our society,' respondent [King & Spalding] has
not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by a requirement
that it consider petitioner [Ms. Hishon] for partnership on her merits.
Id. at 78 (citation omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).
451 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
452 Id. at 561-65.
453 See id. at 571-72.
454 See id. at 572-73 (noting that "every participating unit affects the message conveyed
by the private organizers" and that the Massachusetts order "essentially requir[ed] petitioners to
alter the expressive content of their parade").
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and even if it had, that aim would not be compelling, precisely because it
restricted First Amendment freedoms 455
The Court in these association cases arguably is not applying strict scrutiny.
The Court suggests absolute protection for core First Amendment activity; in
other words, if the law restricts core activity, it does not pass strict scrutiny,
under either prong. 456 If this is true, then the analysis is one of definition and is
not a test of interests, compelling or otherwise. Presumably, under the strict
scrutiny test, some interests are compelling enough to justify intrusion on First
Amendment rights, or, otherwise the analysis is not a test at all. Nevertheless, the
Court is using some sort of test, as opposed to granting absolute protection. The
Court does not absolutely protect even the activity that it claims is at the heart of
the First Amendment. In Roberts, the Court acknowledged that the law interfered
with the Jaycees' expression, but upheld the law because it did not place a
"serious burden" on expression.4 57 If the test were one of absolute protection,
even an insubstantial intrusion on expression could not survive. Thus, the Court's
analysis is in fact a test, though it may not be strict scrutiny in its traditional
formulation.
Applying these principles here, the First Amendment bars use of the civil
rights laws to prevent a plaintiff from filing a winning claim. The ability to file a
winning claim is at the core of the right protected by the Petition Clause, and the
civil rights laws can work a substantial intrusion on that core activity. For
example, under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff arguably cannot file a winning
claim if he has a discriminatory motive4 58 The Act does not just regulate the
manner in which he may file the claim, but it stops the exercise of the right
altogether. To use one of the analogies in Roberts, a law cannot totally bar access
to court based on ill racial motives, just as the state cannot force a person to
choose a marriage partner without consideration of sex, race, or religion. 459
Application of the civil rights laws to bar winning claims does not pass First
Amendment scrutiny, whatever that analysis may be called. If the civil rights
455 The Court also considered whether the statute might be justified by the objective of
achieving a bias-free society and held that this was just a means of limiting speech "in the
service of orthodox expression," which was "a decidedly fatal objective." Id at 578-79.
456 That absolute protection, as opposed to strict scrutiny protection, applies to the content
of speech is the view of Justice Kennedy. See supra note 326.
457 In Roberts, the Court stated that "[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is
not... absolute." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
458 See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
459 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 ("[']he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on
the State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees.").
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statutes, with their aim of achieving a discrimination-free society, do not pass
scrutiny, the other indirect restrictions on court access-the obstruction of justice
statutes, the labor laws, and the antitrust laws-also fail. Indeed, the Court's
holdings in Bill Johnson's Restaurants and Professional Real Estate Investors
certainly suggest that the governmental interests behind the latter two laws are
not compelling enough to justify their impact on court access. The government
cannot use a plaintiff's motive to limit his access to court when he has a winning
claim, no matter how high or noble the governmental aim.
3. Analysis ofMotive Restrictions on Losing Claims
In the foregoing strict scrutiny analysis, I did not address whether the
government may regulate the motive of the plaintiff in filing nonwinning
claims.460 This is the concern of the breathing room doctrine and related rules,
such as the presumption against prior restraints. These doctrines look at whether
a regulation that addresses noncore activity unduly chills the exercise of core
activity protected under the First Amendment. In addition, to the extent that the
R.A.V approach differs from traditional doctrine, this application is where it
would differ. These tests all look to the validity of a restriction on activity that,
under traditional doctrine, is not within the literal First Amendment right Here,
that activity is the filing of losing claims.4 61
a. Breathing Room Balancing Analysis ofMotive Restrictions on
Nonwinning Claims
Both the New York Times breathing room doctrine and the prior restraint rule
look to the impact of punishment of nonprotected speech.462 The Court's two-
tiered merit test in Bill Johnson's Restaurants reflects the concerns of both these
doctrines. 463 The Court did not apply the win-lose test to ongoing suits but
4 60 As noted in Part I, none of the laws is so limited. All potentially apply to penalize
the plaintiff from filing a winning clain This analysis assumes that the statutes and laws are
rewritten or given a narrowing construction by courts to apply only to nonwinning claims.
Without such limitation, the laws would likely fail under the overbreadth doctrine, simply
because of their substantial impact on the filing of a winning claim, see supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
461 The breathing room doctrine also would apply to assess the effect of a motive
restriction on other noncore but related activity, such as the filing of papers other than claims
for relief. I assess this postfiling application of the professional rules of conduct under a
breathing room analysis in Andrews, supra note 11 & Part lI.B3.b.
462 See supra notes 97-100, 346-54 and accompanying text.
463 See supra note 83 (setting forth the Court's two-tiered test).
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instead granted ongoing suits more protection through a lower standard of merit
It held that the NLRB could not enjoin the employer's suit simply because he
had a retaliatory motive if his suit would pass the summary judgment test for
merit (i.e., it presented a genuine issue of fact). Thus, the Court protected suits
from injunction (a reflection of the hostility toward prior restraints) and lowered
the standard by which on-going suits are protected-meritorious as opposed to
winning claims (a reflection of the breathing room doctrine). The Court did not
expressly cite the doctrines and did not elaborate on their application. I consider
them more fully here.
The concept of breathing room is fluid. In Gertz, the Court refused to extend
the protection of the actual malice standard to persons who defamed private
persons, as opposed to public figures.464 The potential for defamation liability
based solely on negligent speech would certainly have a chilling effect on that
speech, but the Court allowed this chilling effect It did so because the speech
was not as important as speech about public figures and because the state interest
in protecting a private person is greater than for the public official4 65 Yet, the
Gertz Court gave some breathing room to such speech, by forbidding the
imposition of presumed or punitive damages. 466
464 See Gertz, 418 U.S 323,334,342 (1974).
46 5 The Gertz Court explained these different interests:
[We have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of
any victim of defamation is self-help--using available opportunities to contradict the lie
or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public
officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
[Public officials and public figures also assume some of the risk of defamation]. No such
assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public
office or assumed an "influential role in ordering society."... Thus, private individuals
are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are
also more deserving of recovery.
For these reasons we conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation
of a private individual.
Id. at 344-46.
46 6 See ia at 349. The Court explained the concern of punitive and presumed damages:
[Vol. 61:665
MOTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON COURTACCESS
The defamation distinctions between public and private speech are likely not
appropriate for judging court access, in part because all civil lawsuits involve
matters of public concern4 67 The Court, however, developed the public-private
distinctions in speech cases by looking at the effect of the law (the "chilling
effect" of a negligence standard and of punitive damages) and at the competing
interests (the greater First Amendment value of public speech and the greater
government interest in compensating private plaintiffs who do not have easy
access to media to otherwise counter defamation). These fundamental factors-
effect of the statute and the relative interests-determine the degree and type of
breathing room necessary to protect the ability to file winning claims.
First, we must examine the effect of the law, and in doing so, draw a
distinction between laws that stop exercise of the right to petition and those that
merely chill or deter that activity. As reflected by the prior restraint rule, if a
statute actually stops the exercise of the core right of petition (the filing of a
winning claim based solely on motive), its effect usually is too great to tolerate,
no matter the government interest. If the statute only chills or deters the filing of
winning claims, the propriety of that effect turns on the relative interests at stake.
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.... The largely
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily
compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. ... More to the point, the States have no
substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of
money damages far in excess of any actual injury.
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom,
but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in
the constitutional command of the First Amendment It is therefore appropriate to require
that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect
the legitimate interest involved.
Id The Court later refined this aspect of breathing room by distinguishing Gertz as involving
speech of public concern, albeit about a private person, and holding that presumed and punitive
damages could be awarded if the speech concerned purely private persons. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Although the Gertz Court
did not limit this aspect of its holding to speech of public concern, the Court in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., allowed states to impose presumed and punitive damages for defamatory
speech about private individuals and about private issues. See id at 761 (in light of the
reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the
state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a
showing of 'actual malice."').
467 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 675-76 (explaining differences between court access
and speech).
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Thus, any injunction barring a plaintiff from filing suit is invalid, at least to the
extent that the court enters the injunction solely because the claim may not win
and because the plaintiff has an ill motive.4 68 An injunction based on the mere
possibility that the claim may lose (if filed) necessarily stops the filing of some
winning claims. It therefore directly infiinges on the core activity protected by
the right to petition courts.
Prefiling certification requirements, such as that in Federal Rule 11, can
produce a similar effect on winning claims. The Court has explained that
preconditions to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms can act as a prior
restraint, just as an injunction might.469 A prefiling certification is a condition to
filing suit. Although it does not require prior state permission, it nevertheless
makes the plaintiff stop and take affirmative action-he must attest to his motive
and to the merits of his claim-before he exercises his right to file suit. The
certification rules thus achieve a special deterrent effect above and beyond that in
a subsequent punishment. In fact, federal rulemakers specifically intended this
added deterrent effect of prefiling certification in Federal Rule 11, which they
describe as a "stop-and-think" standard. 470
The First Amendment likely does not permit the government to condition
access to court on the plaintiff's precertification that he has a winning claim. No
plaintiff or attorney can know that he has a winning claim at the time he files the
suit. Too many unknown factors, including the outcome of discovery, contribute
to the resolution of suit. An honest litigant and ethical lawyer could not make this
certification. Thus, even though a winning claim certification on its face would
468 This is not to say that all injunctions against suits are inappropriate. In fact, the Court
in Bill Johnson's Restaurants stated that the NLRB properly could enter an injunction against
the employer's ongoing state court suit if it lacked merit and was filed for a retaliatory purpose.
See supra note 83. The Court did not attempt to reconcile this ruling with its prior restraint
doctrine. If the right to petition courts is the right as I have defined it-the right only to file the
initial complaint-then an injunction against an ongoing suit is technically not a restraint
against the protected right-the right to file the suit. The more general breathing room doctrine,
however, likely would act as some limitation. Whether, and under what conditions, courts can
properly enter injunctions against the initial filing or later prosecution of a civil suit are
questions beyond the scope of this Article.
469 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (noting that
an "ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public speaking, parades, or
assemblies in 'the archetype of a traditional public forum' is a prior restraint on speech")
(citation omitted).
470 The advisory committee notes to the 1993 revision to Federal Rule 11, for example,
state that "[t]he rule continues to require litigants to 'stop-and-think' before initially making
legal or factual contentions.' FED. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993
amendment.
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bar only those claims outside of the protection of the Petition Clause-
nonwinning claims-its actual effect would be to stop the filing of some winning
claims.
By contrast, a plaintiff can meet a lesser standard of merit certification, such
as that currently in Federal Rule 1 l(b)(2) and (3), that the claim has evidentiary
support and a basis in the law.471 These are ascertainable facts at the time the suit
is filed. It does not require the plaintiff to guess as to the future. To be sure, any
prefiling standard of merit, even one of objective reasonableness, might deter
some plaintiffs from filing a winning suit, but not nearly to the degree of a
winning claim certification, which is a practical impossibility. For these reasons,
the First Amendment allows the government to require plaintiffs to precertify the
merit of their complaints if the merit standard is one of objective reasonableness,
as opposed to winning claims.
Similarly, the First Amendment does not allow the government to force a
plaintiff to precertify his proper motive. A plaintiff of course knows his motive
when he files suit The problem is that, at the point of initial filing, a motive
standard cannot be isolated to apply only to losing claims because a plaintiff
cannot know which claims are winning or losing. By definition, some of the
claims that the plaintiff may file under a reduced merit standard of objective
reasonableness will be winning claims. The plaintiff therefore would have to
certify that he has good motive as to those winning claims, and presumably not
file the claims for which he does not have a good motive. As I discuss above, the
First Amendment does not allow a motive limitation on winning claims. 472 Thus,
all prefiling certification conditions as to motive on meritorious claims are
invalid because such certification would necessarily condition and limit some
winning claims.4 73 In other words, their effect on the core First Amendment right
is too great, regardless of the government interest in requiring certification.
By contrast, subsequent punishment for bad motive does not necessarily
impact the filing of a winning claim. To be sure, such penalties have a chilling
effect Because no one can know whether the suit ultimately will prevail, some
471 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b), reprinted at supra note 152.
472 The restriction does not pass strict scrutiny. See supra Part IV.C.2.
473 The government theoretically could impose a motive certification as to baseless
claims, but this would not make sense. Most systems (properly) bar frivolous claims: A
plaintiff cannot file a baseless complaint, regardless of his motive. Certification as to proper
motive therefore would be irrational because the act itself is prohibited. The government could
choose to ban only those baseless claims that are improperly motivated (and thereby allow
frivolous claims accompanied by a good motive), but such a regulation would be more narrow
than most current standards and would not achieve the aim of filly deterring frivolous
litigation.
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plaintiffs might elect not to file claims that they could win if they know they also
have an "improper" motive. Yet, subsequent punishment does not punish actual
winning claims because by definition, it is assessed only after the plaintiff has
tried and lost his case. Nor does it require the plaintiff to do the impossible. It
does not require him to vouch at the beginning that he has a winning claim, or to
separate those claims that are winning and losing, and certify his motive only as
to the losing claims.
Whether this chilling effect of subsequent punishment is "undue" requires an
examination of the governmental interests and a balancing of those interests
against the particular effect of the punishment. Subtle distinctions in either the
effect or purpose of a statute can change the result. In the final analysis, we must
look at each law and cannot make global conclusions. Nevertheless, in this Part I
illustrate my analysis by drawing a distinction between the two broad categories
of motive restrictions-the direct court access rules and the substantive evil
statutes. As in my discussion of strict scrutiny, I use the civil rights laws as my
example of the latter category and compare them to court rules and statutes
similar to Federal Rule 11 (using only the subsequent punishment aspect of such
rules and not their precertification provisions). I contend that the differences
between these two types of motive restrictions are enough to tip the scale in the
breathing room analysis. The governmental interest in the civil rights laws
outweighs the chilling effect of their subsequent punishment, but the
governmental interest behind Rule 11 provisions does not outweigh the chilling
effect of these rules.
Before I explore the reason for this difference in result, I must note that it
applies only to subsequent punishment of meritorious claims, as opposed to
frivolous claims. The government is free, under either set of laws, to assess
subsequent punishment on baseless claims because the effect on winning claims
is negligible and the governmental interests are strong. Unlike a punishment of
meritorious but losing claims, a penalty assessed only against nonmeritorious
claims will not deter many winning lawsuits. A plaintiff can use objective criteria
to distinguish between baseless and meritorious claims, especially those that are
strong enough to win. Thus, the chilling effect of such a rule is minimal.
Moreover, the government's interest in stopping frivolous claims through its
court access rules, like its interest in curbing racial discrimination, is sufficiently
strong to justify the negligible chilling effect on winning claims.
This balance changes when the law is applied to punish losing but
meritorious claims. Subsequent punishment of meritorious claims, as opposed to
purely frivolous claims, has a greater effect on the filing of winning claims. As I
note above, plaintiffs cannot know if a meritorious claim is winning or not; there
are no objective criteria for making this prediction. This effect, however, is the
same for any motive restriction that applies to meritorious claims, regardless of
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whether the ban is in a court access rule or civil rights law.
The difference in effect derives from the ways in which the two categories of
laws define the improper motive. The civil rights laws narrowly define the
prohibited motive and therefore have only an isolated impact on the filing of
winning claims (only those claims that are filed for the specified discriminatory
motive). The court access rules have a much wider sweep. Rule 11 prohibits all
"improper" motives and thus deters far more claims. Moreover, Rule 11 is vague
in its prohibition. Even if a plaintiff is conscious of his motives (e.g., he bears
great ill will toward and wants to "ruin" the defendant), the plaintiff cannot easily
determine whether he is presenting the complaint for "any improper purpose" in
violation of Rule 11 474 Rule 11 thus has a more chilling effect on the plaintiffs
who want to comply with the law than the civil rights statutes that precisely
define a single motive.475
On the other side of the scale, the government purposes behind the two laws
also differ. As I note above, the primary aim of a court access rule such as Rule
1 l(b)(1) is to deter baseless suits. To be sure, the government has some interest
in stopping general ill motives through its court access rules-the integrity of the
process and attorney professionalism interests that I discuss above in applying
strict scrutiny476-but these interests are secondary to the primary aim of court
access rules, which is to deter frivolous claims. By contrast the government's
primary aim in the substantive evil statutes is to stop acts that are defined by the
ill motives, such as racial discrimination. Those statutes aim to achieve
substantive societal goals, such as the assurance of fair and nondiscriminatory
access to housing, that are above and apart from the integrity and procedural
justifications for court access rules. This is not to say that there is a wide gulf
between the two sets of interests, only that there is some difference.477
These differences in both effect and purpose are enough to tip the scales.
Court rules, such as Rule 11, do not give enough breathing room to the plaintiffs
474 Seesupra Part flI.B.I.b. (discussing the conflicting opinions and ambiguities
regarding the "any improper purpose" standard of Rule I 1(bXl)).
475 Indeed, this is the reason why courts look particularly harshly on vague statutes that
touch upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms-vague statutes have a chilling effect.
See supra notes 102-03.
476 See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
477 Indeed, as to some of the statutes, courts or the legislature may decide that the
govemmental interest is not great enough to justify punishment of losing but meritorious
claims. But this would be a policy choice, not one mandated by the First Amendment. This
policy distinction is reflected in the different outcomes for the labor and antitrust laws in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants and Professional Real Estate Investors. See supra notes 84-86 (arguing




ability to file winning claims and therefore run afoul of the Petition Clause. The
balance is slightly different for the civil rights laws, and they may be applied to
punish plaintiffs for filing losing suits if they acted with the proscribed
discriminatory motive.
We must keep this conclusion in context. The government interest in
stopping racial discrimination or other substantive evils is not compelling
enough, under strict scrutiny, to justify restriction on the plaintiff s ability to file
a winning claim. Nor is such governmental interest sufficient to justify a prefiling
restriction. Congress, for example, cannot expand the Fair Housing Act to
require all citizens to affirmatively precertify to the federal department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that they do not have a discriminatory
aim in filing suit against their neighbor. This requirement, like the
precertification standards of Rule 11, would have too great a chilling effect on
the ability to file a winning claim. For the same reason, HUD could not enjoin a
meritorious suit solely on the basis that the plaintiff filed it for a discriminatory
intent.
Subsequent punishment of losing suits due to their discriminatory motive
presents a different balance. Unlike an injunction or precertification standard, the
subsequent punishment would never apply to a winning claim.478 To be sure,
punishment in any form causes some deterrent effect, but the government's
478 The definition of a 'losing claim," in order to apply this form of subsequent
punishment, is itself problematic. The definition of a losing claim is easy only when the case is
completed after trial, affirmed on appeal, and the party has lost the case in its entirety. The
analytical difficulty of other cases arises in two respects: first, in defining the extent to which
the plaintiff must lose where he has multiple claims, and second, in defining a "loss" in cases
that end in early stages of the proceedings. As to the first, I suggest that the First Amendment
would permit the plaintiffto suffer subsequent damages for the filing and loss of a single claim
(as opposed to his win on other claims in the same complaint), but only to the extent that the
defendant suffers unique harm from the filing of the particular losing claim and can prove the
other elements of the substantive cause of action. As to the second problem of definition, I
contend that any judicial determination of the claim is sufficient to trigger the "win-lose"
distinction. A dismissal of the suit, other than the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of his own suit,
for whatever grounds (including for nonmeritorious reasons), is sufficient to constitute a "loss"
so long as it is not reversed on appeal. The defendant's damages for such an early dismissal
will be appreciably less than for a suit that is prosecuted through jury trial, but if the defendant
suffered harm and can satisfy the other elements of a cause of action, the First Amendment
does not bar his recovery. This leaves the question of the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of his
own suit. I suggest that the plaintiff may be held liable under these circumstances only if the
defendant can prove that the plaintiff would have lost had he pursued his claim (at jury trial or
earlier motion). This procedure would be analogous to that in attorney malpractice claims,
where the plaintiff-client must prove that he would have prevailed on his underlying claim
absent attorney error.
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interest in deterring discrimination is sufficient to offset this lesser chilling effect
In other words, we are willing to tolerate the fact that some plaintiffs may decide
not to file a lawsuit for a discriminatory motive, so long as the laws do not
punish him if he prevails or require him to affirmatively certify his motive before
he tries his case. Thus, the substantive evil statutes such as the civil rights laws,
imposed as subsequent punishment, are the lone form of motive restriction that
survives traditional First Amendment analysis.
b. R.A.V. Strict Scrutiny Analysis ofMotive Restrictions on Nonwinning
Claims
The breathing room analysis of nonwinning claims is the one area in which
the Court's "new" approach in RA. V might make a difference-cases where the
activity at issue falls outside the categorical approach's definition of an
absolutely protected right The difference is in the analysis. 479 PA. V. would
require strict scrutiny, as opposed to the balancing test of the breathing room
doctrine. As we shall see, just what this strict scrutiny requires is open to debate,
but to the extent that there is any difference, the R.A. V strict scrutiny approach is
more demanding. Thus, any potential difference between R.A. V and my
proposed breathing room analysis would arise only with regard to use of the
substantive statutes, such as the civil rights laws, as subsequent punishment. This
is the one application of a motive restriction that I contend survives breathing
room analysis. In all other respects, motive restrictions fail the balancing test and
thus should fail a more strict analysis.
The one thing that is clear about RA.Y is that it requires a very strict
scrutiny of any speech regulation that discriminates by viewpoint. The ordinance
in R.A. V singled out for prohibition only those words that insulted or provoked
violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.480 The Court held
that such viewpoint discrimination was not justified, even among "fighting
words."481 The specific effect of this statute, as opposed to a broader fighting
words statute, was to invoke the viewpoint of the city council: "mTlhe only
interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city
4 79 In the actual case, the difference did not cause a different result as illustrated by the
concurring Justices who used another existing doctrine-overbreadthf--to invalidate the
ordinance. Justice White stated that "[a]Ithough the ordinance reaches conduct that is unprotected,
it also makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and
is protected by the First Amendment. The ordinance is therefore fatally overbroad and invalid on its
face." 505 U.S. at 414 (citation omitted) (White, J., concurring).
480 For the terms of the St. Paul ordinance, see supra note 380.
481 505 U.S. at 391.
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council's special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out. That is
precisely what the First Amendment forbids. '482 Thus, although the city's
interest in presenting racial or other discrimination was itself "compelling," its
interest in imposing the city's viewpoint on race was not.4 83 The law did not pass
strict scrutiny.
The Court thus suggested that viewpoint regulation is never permissible
under strict scrutiny. A critical question is whether motive is the same as (or
close enough to) viewpoint regulation. The two types of laws have similarities.
Regulation of racial motives in litigation, to prohibit racially motivated lawsuits,
necessarily reflects governmental preferences about how a plaintiff should think
and feel about race. Motive restrictions tend to reflect community preferences
rather than the neutrality inherent in the First Amendent 4 84 Indeed, in R.A. V,
the Court used motive terminology in describing the effect of the ordinance as
barring bias-motivated speech.485
If motive restraints are considered the equivalent of a viewpoint regulation,
they fail strict scrutiny for the same reason that the ordinance failed in R-A. V.
They would fail because their special effect would be to limit the motive
(viewpoint) of the plaintiff to that condoned by the government. That aim would
not be compelling even though the broader aim of preventing racial, religious, or
sex discrimination is compelling. Such a linking of motive and viewpoint
regulation under R.A. V would mean that baseless suits could not be regulated by
motive. Just as the city of St. Paul could not ban fighting words-speech not
usually afforded any protection-based on racial hatred, it could not single out
frivolous suits filed for racial hatred for special punishment If motive restrictions
fail under this reasoning, they fail because they are viewpoint discrimination, not
because of the value of the underlying claim, whether winning, frivolous, or
somewhere in between.
I do not think that R.A.JV mandates this result. First, of course, RA. V
involved speech and not court access. Even in the speech context however,
motive is not the same as viewpoint. A comparison of hypothetical laws
482 Id. at 396.
483 The Court held that the government's asserted interest in enacting the ordinance was
compelling--"to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in peace
where they wish" Id. at 395. Although the ordinance seemingly achieved that end, the Court
held that because the city council could have achieved the end through other more benign
means, such as through a prohibition on all fighting words, it failed strict scrutiny. See id at
395-96.
4 84 See supra notes 414-17 and accompanying text.
4 85 See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
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regulating speech illustrates this difference-first, a law that outlaws speech
motivated by racial hatred, regardless of its actual content, and second, a law that
regulates speech that reflects or incites racial hatred. The first is a motive
restriction. The second regulates viewpoint. It controls the content of the speech
and it achieves the (improper) government aim of controlling the type of speech
that enters the marketplace of ideas. It is a more effective control of the debate of
ideas, and is therefore more offensive to First Amendment principles than the
motive restriction.
Motive is also different from belief. It is one thing to say that a person
generally is a racial bigot than it is to say that he acted with regard to a particular
person because of his racial hatred. A restriction based on the first sense of the
word, the plaintiff's general belief system, seemingly would be more offensive to
First Amendment principles than the second. Government has more interest in
regulating motive in the second sense because it creates a higher risk of harm and
more particularized damage to a particular person4 86 The Court in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell suggested this when it distinguished the case where government sought
to punish a defendant for his "abstract beliefs" '487 from the Wisconsin statute
which addressed the particular harms caused by racially-inspired conduct4 88
Three (admittedly) extreme variations on court restrictions illustrate these
distinctions as applied to civil complaints. First, a belief regulation might bar
persons with certain feelings about race from using the courts, no matter how
meritorious the complaint. Second, a viewpoint regulation might bar a plaintiff
from bringing a legal challenge to a government affirmative action program,
4 86 See Tribe, supra note 34.4
487 508 U.S. 476, 486 (1993). The Court stated that where evidence admitted by a
sentencing judge "proved nothing more than [the defendant's] abstract beliefs, ... its
admission violated the defendant's First Amendment rights.' Id.. "[Albstract beliefs, however
obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration... .; Id. at 485 (citations
omitted).
488The Court stated:
[Tjhe Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because
this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harr For
example,... bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes,
inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. The
State's desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for
its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with
offenders' beliefs or biases.
Id at 487-88 (citations omitted).
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regardless of the legal merit of the claim.489 Third, a motive restriction might bar
a plaintiff from filing any suit for a racially discriminatory purpose, regardless of
the merit of his claims. The first statute would fail First Amendment scrutiny
because it addresses only belief, not any particular harm resulting from that
belief, and it stops a white bigot from suing a white person for reasons unrelated
to race. It infringes on the person's freedom to think and believe as he wishes,
irrespective of any harm that his belief might cause. The second statute is
offensive to First Amendment principles because it suppresses ideas and
challenges to government action. The third statute, the motive restriction, is not
as offensive. It does not bar all bigots from going to court, but instead only those
who are actually suing because of their racial haired. Nor does it suppress all
ideas and challenges to government. So long as the plaintiff possesses the
requisite good intentions as to his challenge to the affirmative action program, he
can present the challenge. The public has at least a chance that the merits of the
challenge will be presented and publicly aired. This is not to say that motive
restrictions are permissible, only that they are not as offensive to First
Amendment values as a belief or viewpoint regulation.
RA. V may simply mean that courts must scrutinize all regulation of speech,
and that viewpoint discrimination is particularly suspect because it has a highly
adverse effect on First Amendment principles.490 As in Roberts and Hurley, the
test is likely the degree of intrusion. 491 In other words, the St. Paul ordinance in
R.A. V was invalid because it worked a substantial intrusion on the core First
Amendment right to shape one's own expression. If this is the case, the
government is likely free to regulate frivolous claims by motive (i.e., ban only
those claims that lack both legal or factual merit and are filed for an improper
motive). Frivolous lawsuits serve no societal good, and they are particularly
offensive if filed for an insidious motive. Thus, the governmental interest in
restricting baseless claims is compelling, and the First Amendment effect of a
motive restriction is less intrusive than a viewpoint regulation.
But does a motive restriction on a meritorious (but losing) claim survive
489 The government sought to protect itself from challenge in In re Wlorkers'
Compensation Refund, 46 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1995). There, Minnesota attempted to deter
challenges to its new worker's compensation statute by making any plaintiff bear the state's
costs in defending such challenges, win or lose. See id at 821. The Eighth Circuit invalidated
the provision as an infringement on the right to petition courts. See id. at 822.
490 To some extent this reading is borne out by Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at (1993),
where the Court permitted use of racial motive as factor in enhancing the punishment for other
crimes, even though the punishment had some effect on speech. As the Court noted in
application of the overbreadth doctrine, the predicted effect on speech was "attenuated" and
"unlikely." Id at 488.
49 1 See supra notes 443-59 and accompanying text.
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such scrutiny? This case falls somewhere between my prior two applications of
strict scrutiny. It is less likely to pass strict scrutiny than the immediately
preceding example of motive regulation of baseless claims. The government
does not have as strong an interest in restricting meritorious claims, and
meritorious claims have greater First Amendment value than frivolous suits. On
the other hand, a motive restriction on meritorious (but losing) claims is more
likely to survive strict scrutiny than a motive restriction on winning claims. To
use Roberts and Hurley terminology, a restriction on meritorious but losing
claims intrudes less on First Amendment interests than a restraint on winning
claims.492 Whether this lesser intrusion is permissible likely depends on the
relative governmental interest at stake. The governmental interest behind civil
rights laws are likely sufficiently compelling to justify this lesser intrusion.
In sum, R-A. V does not change the result If the governmental interest is
great (such as to prevent discrimination) and the effect on core activity is not
substantial, a restriction might survive R.A. V strict scrutiny. Under this view,
losing claims are still within the protection of the First Amendment, but the
analysis recognizes that losing claims have less First Amendment value than
winning claims (just as clubs such as the Jaycees have less First Amendment
value than more intimate associations such as marriage). Some laws that intrude
upon the filing of losing but meritorious claims may not pass strict scrutiny-
such as the court access rules, where the government has only a secondary
interest in regulating motive beyond the primary interest in regulating frivolous
claims. Thus, I have come full circle and reach the same result as under the
breathing room doctrine.493 The substantive statutes, such as the civil rights laws,
are likely the lone form of motive restriction that, in some applications (against
losing claims), survive First Amendment analysis, whether under the breathing
room or RA. V "strict scrutiny" analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the right to petition courts is a new and untested right, we now
know something more about that right. It means that plaintiffs may come to court
and pursue winning claims, regardless of their personal motives. In the preceding
Part, I set out a general analysis and applied broad principles to categories of
motive restrictions. In conclusion, I note some specific faults of particular types
of statutes and suggest general cures. However, proper analysis requires an even
more detailed evaluation of each law, according to its individual aim and
4 92 See supra notes 443-59.
4 93 See supra Part IV.C3.a.
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effect.4 94 Here, I provide only a starting point for that careful examination.
A. Federal Rule 11(b) and Its State Counterparts
Federal Rule 11(b)(1), and the many other rules based upon it violate the
First Amendment. They do not pass strict scrutiny to the extent that they penalize
a plaintiff for filing a winning claim. They do not give sufficient breathing room
to the extent that they require a plaintiff to precertify that he has a proper purpose
in filing a losing but nonfrivolous claim.495 Moreover, they are vague in that they
proscri'be "any improper purpose." Although they reach some activity not
protected by the First Amendment, such as the filing of motions4 96 they
substantially burden First Amendment activity and are thus overbroad. Federal
Rule 11 and its state counterparts are invalid on their face.497
The improper purpose clause of these rules must be eliminated in its entirety
4941 have attempted to provide this more detailed analysis of the professional rules of
conduct in Andrews, supra note 11. That each form of law needs individual analysis is
illustrated by two unique features of the professional rules: that they bar only lawyer's
assistance, not the client's literal court access, and that they may regulate lawyer motive as well
as client motive. These features require refinement of the general analysis I propose here.
495 In Part IV.C.3.a, I argued that rules cannot require a plaintiff to precertify that he has a
winning claim. Rule 11 does not impose such a standard. Indeed, it requires in paragraph (b)(2)
and (b)(3) that the plaintiff certify only as to a minimal amount of factual and legal basis for his
claim. See FED. R Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). This gives the plaintiff sufficient breathing room.
Other academic commentators argue that Rule 11 may run afoul of the First Amendment
because it applies a negligence standard (the reasonable inquiry test) to this merit certification,
rather than the New York unes actual malice standard. See supra note 4 (collecting academic
commentary). Although that question is beyond the scope of this Article, I addressed the issue
briefly in my previous article. See Andrews, supra note 5, at 683-85.
496 Because motions are part of the procedure that follows the filing of a claim, their
regulation is subject to the reasonableness standards of due process, and not heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment. Whether due process would permit a motive limitation on
the filing of motions is beyond the scope of this Article. Likewise, I do not address the
propriety of rules that set motive limitations on other civil papers, such as discovery. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2)(B) (providing that a person filing a discovery request, response, or
objection certify that the paper was "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigatiof). All such rules,
however, arguably implicate First Amendment breathing room analysis, to the extent that a ban
on filing subsequent litigation papers might chill exercise of the right to file the pretrial claim. I
look at this issue and its relation to the professional rules of conduct in my previous article. See
Andrews, supra note 11, Part l.C.3.
497 For this reason, a judicial limitation on the rule, such as that applied by the Ninth
Circuit in Townsend, see supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text, would not cure the First
Amendment problem with Rule 11.
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or substantially rewritten. The rules may use motive as a means of limiting
frivolous claims, such that a claim is barred only if the plaintiff files it for an
improper purpose and the claim lacks factual and legal merit, but this use of
motive would substantially narrow the effect and aim of the rles. 98 In other
words, the rules would bar only those frivolous claims that are also filed for a
bad motive and would not reach frivolous claims filed for good intentions. To
remain consistent with the intent of the federal rulemakers-to bar frivolous
suits-motive should not limit the penalties for frivolous suits, but instead
enhance the penalty for other violations. 499
B. State Statutory Efforts to Cure Litigation Abuse
I cannot list and describe all of the state sanction statutes, let alone their
specific faults. However, to the extent that the statutes closely mirror the
certification provisions of Federal Rule 1l(b)(1), such as the Georgia anti-
SLAPP statute,50 0 they have the same defects. A few additional examples
illustrate other possible defects and cures. For instance, the Alabama Litigation
Accountability Act refers to improper purpose in defining pleadings that are
prohibited as "without substantial justification."50 1 Alabama can cure its statute
by simply deleting this reference. Likewise, Arizona can cure its statute by
deleting as one basis for assessing double damages, the bringing of claims solely
or primarily for delay or harassment.50 2
The California Vexatious Litigant statute503 raises unique concerns because
it can act as a prior restraint on access to court. The general problem of the
statute's allowance of prior restraints is beyond the scope of this Article, but to
the extent that the court relies on motive to curb access, it is invalid. California
lawmakers must either drop motive as a condition on the ability to go to court, or
at least tie motive to an additional finding that the claim is frivolous. This may
not cure all of the problems of such a prior restraint, but it will cure those arising
from use of a motive standard.
4 98 See supra note 473.
499 Federal Rule 11 already allows a court to consider the litigant's state of mind when
assessing sanctions. See supra note 178-79 and accompanying text.
5 00 See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
501 See ALA. CODE §12-19-271(1) (1995); see also supra notes 215-16 and
accompanying text.
502 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
503 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
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C. The Inherent Power of the Court
This doctrine needs only clarification to conform to the First Amendment
Even as the inherent power doctrine now stands, it runs afoul of the Petition
Clause only in its most extreme application. Most courts do not now interpret
this doctrine to reach meritorious civil claims and instead require both bad faith
and objectively unreasonable conduct before they will impose sanctions. 5°4 This
needs to become the uniform practice.
D. The Tort ofAbuse ofProcess
The tort of abuse of process likewise needs only a judicial clarification to
avoid problems under the Petition Clause. Most courts already narrowly interpret
the tort so that it does not apply to the filing of meritorious suits.505 So long as all
courts similarly read the tort, assessment of damages against the plaintiff for
abuse of process will comport with the First Amendment.
E. Regulation ofLaisyers
The appropriate fix to the disciplinary regulation of lawyers depends on the
particular rule employed by the state or federal court.506 For example, if the rule
currently in effect is Model Rule 3.1, only a minor correction is likely necessary:
Delete the suggestion in the comments that the rule bars meritorious but
improperly motivated complaints. 50 7 Absent this confusing comment, the black
letter rule, which uses a "frivolous" standard, is sufficiently narrow. The systems
that use the former Code provision, based on Model Code DR 7-101(A)(1), 5°8
can adopt Model Rule 3.1 (without the offending comment), or otherwise rewrite
their rule so that they eliminate the current harassment-malicious injury standard.
The federal vexatious lawyer statute should require only judicial restraint
and clarification in order to conform to the Petition Clause. The statute as written
applies only to "unreasonable" activity. Courts need to interpret this language so
that section 1927 does not apply to a lawyer who files an objectively reasonable
504 See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
505 See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
5061 discuss in more detail the appropriate reform of the professional rules of conduct in
Andrews, supra note I1, at Part IV.
507 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. However, a clarifying sentence would
better alleviate the confusion caused by the near 20-year presence of this sentence.
508 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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lawsuit.509 With this judicial restriction, the statute can stand as written.
Although the statute presents a close question, on balance its terms are not so
overbroad or vague that it is invalid on its face.
F. The Indirect Controls on Court Access.
The various antitrust, labor, obstruction of government, and civil rights
statutes (as well as the interference torts) violate the First Amendment to the
extent that they are applied to penalize the filing of winning lawsuits. All that is
required to cure the current problem with these laws is judicial limitation, not
legislative revision. The laws primarily reach other activity, and are not so
overbroad or vague that they are invalid on their face. Indeed, the Court already
has cured the problem in the federal antitrust and labor laws through judicial
limitation in Professional Real Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's
Restaurants.510 To the extent that these statutes authorize injunctive authority,
the courts need to limit that power, at least as in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, to
claims that lack merit.511 However, unlike the court access rules, these
"substantive evil" statutes may apply to assess subsequent punishment against
plaintiffs who file losing but meritorious claims. Whether the courts, Congress,
or the state legislatures want to further limit application of the laws so that they
do not penalize a losing but meritorious claim, as the Court did in Professional
Real Estate Investors, is a policy judgment, not a First Amendment question.
G. Summary
In future articles, I will explore other rules or governmental actions that
might run afoul of the Petition Clause, but these foregoing motive restrictions
are likely the most pervasive form of law that violates the right to petition
courts. This is the logical reading of Bill Johnson's Restaurants and
Professional Real Estate Investors, but the conclusion also follows from
independent strict scrutiny and breathing room analysis. The only way in which
the government may use motive to punish resort to courts is through laws, such
5 09 Federal lawmakers may want to punish lawyers who personally have this ill motive
(as opposed to the client having such a motive). I discuss the general propriety of such a limit
on a lawyer's motives in Andrews, supra note 11, at Part mB.2.
510 See supra notes 49-51, 55-58. Some courts and commentators already have taken on
this task with regard to other laws. See United States v. Robinson, 3 Fair Housing & Fair
Lending Cases 15-979 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 1995), discussed supra note 86; see also supra notes
59-63 and accompanying text.
5 11 Seesupra notes 83 and accompanying text, 463 and accompanying text
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as the civil rights statutes, which aim to deter substantive evils other than
litigation abuse. Even in this case, punishment is permissible only after the
plaintiff has lost the underlying suit. A plaintiff's motive is never a permissible
basis on which to punish his filing of a winning suit or to bar his initial access
to file a meritorious claim. In sum, except in very narrow circumstances,
motive is an improper basis on which to limit the fundamental First
Amendment right of a person to "petition the government for redress of
grievances."
